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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Godfrey, Jenna Lynn. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2010.  Re-Implementing 
Assertive Community Treatment: One Agency’s Challenge of Meeting State Standards.  
Major Professor: Gary Bond, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) is a widely implemented evidence-based 
practice for consumers with severe mental illness.  However, fidelity to the model is 
variable and program drift, in which programs decrease in fidelity over time, can occur.  
Given substantial variability in fidelity and program drift in evidence-based practices, a 
study to examine how to re-implement ACT to high fidelity on established teams was 
warranted.  The present study examined three teams providing moderate fidelity services 
prior to a state-wide policy change to the definition of ACT.  Two of the teams attempted 
to implement ACT in accordance with state standards, while the third team served as a 
quasi-control for factors related to other state policy changes, such as a change to the 
funding mechanism.  The implementation effort was examined using qualitative and 
quantitative measures over a 14-month period at a large, psychosocial rehabilitation 
center.  Themes that were common across all three teams included the perceived negative 
impact of fee-for-service, ambiguity of stipulations and lack of guidance from the 
Department of Mental Health (DMH), difficulties with the managed care organization, 
xv 
 
 
importance of leadership within the agency, and familiarity with the services.  Perceived 
barriers specific to the implementation of ACT standards included DMH stipulations, 
staff turnover, lack of resources, and implementation overload, i.e., too many changes at 
once.  One team also had the significant barrier of a misalignment of requirements 
between two funding sources.  Staff attitudes represented both a facilitator and a barrier 
to ACT implementation, while management being supportive of ACT was viewed as a 
major facilitator.  One of the two teams seeking ACT status was rated at high fidelity 
within 6 months and maintained high fidelity throughout the study.  The other team 
seeking ACT status never achieved high fidelity and decertified from ACT status after 6 
months.  The agency’s focus on productivity standards during the implementation effort 
hampered fidelity on the two teams seeking ACT status and greatly contributed to 
burnout on all three teams.  The team achieving ACT status overcame the barriers in the 
short-term; however, DMH requirements may have threatened the long-term 
sustainability of ACT at the agency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The term severe mental illness (SMI) is applied to disorders that are characterized 
by diagnosis, disability, and duration (Schinnar, Rothbard, Kanter, & Jung, 1990).  Most 
people with SMI have a diagnosis that falls under the schizophrenia spectrum or bipolar 
disorder.  The disability criterion stipulates the individual must experience substantial 
impairment in functioning such as in work, social, or self-care.  Finally, the individual 
must have received intensive psychiatric treatment for a significant length of time.  
Together, these three conditions determine whether the individual is said to be suffering 
from a SMI.  Once the illness is classified, a key issue is how to effectively treat those 
who are severely impacted by mental illness.   
In 1998, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation enlisted a panel of experts to 
identify evidence-based practices (EBPs), or interventions strongly supported by research 
that are shown to improve client outcomes (Drake & Goldman, 2003), to serve the SMI 
population.  The panel identified five psychosocial EBPs and one that focused on 
prescribing practices that were considered to promote recovery and psychiatric 
rehabilitation outcomes for individuals with SMI, e.g., employment, community 
integration, independent living, illness management, and social integration.  The five 
psychosocial treatments included assertive community treatment (Stein and Test 1980), 
family psychoeducation (Dixon et al., 2001), supported employment (Bond, Becker et al., 
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2001), illness management and recovery (Mueser et al., 2002), and integrated dual 
disorder treatment (IDDT) for substance abuse and mental illness (Torrey et al., 2002).  
Of the psychosocial practices, assertive community treatment, family psychoeducation, 
and supported employed were supported by randomized control studies at the time of the 
panel.  The other two interventions, illness management and recovery and IDDT, were 
more general constructs for which evidence had been accumulating (Mueser, Torrey, 
Lynde, Singer, & Drake, 2003).   
While effective interventions have been identified, research has shown that the 
majority of individuals with SMI do not receive EBPs at community mental health 
centers (CMHCs) (Lehman & Steinwachs, 1998a; McCracken & Corrigan, 2004).  In 
fact, it is estimated that 95% of individuals with SMI receive either no care, inadequate 
care, or minimally adequate care, leaving only 5% who receive evidence-based care 
(Drake & Essock, 2009; Lehman & Steinwachs, 1998a; New Freedom Commission on 
Mental Health, 2003; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999; Wang, 
Demler, & Kessler, 2002).  In response to these findings EBP dissemination efforts have  
occurred nationwide and public health authorities have recently allocated over $2 billion 
to assist with the dissemination of EBPs (McHugh & Barlow, 2010).  Studies have also 
begun to examine the strategies and barriers to EBP implementation to provide assistance 
to practitioners and mental health agencies in order to bridge the gap between science and 
practice in CMHCs.   
The National EBP Implementation Project examined implementation efforts for 
the five psychosocial EBPs in eight states (Mueser et al., 2003).  The states of Indiana 
and New York elected to implement assertive community treatment (ACT), which is a 
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team-based intensive case-management approach that has been shown to be particularly 
effective for treating those individuals who are the highest users of services (Bond, 
Drake, Mueser, & Latimer, 2001; Essock, Frisman, & Kontos, 1998; Latimer, 1999, 
2005; Mueser et al., 2003; Rosenheck & Neale, 1998; Rosenheck, Neale, Leaf, Mistein, 
& Frisman, 1995).  However, in order to obtain similar outcomes across teams, the 
primary principles of ACT services must be standardized.  Despite research showing that 
the principles of ACT are widely known (McGrew & Bond, 1995) and the availability of 
a detailed toolkit to assist with implementation (Phillips & Burns, 2002), not all ACT 
services are implemented according to the original conception of the model (Bond, 1991; 
Test, 1992).  Therefore, one key indicator of implementation success is fidelity to the 
model, which refers to degree of adherence to the standards and principles of the model 
(Bond, Evans, Salyers, Williams, & Kim, 2000).   
Variations in fidelity may occur for many reasons, including staff members’ 
regression to providing the more familiar services that were previously offered (Bond, 
1991).  ACT teams in Illinois illustrate how initial implementation of a service can 
decrease in fidelity over time.  When the state of Illinois switched from managed care to 
fee-for-service they underwent a critical evaluation of their current mental health 
services.  Previous research indicated that high fidelity ACT teams were once present in 
Illinois (Bond & Salyers, 2004).  However, the statewide assessment concluded that ACT 
teams throughout the state were not currently practicing high fidelity services (DMH, 
2006).  The discovery that ACT was no longer properly implemented in Illinois (i.e., not 
high fidelity) led to an initiative to redefine mental health services, including ACT 
services, within the state (DMH, 2006).  While other states, such as Indiana, implemented 
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ACT services to replace ineffective brokered case management, Illinois attempted to 
replace ACT-like services with high fidelity ACT by strengthening the state standards for 
ACT services.  Given the tendency of fidelity to decrease over time (i.e., “program 
drift”), a study to address implementation of higher fidelity services from existing lower 
fidelity services was warranted.  Additionally, the impact of state-specific changes to the 
definition of ACT services is an important topic as the ACT model continues to be 
implemented throughout the nation. 
The current study provides a mixed-method examination of the facilitators and 
barriers to implementing higher fidelity ACT using a large psychosocial rehabilitation 
center in Illinois as a case study.  Facilitators and barriers are activities that encourage 
and inhibit implementation, respectively, and both can result from actions of the provider 
agency, the state mental health authority, clinicians, and/or other stakeholders.  The 
introduction first provides a description of ACT services, including the principles of the 
ACT model, a discussion on the efficacy and cost-effectiveness, the role and importance 
of fidelity, and the national dissemination of ACT.  Next is a discussion on previous 
implementation research, followed by a description of the policy changes that occurred in 
the state of Illinois.  Lastly, the introduction addresses the rationale for the study and 
design and presents the study hypotheses. 
 
 
ACT was developed in the 1970s in Madison, Wisconsin under the original name 
Training in Community Living (Stein & Test, 1980).  The model arose from the need to 
better serve consumers who were caught in the “revolving-door” syndrome in which 
Assertive Community Treatment 
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repeat hospitalization was common following deinstitutionalization (Tibbo, Joffe, Chue, 
Metelitsa, & Wright, 2001).  The movement toward community-based treatment rather 
than institutionalization brought with it many providers and services that were often 
physically separate and under different administrations (Test, 1979).  This disconnect 
between the services made attaining adequate care in all relevant realms difficult for 
individuals with mental illness, thus contributing to repeat hospitalization.  It has long 
been acknowledged that continuity of care is crucial for effective community-based 
treatment in the SMI population (Test, 1979; Turner & TenHoor, 1978), yet this was not 
being provided.   
Stein and Test designed a service delivery model in which a multidisciplinary 
team of professionals provided continuity of care by addressing all the services the 
consumer requires, 24 hours a day, seven days a week (Phillips et al., 2001) with the aim 
of preventing unnecessary and lengthy hospitalizations and improving community tenure 
(Tibbo et al., 2001).  The resulting ACT model, also known as the Program of Assertive 
Community Treatment (PACT), is characterized by intensive services that include but are 
not limited to a comprehensive team approach with shared caseloads and frequent staff 
meetings, low staff-consumer ratios (generally 1:10), intensive community-based services 
with assertive outreach, 24-hour availability, a psychiatrist team member to ensure 
medication management and continuity between community and hospital care, and 
individualized services tailored toward consumers’ strengths and deficits (Ben-Porath, 
Peterson, & Piskur, 2004; Bond, Drake et al., 2001; Phillips et al., 2001; Stein & Test, 
1980).  Rather than brokering services, the treatment, including support and rehabilitation 
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services are provided directly by the ACT team in a community-based setting (Stein & 
Test, 1980).   
The ACT approach to providing services assumes if appropriate, individualized 
treatment is planned during daily team meetings, staff members can respond flexibly to 
variations in consumer needs and potential crises that would normally lead to 
hospitalization can be averted or handled within the community setting (Latimer, 2005; 
Tibbo, Chue, & Wright, 1999; Tibbo et al., 2001).  The rationale for the ACT model is 
that by concentrating intensive services on high-risk individuals, continuity and 
coordination of care will be enhanced, resulting in an improvement in both quality of care 
and cost-effectiveness (Lehman et al., 1999).  Because this intensive level of services 
provided by a multidisciplinary team is expensive, ACT is most appropriate and cost 
effective for individuals who experience severe symptoms, have the greatest level of 
functional impairment, and are high users of hospital services (Bond, Drake et al., 2001; 
Essock et al., 1998; Latimer, 1999, 2005; Mueser et al., 2003; Rosenheck & Neale, 1998; 
Rosenheck et al., 1995). 
 
 
 
Efficacy and Cost-effectiveness of ACT 
 
 
Efficacy of ACT 
 
ACT has been extensively researched in the 30 years since its development with 
over 25 randomized control studies demonstrating its efficacy and validating its label as 
an EBP for treating individuals with SMI (Bond, Drake et al., 2001; Drake et al., 2001; 
Latimer, 1999; Lehman & Steinwachs, 1998a; Mueser, Bond, Drake, & Resnick, 1998; 
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Phillips et al., 2001).  Specifically, research has shown that ACT is effective at improving 
various outcomes, including enhancing independent living and maintenance of stable 
housing, increasing compliance with appointments and engagement in treatment, 
improving quality of life, increasing consumer and family member satisfaction and 
decreasing psychiatric symptom severity.  However, the ACT model's most robust impact 
is in reducing hospitalizations (Ben-Porath et al., 2004; Bond, Drake et al., 2001; Bond & 
McDonel, 1991; Bond, McGrew, & Fekete, 1995; Burns & Santos, 1995; Herdelin & 
Scott, 1999; McGrew, Bond, Dietzen, McKasson, & Miller, 1995; Mueser et al., 1998; 
Phillips et al., 2001; Rosenheck & Dennis, 2001; Stein & Test, 1980).  A meta-analysis of 
44 studies revealed ACT reduces the number of admissions and proportion of consumers 
hospitalized while these outcomes tend to increase in non-ACT case management 
programs.  Additionally, while both ACT and standard case management showed a 
reduction in average number of days hospitalized, ACT was found to be significantly 
more effective (Ziguras & Stuart, 2000).   
 
 
Cost-effectiveness of ACT 
  The ability of ACT to reduce costly inpatient treatment, suggests the possibility 
that ACT may “pay for itself” in many cases (Latimer, 1999, 2005).  A case example of 
cost-effectiveness is demonstrated by Bond and colleagues’ (1988) controlled study in 
which 167 consumers at risk for rehospitalization were randomly assigned to ACT or a 
control group, which consisted of treatment as usual, in three CMHCs in Indiana.  One of 
the CMHCs experienced poor implementation of ACT, but even with this factored in, the 
consumers receiving ACT were rehospitalized an average of 9.2 days over six months, 
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which was significantly less than the 30.8 days for the control group.  The CMHC that 
was most cost-effective had estimated savings of $5,500 for each ACT client over the 
six-month period (Bond, Miller, Krumwied, & Ward, 1988). 
Another example is provided by Lehman and colleagues (1999) who assessed the 
cost-effectiveness of ACT in homeless persons with SMI.  In their study, 152 homeless 
consumers were randomly assigned to either ACT or usual services.  Those receiving 
ACT spent 31% more days in stable housing compared to those in usual services.  
Additionally, the consumers receiving ACT had significantly lower costs associated with 
mental health inpatient days and mental health emergency room care, but significantly 
higher costs for mental health outpatient visits and substance abuse treatment.  For each 
day of stable housing, the ACT consumers incurred $242 in direct treatment costs while 
the cost per day for usual care consumers was $415, leading to an efficiency ratio of 0.58 
in favor of ACT (Lehman et al., 1999).  In Lehman’s study of homeless individuals with 
SMI the higher use of outpatient treatment by consumers receiving ACT was more than 
offset by the high cost of inpatient treatment by the consumers receiving usual care. 
However, other studies have shown that increases in outpatient costs associated 
with ACT can counteract the savings obtained from reduced inpatient hospitalization 
leading to overall cost neutrality but better consumer outcomes (Weisbrod, Test, & Stein, 
1980; Wolff, Helminiak, & Diamond, 1995).  Whether ACT currently is and remains 
cost-effective is a function not only of the service itself but also of each team’s admission 
and discharge criteria (King, 2006).  Additionally, how effective ACT is in relation to 
other treatments depends on what constitutes ‘usual care’, which is likely to continue to 
change over time (Fiander, Burns, McHugo, & Drake, 2003).  Because of the success and 
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popularity of ACT services, many usual care services have incorporated ACT principles 
(McHugo et al., 1998), which greatly benefits consumers but also contributes to reduced 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of ACT in comparison to standard care.  While ACT 
has been extensively studied in the past, the ever changing environment and the high cost 
of ACT relative to other services underscores the importance of continually monitoring 
its effectiveness (King, 2006).  In a narrative analytic review, King (2006) found 
evidence that ACT will either be cost neutral or more costly than usual care unless the 
alternative requires lengthy inpatient hospital stays.  A separate systematic review found 
intensive case management such as ACT works best at reducing hospital use when use is 
high but is less effective when hospital use is already low (Burns et al., 2007).  Because 
most standard care today relies less on lengthy inpatient admissions, King argues the days 
of ACT being cost-effective may be over (King, 2006). 
 In addition to the changing service environment and improved standard care, 
another factor that may increase cost-effectiveness is the extent to which the agency 
provides ACT services only to those consumers who are most likely to benefit.  ACT is 
most beneficial to a subgroup of consumers who have the most need, such as those with 
SMI who have a recent history of frequent or long-term hospitalizations or those who 
require daily assistance to live in the community due to extremely impaired psychosocial 
functioning (Rosenheck et al., 1995).  Therefore, the reduced cost-effectiveness may 
result from improper admission to the ACT program.  One implementation study found 
some of the ACT teams went against the intent of the ACT model by enrolling consumers 
who were already well integrated into their existing mental health services in order to 
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reach goals of rapid enrollment and low dropout rates (Moser, DeLuca, Bond, & Rollins, 
2004).   
In summary, the issue of whether ACT is more efficacious and cost-effective than 
standard care largely depends on the characteristics of the services provided as well as the 
consumers receiving the services.  ACT was designed to contain certain key elements 
(e.g., 1:10 staff to client ratio) and was intended to be used on and is most cost-effective 
with consumers with the highest levels of inpatient service use.  However, while ACT 
was originally conceptualized to be required by consumers for life (Rosenheck et al., 
1995), it is becoming increasingly evident that consumers can make gains in their ability 
to live independently and can be successfully transferred to less intensive services 
without causing harm (Salyers, Masterton, Fekete, Picone, & Bond, 1998).  Therefore, 
ACT may not be cost-effective for all consumers at all times of their lives.  When 
agencies implement ACT and other EBPs it is important to follow the model as it was 
intended to be used, which includes incorporating the key components as well as serving 
the appropriate type of consumer for whom the service has been proven to be effective.   
Fidelity to the ACT model will help ensure the service is provided as it was 
intended on the appropriate consumers, which in turn is hypothesized to enhance efficacy 
and cost-effectiveness.  In order for newly implemented ACT services to replicate the 
outcomes found in the literature, the ACT team must have fidelity to the model. 
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While there is a specific model to guide ACT services that is well articulated and 
understood (McGrew & Bond, 1995) not all teams are equivalent in their fidelity to the 
standards and principles of the model (Bond, 1991; Siskind & Wiley-Exley, 2009; Test, 
1992).  There are several reasons why teams would differ in their fidelity to the ACT 
model.  For instance, local conditions often influence the program design (e.g., rural 
teams and state standards) and adaptations by CMHCs to internal and external conditions 
can significantly impact fidelity to implementation (Aarons, Wells, Zagursky, Fettes, & 
Palinkas, 2009; Bachrach, 1988; Siskind & Wiley-Exley, 2009).  Additionally, variations 
in fidelity may occur when the model is not well understood by the team members, when 
the training is inadequate, or when staff members regress to the more familiar services 
previously provided (Bond, 1991).  Moreover, according to ACT case managers, some of 
the critical ingredients such as presence of a full-time substance abuse specialist, a 
psychiatrist’s involvement on the team, the team being involved with hospital discharge, 
and working with a consumer support system are consistently under-implemented 
(McGrew, Pescosolido, & Wright, 2003).  Therefore, merely labeling the services as 
ACT does not indicate the team is following all the ACT principles as envisioned by the 
model developers (Test, 1992).  Research has shown high fidelity implementation of 
EBPs is more likely to occur when the implementers are provided with significant 
resources in the form of funding and technical assistance (Fagan & Mihalic, 2003).  In 
many settings resources, such as the availability of trainings, are low and as a result 
adaptation of the model (i.e., lower fidelity) is more likely to occur (Ringwalt et al., 
2003). 
ACT Fidelity 
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The variation in implementation of ACT led to the recognition of the need for, 
and the subsequent development of, practice manuals (Allness & Knoedler, 1998, 2003; 
Stein & Santos, 1998), videotapes (Harron, Burns, & Swartz, 1993), and the realization 
that quantitative monitoring of program fidelity is central for quality assurance (Torrey, 
Finnerty, Evans, & Wyzik, 2003) as well as for adequate interpretation of outcome 
findings (Teague, Bond, & Drake, 1998).  The Dartmouth Assertive Community 
Treatment Fidelity Scale (DACTS; Teague, Bond, Drake, 1998) was developed to 
discriminate well-implemented ACT programs from other types of case management 
services and to assess fidelity to the ACT model in order to provide a useful tool for 
training and self-evaluation within programs.  Support for assessing fidelity comes from 
research findings that teams with higher ACT fidelity are generally more effective at 
reducing hospital admissions (Bond & Salyers, 2004; Latimer, 1999; McGrew, Bond, 
Dietzen, & Salyers, 1994; McHugo, Drake, Teague, & Xie, 1999).  In fact, fidelity can 
account for better consumer outcomes in other EBPs as well.  In supported employment it 
is estimated that 20 to 60% of the variance in program outcomes can be accounted for by 
program fidelity (Drake, Bond, & Rapp, 2006).  Therefore, agencies striving to 
implement EBPs, such as ACT, should measure their fidelity to the model and make 
changes to their practices accordingly.  Because fidelity instruments identify and measure 
adherence to the critical ingredients of the EBP, these instruments can be used to provide 
clear standards, monitor the program over time, improve services, and assess the 
relationship between adherence and outcomes (Bond et al., 2000).  The development of a 
measure to monitor adherence to the ACT model has helped make the monitoring of 
large-scale implementation possible.    
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Knowledge of the ability of ACT to improve consumer outcomes has spread 
throughout the United States and the world, resulting in wide-spread dissemination of the 
model as well as close variations labeled under different terms such as continuous 
treatment teams and the Thresholds Bridge program in Chicago (McDonel et al., 1997).  
Dissemination involves strategic efforts to get the knowledge and information about an 
innovation such as ACT out to individuals, organizations, and communities in an effort to 
create change (Backer, 1991; Rogers, 1995).  A published research article can be 
considered a dissemination effort.  Once the information of an innovation is known, the 
recipient of this knowledge makes the decision whether to implement the innovation into 
their practices.  Dissemination is the efforts taken to spread knowledge while 
implementation is the process of applying strategies to adopt this knowledge into 
everyday practice (Grimshaw et al., 2005).  Therefore, while several studies use the terms 
‘dissemination’ and ‘implementation’ interchangeably, these are two distinct concepts.   
Dissemination of ACT 
Previous research has shown dissemination does not always lead to 
implementation.  One of the most common reasons for failure of past dissemination 
efforts is the erroneous assumption that getting out information is enough to create 
change (Backer, 2000; Fixsen, Naoom, Blase, Friedman, & Wallace, 2005).  It has been 
established that passive diffusion in which the health care providers are expected to read 
about and adopt effective interventions on their own (Shojania & Grimshaw, 2005) as 
well as merely disseminating practice guidelines (Grimshaw et al., 2005) are not effective 
strategies for implementation.  For instance, a study examining the implementation of 
family psychoeducation found clinicians and administrators rank empirical findings in the 
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literature of the effectiveness of the intervention as the lowest in terms of factors that help 
implementation (McFarlane, McNary, Dixon, Hornby, & Cimett, 2001).  Once the 
information is disseminated the stakeholders must first make the decision to adopt the 
practice and then must carry out actions to assist with the implementation efforts.  
Therefore, while it is important to establish the effectiveness of an intervention and 
publish the findings, this strategy alone is generally not sufficient to influence 
implementation efforts.  However, if guidelines are disseminated accompanied by 
strategies to overcome possible implementation barriers, adherence to the intervention 
model can be improved (Grol, 2001). 
There have been several key dissemination efforts for ACT that contributed to 
wide-spread implementation of the service.  First, the published data highlighting the 
impact on reducing costly rehospitalizations, is appealing to state mental health planners 
(Bond & Salyers, 2004) and therefore ACT has been incorporated into several statewide 
mental health initiatives.  Second, in 1996, the National Alliance on Mental Illness 
(NAMI) established initiatives and began campaigning for the formation of ACT teams.   
NAMI set a goal of the availability of ACT services in all 50 states by 2002 (Flynn, 
1998).  Support for ACT and other EBPs has also come from various agencies such as the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services (SAMHSA), the National Institute of 
Mental Health (NIMH), and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality as well as 
organizations such as the National Association of State Mental Health Program Managers 
(NASMHPD) and foundations such as the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the 
MacArthur Foundation (Goldman et al., 2001).  President Clinton then advanced the 
wide-spread adoption of ACT by instructing the Health Care Financing Administration to 
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authorize ACT as a Medicaid-reimbursable service (News & Notes, 1999).  
Dissemination and implementation were further supported by strong recommendations in 
the Surgeon General’s Report (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999), 
by expert consensus panels in the Schizophrenia Patient Outcomes Research Team 
guidelines (Lehman & Steinwachs, 1998b), and at the 1998 Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation sponsored conference where ACT was identified as an EBP for individuals 
with SMI (Mueser et al., 2003).   
Finally, to facilitate the implementation and maintenance of EBPs, such as ACT, 
SAMHSA sponsored the development of program-specific toolkits for the National EBP 
Implementation Project in 1999 (Drake et al., 2001; Mueser et al., 2003).  Each of the 
five psychosocial EBP toolkits was developed by a team consisting of various 
stakeholders (researchers, clinicians, program managers and administrators, consumers, 
and family members) and includes engagement material and information for each type of 
stakeholder, educational and training materials (e.g., instructional videotapes, practitioner 
workbooks, and research articles), implementation recommendations, and fidelity scales 
to assist with the monitoring of implementation (Drake et al., 2001; Mueser et al., 2003).  
The second phase of the National EBP Implementation Project began in 2002 and used 
these toolkits along with consultation and direct face-to-face trainings to study facilitating 
conditions and strategies as well as barriers which influence EBP implementation in 
CMHCs.  Eight states agreed to implement at least two of the five psychosocial EBPs in 
at least two sites for each EBP.  A total of 53 sites across eight states participated in data 
collection that continued through 2004 (Drake et al., 2001; Mueser et al., 2003).  The 
results of this study are described in subsequent sections. 
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Among the SAMHSA-identified EBPs for individuals with SMI, ACT continues 
to receive much attention with wide-spread implementation in CMHCs throughout the 
country.  A 1996 survey reported on the existence of 396 ACT teams in 34 states, of 
which, 11 of these states are able to provide ACT in 50% or more of their service areas 
(Meisler, Blankertz, Santos, & McKay, 1997).  However, while ACT has been widely 
implemented, how to best implement the intervention is not well understood (Moser et 
al., 2004).  The ACT model has an advantage over many mental health models (Brekke, 
1988) in that the critical ingredients were well defined by the model developers (Stein & 
Test, 1980) and these components are generally well understood by program leaders 
throughout the United States (McGrew & Bond, 1995); however, fidelity to the original 
program model is still variable (Bond, 1991; Salyers et al., 2003; Test, 1992).  
Consequently, the ACT model provides an excellent case example of difficulties in 
achieving successful implementation of a model that has been shown to be effective.  The 
present study determines the strategies and barriers to implementing a state-wide policy 
change to the definition of high fidelity ACT services in a large community mental health 
agency. 
Implementation Studies 
Implementation is a complex process with several components that could 
influence the success at every stage of the process including what factors determined the 
decision to implement (e.g., was the decision shared by all stakeholders or was it 
ordered?) (Panzano et al., 2005).  Therefore, there are aspects that could influence 
implementation success that occur well before the formal act of adopting the innovation 
begins.  Additionally, research has shown that perceptions of the importance and of the 
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ability to change both facilitators and barriers varies considerably across stake-holders 
(Aarons et al., 2009).  Moreover, implementation is being studied in various realms with 
researchers examining different components that they feel should influence the process.  
The wide variation in implementation studies makes the task of connecting the 
knowledge from these studies arduous.  There is much to learn regarding implementing 
EBPs, such as ACT, as this knowledge is in its infancy.   
  The National Institute of Mental Health funded several demonstration projects to 
attempt to replicate effective model programs through its Community Support Program 
(Turner & TenHoor, 1978).  However, it was erroneously assumed that CMHCs would be 
able to effectively adopt a new practice if they were provided with a written description 
of the practice, funding to hire new staff, and minimal initial training.  The results of 
these projects were variable as many programs were poorly implemented or not 
implemented at all (Backer, 2005; Bond, Drake, McHugo, Rapp, & Whitley, 2009).  
These early implementation studies demonstrate the need to measure and monitor 
program fidelity to ensure the program is being properly implemented.  Many 
demonstrations that were able to achieve initial success in implementing the model had 
poorer fidelity in the long-term (i.e., program drift) (Bond, 1991; McGrew et al., 1994), 
presumably due to financing regulations, organizational relationships, and data systems 
not in place to sustain the EBP (Drake et al., 2001).  Assessing fidelity represents a 
strategy for continuous quality improvement to inform and sustain the practice and avoid 
program drift (Bond et al., 2009; R. McHugh, Murray, & Barlow, 2009).  Additionally, 
some level of pre-existing structure and support is likely integral for successful 
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implementation of EBPs as these are complex, multi-faceted interventions (Torrey et al., 
2001).  
 
 
Based on previous implementation studies of EBPs, Figure 1 outlines the 
theoretical framework for factors that are expected to influence implementation success 
(i.e., fidelity) in the present study, which includes leadership, staffing/staff attitudes, 
training/consultation, turnover, agency culture, performance monitoring, and Illinois 
Department of Mental Health (DMH) policies.  It is acknowledged that other aspects such 
as complexity of the model have also been shown to influence implementation of EBPs, 
such as IDDT (Bond et al., 2009; McHugo et al., 2007; Moser et al., 2004).  However, 
with the large variation in EBP models and the diverse experiences of the 53 sites 
represented in the National EBP Implementation Project, it is difficult to arrive at a single 
list of factors across all EBPs that account for high fidelity (Bond et al., 2009).  The 
factors expected to influence ACT implementation in particular are examined and 
discussed in the literature review to follow. 
Factors Predicted to Influence Implementation 
 
 
 Leadership is important to assess when studying an organization as it helps to 
shape perceptions of staff, responses to organizational change, and has been found to be 
related to mental health providers’ attitudes toward the adoption of EBPs (Aarons, 2006).  
Consequently, the presence or absence of effective leadership, particularly support from 
upper management, has been found to have a substantial impact on implementation 
Leadership 
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success across EBPs (Bond et al., 2009; Mancini et al., 2009; McDonel et al., 1997; 
Panzano et al., 2005; Rapp et al., 2008).  In a study of ACT implementation, leadership 
was found to underlie all the identified organizational facilitators and barriers, including 
staffing and change culture (Mancini et al., 2009).   
When evaluating the role of leadership, it is important to distinguish between 
leadership from within the team, i.e., Team Leader or emergent leadership from other 
team members, and leadership from management outside of the team.  Both levels of 
leadership can impact the outcome of implementation.  For example, in the National EBP 
Implementation Project, poor leadership from administrators created significant problems 
for ACT implementation across teams in two states that included a failure to understand 
the program model, an excessive focus on productivity standards, poor selection and 
management of Team Leaders and staff, and reluctance to dedicate necessary resources 
(Mancini et al., 2009).  Earlier analyses from one of these states found administrative 
policies regarding unreasonable productivity standards were particularly significant in 
inhibiting the development of the ACT teams (Moser et al., 2004).  Productivity 
standards, or requiring clinicians to amass a certain number of billable hours, make the 
start-up of a new program difficult as there is considerable time needed for training and 
mastering the techniques of a new practice (Moser et al., 2004).  Conversely, effective 
administrative leaders were found to promote implementation by having a clear 
understanding of the model, communicating this understanding to staff, hiring staff with 
appropriate credentials to meet program standards, allocating sufficient resources 
including allotting time for trainings without focusing only on productivity standards, and 
monitoring the team performance and fiscal viability (Mancini et al., 2009).   
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While having effective upper management leaders clearly has benefits to the 
success of implementation, the success of the team is also influenced by the leadership 
style of the team leader.  Mancini and colleagues (2009) found a strong team leader was 
often able to serve as a buffer between the team and less effective leadership from 
administrators by advocating for the team, thereby promoting effective team functioning.  
Effective team leaders tended to have a thorough understanding of the ACT model, 
managed team dynamics, held staff accountable for their actions, and promoted morale.  
Ineffective team leaders generally did not empower staff, did not organize activities 
effectively or manage workload equitably, and often did not address personnel problems 
on the team.  Poor leadership from team leaders was found to create several problems to 
successful ACT implementation, such as providing lower intensity services than the 
model requires, causing disorder within the organization, and contributing to lower staff 
morale (Mancini et al., 2009).  Therefore, in order to assess the role of leadership in the 
implementation process, all levels of leadership within the organization should be 
considered.   
 
As previously mentioned, effective leadership can impact whether appropriate 
staffing occurs.  Appropriate staffing includes hiring individuals who have the necessary 
skills, as well as attitudes that are supportive of the EBP philosophy.  Choosing the 
appropriate staff, who not only have the skills required for the EBP but also have a 
compatible treatment philosophy and are accepting of treatment derived from research, 
has been found to be instrumental to successful implementation of EBPs (Aarons, 2004; 
Staffing/Staff Attitudes 
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Aarons & Palinkas, 2007; Mancini et al., 2009; Moser et al., 2004; Nelson & Steele, 
2007; Rapp et al., 2008).  In the National EBP Implementation Project, Rapp and 
colleagues found that the three main barriers to the implementation of SE and IDDT in 
Kansas were deficits in skills of supervisors, resistance to change by practitioners, and 
failure of other agency personnel to satisfy new responsibilities (Rapp et al., 2008).  
Similarly, when analyzing all the SE sites in the National EBP Implementation Project, 
Bond and colleagues identified staff resistance to SE as a major barrier to implementation 
(Bond, McHugo, Becker, Rapp, & Whitley, 2008).  In a study of family psychoeducation 
implementation in Maine and Illinois, successful implementation was more likely to 
occur at sites where staff viewed the model more positively and were interested in 
receiving supervision and consultation on the model.  Implementation in this study was 
also influenced by whether upper management addressed both real and perceived 
resource limitations (McFarlane et al., 2001).  With ACT implementation specifically, 
lower performing teams were found to have less skillful staff who tended to have more 
negative attitudes toward the implementation process (Mancini et al., 2009).   
 
Once appropriate staff are chosen, the next step to successful implementation is to 
provide adequate training and consultation to these individuals.  Research has found that 
both training and consultation are important across EBP implementation (Backer, 2005; 
Panzano et al., 2005; Rapp et al., 2008) as well as with ACT implementation specifically 
(Mancini et al., 2009; McDonel et al., 1997; Moser et al., 2004).  One project found that a 
two-day workshop on ACT was not sufficient for promoting high fidelity to the model 
Training/Consultation 
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(McDonel et al., 1997).  Several studies have found that having access to a technical 
assistance center or outside consultant promoted successful implementation (Mancini et 
al., 2009; McFarlane et al., 2001; McGrew et al., 1995; Moser et al., 2004; Panzano et al., 
2005).  McGrew and colleagues (1995) concluded that the key component to the 
successful implementation of ACT at six sites in Indiana was the presence of an outside, 
clinically experienced consultant who was in frequent contact with each team and made 
on-site visits for assessment and training.  According to one study, the most effective 
consultant-trainers to ACT teams were individuals who were viewed as experts, who 
advocated on behalf of the team, and who had an approachable personality (Mancini et 
al., 2009).  In ACT teams in which there was a poor relationship with the consultant-
trainer, the consultation was not only ineffective but also appeared to have negative 
effects.  A particularly problematic relationship occurred when an experienced team 
leader was paired with a less inexperienced consultant-trainer (Mancini et al., 2009).   
  
Staff turnover can occur due to several factors including inappropriate selection of 
staff (e.g., clinician treatment philosophy does not match the treatment philosophy), 
inadequate training leading to poor performance, or staff burnout.  Turnover can hamper 
implementation efforts as the replacement staff are not always provided with the initial 
trainings (Bond et al., 2009; Mancini et al., 2009).  A study of IDDT implementation 
found a drop in fidelity was often observed when turnover occurred; conversely training 
was important to sustaining fidelity during times of staffing instability (Woltmann & 
Whitley, 2007).  In eight Californian sites implementing IDDT, turnover not only slowed 
Staff Turnover 
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progress but resulted in complete failure at one site due to the newly hired administrator 
being uninterested in the project (Chandler, 2009b).  Similarly, studies of ACT 
implementation found turnover created challenges for achieving high fidelity (Mancini et 
al., 2009; McDonel et al., 1997) with lower fidelity teams demonstrating substantially 
higher rates of staff turnover (Mancini et al., 2009; Rollins, Salyers, Tsai, & Lydick, 
2009).  Therefore, when implementing an EBP, special attention should be paid to how 
turnover is handled when it occurs.   
 
In order for change to occur the environment or the agency culture must be 
supportive of that change.  The leadership of upper management and Team Leaders as 
well as the attitudes toward change and EBPs of the staff will impact whether the culture 
is viewed as one in which it is acceptable for change to occur (Mancini et al., 2009).  One 
study found that the perceived openness of the clinical setting’s culture to allow EBP use 
influenced whether EBPs were in fact utilized (Nelson & Steele, 2007).  Another study 
found successful EBP implementation was related to extent to which the agency 
displayed a learning culture that was accepting of change (Panzano et al., 2005).  With 
regards to ACT, many of the sites involved in the National EBP Implementation Project 
appeared reluctant to adapt their previous services to the ACT model.  Mancini and 
colleagues (2009) conclude this lack of change culture was primarily influenced by the 
priorities of those in leadership roles. 
Culture Supportive of Change 
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A review of EBP implementation research also identified performance assessment 
and monitoring as a key component to successful implementation (Backer, 2005).  
Fidelity monitoring provides a means of accountability and creates a frame of reference 
for planning the implementation effort (Bond et al., 2000).  Panzano and colleagues 
(2005) found that the variable most related with positive implementation outcomes was 
the extent to which the agency monitored their performance during the implementation 
process.  Similarly, Bond and colleagues found frequent assessment of fidelity to be a key 
element to the implementation model of the five psychosocial EBPs in the National EBP 
Implementation Project.  Specifically, whether the sites used the fidelity reports to 
improve their practice was found to influence level of fidelity to the EBP (Bond et al., 
2009).  Additionally, those sites with committed leadership were also more likely to use 
feedback from performance monitoring and to make the necessary structural changes to 
the team (e.g., prescribing team meetings on a regular basis) in order to achieve high 
fidelity (Bond et al., 2009).  Separate analyses of the IDDT and SE sites in Kansas also 
concluded measuring fidelity was a useful strategy for achieving high fidelity in these 
specific EBPs (Rapp et al., 2008).   
Performance Monitoring 
Monitoring fidelity was also found to be related with achievement of high fidelity 
in the 13 ACT sites that participated in the National EBP Implementation Project.  
However, an interesting finding emerged between the two states that implemented ACT 
(Mancini et al., 2009).  Fidelity elements were incorporated into certification standards in 
one state, but licensing staff were only required to use a checklist approach to assess 
compliance.  Additionally, these state standards were less stringent than the DACTS 
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fidelity items from which they were based.  A more detailed fidelity assessment and 
feedback on adherence was completed by a technical assistance center that was 
independent of the state.  The other state in the study used a more comprehensive 
approach to monitoring fidelity, which included administering the entire DACTS 
instrument.  This more detailed approach was seen as burdensome by providers and 
auditors and in some cases undermined team morale as the state and local mental health 
authorities placed extensive and at times duplicate requirements on teams (Mancini et al., 
2009).  Therefore, while the close monitoring of fidelity ensured that the teams did not 
diverge significantly from the model, the manner in which fidelity monitoring was 
completed and the time commitments this placed on the teams also had an impact on 
implementation (Mancini et al., 2009). 
 
In the analyses of the National EBP Implementation Project state factors such as 
funding were found to influence fidelity across the five EBPs (Bond et al., 2009; Rapp et 
al., 2005).  For instance, funding cuts and lack of Medicaid reimbursement served as 
major barriers to achieving high fidelity in the sites implementing SE in the National EBP 
Implementation Project (Bond et al., 2008) and in a separate study examining IDDT 
implementation in California (Chandler, 2009a).  Moreover, a study of family 
pscyhoeducation found uncertainty of reimbursement and financing for the agency as a 
whole were identified as perceived obstacles to implementation (McFarlane et al., 2001).  
With regards to ACT, the state mental health authority (SMHA) in Indiana facilitated 
implementation through the establishment of standards, the formation of a technical 
State Mental Health Authority Policies 
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assistance center to aid in implementation efforts, and through adequate funding (Moser 
et al., 2004).  Therefore, the SMHA can either serve as a facilitator or a barrier depending 
on its actions and support of the EBP.   
In summary, several EBP implementation studies across various states have found 
the following variables are related to whether implementation is facilitated or inhibited: 
leadership, staffing and staff attitudes toward EBPs, training and consultation, turnover, 
agency culture, monitoring implementation/measuring fidelity, and state requirements 
and policies.  States and agencies should consider these factors when planning policy 
changes and implementation of an EBP.   
However, these themes, such as leadership, are so generic and can have multiple 
meanings that they are often not very helpful.  Studies need to examine what aspect of 
these factors accounts for success or failure of the implementation.  For instance, what 
about leadership and leadership on what level (e.g., upper management, supervisor, etc.) 
influence outcome?  Additionally, the current implementation literature focuses on the 
implementation of services that are novel for the mental health center.  With the variation 
in implementation success (i.e., inability of some agencies to implement with high 
fidelity) and the occurrence of program drift, research should also examine how to 
improve upon existing services by moving toward higher fidelity.  With regards to ACT 
services, the state of Illinois provided a case example of a state-wide decision to redefine 
services and tie funding to fidelity in an effort to provide higher fidelity ACT to 
consumers. 
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In 2006 the state of Illinois underwent a System Restructuring Initiative (SRI) 
lead by a statewide advisory task group that was consumer-chaired and included 
consumers, providers, trade associations, advocates, and state representatives.  SRI work 
groups were developed to review three mental health service areas: services provided, 
financial aspects, and access and eligibility.  The services work group found the current 
service definitions did not fully promote recovery/resiliency and determined the Medicaid 
State Plan should be updated (DHS, 2007).  In agreement with the definitions provided in 
the literature (Strauss, Hafez, Lieberman, & Harding, 1985), the SRI defined recovery as 
a “non-linear process based on continual growth, occasional setbacks, and learning from 
experience.”  Resilience was defined by the SRI as “the ability to harness inner strengths 
and rebound from setbacks or challenges” (DHS, 2007).  The work group also recognized 
that what constitutes recovery is unique for each individual and therefore the recovery 
process must be self-directed by the individual (DHS, 2007).  The rationale for changes 
to the existing services was that “recovery and resilience” should be “the goal of services 
in a transformed mental health system” (DHS, 2007). 
Policy Changes in Illinois 
In addition to recommending a change to the nature of services (i.e., recovery-
focused), the state assessed the type of services being provided to consumers.  In 2006, 
the Department of Mental Health (DMH) along with program consultants from Parker 
Dennison and Associates conducted statewide assessments of ACT teams in Illinois.  At 
the time of the 2006 assessment, Thresholds, a large psychosocial rehabilitation agency in 
Chicago, was the largest provider of ACT services in the state with 14 ACT teams and 
approximately 750 consumers enrolled in ACT (DMH, 2006).  The review by Parker 
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Dennison and Associates and DMH used the draft ACT service definition fidelity tool 
and concluded, “Thresholds was not providing ACT consistent with the evidence based 
practice” (DMH, 2006, pp.1).  The 14 ACT teams were found to differ in their 
congruence with the ACT model but none were deemed to meet fidelity requirements.  In 
2006 Thresholds also conducted four internal fidelity assessments using the Dartmouth 
ACT Fidelity Scale (DACTS).  The ACT team titled Bridge West received a total 
DACTS score of 3.51, Bridge South scored 3.75, Bridge Southwest scored 3.69, and 
Bridge Deaf South received a total score of 3.31.  A DACTS total score of 4.0 or greater 
is considered high fidelity while scores between 3.0 and 4.0 indicate moderate fidelity 
(McHugo et al., 2007).  Therefore, all four teams that were assessed internally by 
Thresholds were providing services that would not be classified as high fidelity according 
to the DACTS.  As a result of the DMH findings, the SRI recommended changes to ACT 
and other examined services in order to improve fidelity and enhance recovery.   
Service priorities, as well as new or expanded services, were established for 
Community Support Programs (individual, group, team, residential), Psychosocial 
Rehabilitation, and ACT (DHS, 2007).  Changes to Community Support Teams and ACT 
are relevant to the proposed study and therefore will be covered in detail. 
 
Community Support Teams 
 Community Support (CS) services are designed to meet various types of treatment 
support needs for consumers including educational, residential, co-occurring disorders, 
social, vocational, mental health, and financial (DHS, 2007).  The goals of CS services 
are to provide interventions and activities targeted toward building the consumer’s 
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capacity to achieve their self identified recovery goals, developing their ability to manage 
symptoms, and to promote stability and independence (DHS, 2007).  These goals are to 
be accomplished through active participation in shared decision-making as well as 
education, training, and assistance in developing the consumer’s strengths, resources, and 
choices (DHS, 2007).   
There are four options for CS services: individual, group, team, and residential.  
Individual, group, and residential CS services are provided solely by case managers, 
while community support teams (CST) are similar to ACT teams in that services are 
delivered by a team of providers.  The CST teams are available to serve individuals with 
moderate to severe mental illness who need more intense, coordinated care than what 
case management or the other CS services can provide.  Therefore, CST teams can serve 
as a step-down from the more intensive ACT services or a step-up from case management 
or other CS services depending on the consumer’s functioning.  Additionally, the state 
permits CST services to be intensified (i.e., more frequent visits) in times of temporary 
increased need.   
 
ACT Services 
There are three principles that drove the change to the definition of ACT services 
in the state of Illinois.  First, the DMH chose to embrace the belief in recovery driven 
services.  Historically, ACT has been criticized for being overly paternalistic and 
coercive (Spindle & Nugent, 2000).  The new definition for ACT services in Illinois calls 
for the services to be a participatory process with shared decision-making between the 
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consumer and provider rather than directed by the service provider in order to embrace 
the concept of recovery (DHS, 2007).   
Secondly, because there are limited ACT resources, the state officials assert these 
resources need to be focused on individuals with the most acute needs.  Therefore, the 
creation of admission criteria is necessary to ensure that the limited resources are 
reserved for those who would benefit the most from the service for the appropriate length 
of time (DHS, 2007).  The screening instrument selected to determine eligibility for ACT 
services is called the Level of Care Utilization System for Psychiatric and Addiction 
Services (LOCUS; American Association of Community Psychiatrists, 2000).  All 
consumers served by the ACT team are to score above the cutoff of 4 on this instrument, 
indicating a greater severity of symptoms.  In contrast, while the CST teams were 
conceived to serve consumers with moderate symptomatology, the CST teams may also 
serve those who would qualify for ACT services (DHS, 2007).  
The third principle driving changes to services in Illinois was the need to be 
compliant with Medicaid’s expectation that ACT services be comprehensive (DHS, 
2007).  The new definition of services requires the ACT team have the capacity to 
respond to emergencies 24 hours a day, seven days a week and provide all of the services 
and supports (including peer support) needed by the consumer (DHS, 2007).  A new 
billing system establishing a fee-for-service funding mechanism was initiated to be more 
consistent with billing and reimbursement from Medicaid. 
The differences between CST teams and ACT teams under Rule 132 are displayed 
in Table 1.  As shown in the table, the ACT team not only requires the hiring of a greater 
number of staff but also stipulates staff must specialize in certain roles (e.g., substance 
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abuse and vocational specialist).  The ACT team must also employ a “person in 
recovery” commonly known as a peer specialist, which is a staff member who is also a 
consumer (i.e., individual with a mental health diagnosis).  Additionally, the Team 
Leader must be a licensed clinician on the ACT teams.  Agencies can bill $83.60 per hour 
of CST compared to $122.80 per hour of ACT for services provided in the consumer’s 
home (Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, 2007).   
The state standards for ACT and other services are encompassed in a document 
entitled Rule 132, which also outlined the fee-for-service funding mechanism.  While 
what constitutes the ACT model was defined by the original developers (Stein & Test, 
1980), ACT services can have slight variations from state to state.  Agencies often strive 
to incorporate all of the elements outlined by the model developers as these elements are 
what have been shown to be effective.  However, in reality in which time and resources 
are limited, the elements required by the state for funding are given the most priority.  
Table 2 displays the discrepancies between Rule 132 and the DACTS.  For instance, the 
Team Leader is required to be a licensed clinician under Rule 132, but the qualifications 
of the Team Leader are not stipulated in the DACTS.  This Rule 132 requirement of 
licensure proved to be problematic for the agency for several reasons that will be 
discussed later.   
 
 In 1978, Thresholds designed the Bridge Program based on the Madison ACT 
model but with key adaptations that were created in response to a variety of perceived 
needs and through different funding mechanisms (Bond et al., 1989; McGrew et al., 
History of ACT Services at Thresholds 
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1994).  The history of ACT and the Bridge program at Thresholds has been complex due 
to changes in the conceptualization over the 30 year history and the influence of funding 
sources, such as grant stipulations, shaping the organization of the teams.  The Bridge 
programs included a generalist staff team approach (rather than a multidisciplinary team 
approach characteristic of the Madison ACT model), group living arrangements in two 
programs, a no-close policy, and contact with consumers exclusively in the field 
(Witheridge & Dincin, 1985).  The Bridge adopted a program philosophy that consumers 
should be chosen solely on the basis of their high utilization of psychiatric hospitals, 
emergency services, and other crisis services (Bond et al., 1995; Bond et al., 1989; 
McGrew et al., 1994; Witheridge & Dincin, 1985).  Originally the Bridge began as a 
small NIMH-funded demonstration project on the North Side of Chicago serving 50 
consumers (Bond et al., 1989; Witheridge & Dincin, 1985; Witheridge, Dincin, & 
Appleby, 1982) but the success at reducing hospital use led to the expansion of the 
program throughout the agency and the city (Bond et al., 1995; Witheridge & Dincin, 
1985).   
Beginning in 1986, the Thresholds Bridge model of ACT served as a model for 
ACT replications in large cities in other states (Bond et al., 1990).  In 1994 Illinois 
underwent a state-wide initiative to develop ACT programs throughout the state based on 
the success of the Thresholds Bridge approach.  Thresholds and other agencies were 
enabled to develop a 6-person ACT team, which substance abuse and housing services, 
serving a caseload of 50 consumers (Bond, Salyers, & Fekete, 1996).  However, only 
about half of the ACT teams implemented in 1994-1996 were at high fidelity when an 
evaluation was conducted (Bond & Salyers, 2004).   
33 
 
 
According to the Clinical Director at Thresholds, the Bridge program had grown 
to 14 teams by 2007.  The 2006 Review of impact of proposed ACT/CST definitions/rates 
at Thresholds DMH report indicated program drift had occurred, i.e., that some of the 
ACT policies were no longer practiced to high fidelity.  For instance, the 2006 DMH 
report found a substantial amount of contact was occurring at the facility rather than in-
vivo.  Additionally, the Bridge teams were not rated as high fidelity ACT in 2006 due to 
a difference in conceptualization of the models that resulted in some of the elements not 
being implemented (e.g., generalist rather than multidisciplinary team approach 
influenced the staff positions/roles on the team).  Therefore, immediately prior to the SRI, 
Thresholds had 14 Bridge teams, which were moderate fidelity ACT teams, to serve 
consumers with SMI.  With the new state defined conceptualization of ACT and tie to 
state funding, Thresholds realized the need to implement and maintain higher fidelity 
teams.   
 
ACT has been widely disseminated throughout the United States.  However, not 
all sites that implement the practice reach high fidelity (Bond, 1991; Test, 1992).  A 
survey of 303 ACT programs from 34 states found considerable variation from the model 
in terms of program size, staff to client ratio, staff composition, team approach to clients, 
hours of operation, and intended length of treatment (Deci, Santos, Hiott, Schoenwald, & 
al., 1995).  Additionally, program drift in which fidelity scores decrease over time can 
occur with ACT teams (Bond, 1991; McGrew et al., 1994).  With differential fidelity 
levels represented in ACT teams throughout the nation, it is important to document how 
Rationale for the Present Study 
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the change to higher fidelity can be accomplished on existing teams.  Previous ACT 
implementation studies examined strategies and barriers to initiating an ACT program.  
The present study examined the factors that influenced implementation of high fidelity 
ACT from existing ACT-like services.   
Additionally, the majority of previous research has examined an external 
purveyor model to implementation rather than an internal model.  A purveyor is an 
individual or group of individuals who represent a practice and who actively work to 
implement that practice with high fidelity and good effect (Fixsen et al., 2005).  The 
purveyor can be internal or external to the agency.  The strengths of an external purveyor, 
such as a technical assistance center, are that experts in the practice or model are 
integrated into the implementation efforts.  These experts are likely to have trainings and 
fidelity measures specifically for the particular EBP and to have experience with 
implementation in various agencies. This knowledge can be used to develop different 
implementation approaches required across agency types, and their ongoing research (i.e., 
fidelity monitoring) can quickly inform their implementation approaches (Brekke et al., 
2009).  The strengths of an internal purveyor are that the purveyor is able to quickly 
intervene and provide consistent, real-time, hands-on training, fidelity assessment, and 
trainings as needed.  Internal purveyors are also better able to develop implementation 
practice skills that are specifically tailored to the agency context and will allow the 
agency to feel ownership over the implementation process (Brekke et al., 2009). 
While both purveyor models have clear strengths, the prevailing model for studies 
of implementation has been the use of an external specialist purveyor model (Brekke et 
al., 2009).  Because in the natural environment many agencies do not have access to an 
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external purveyor such as a technical assistance center, it is important to study how 
implementation occurs with an internal purveyor model.  Moreover, implementation 
studies of evidence-based interventions have largely been uncontrolled (Backer, 2005). 
    
The purpose of this study was to develop a theory of the variables that facilitate 
and inhibit a team from transitioning from moderate fidelity to high fidelity ACT 
services.   
Purpose of the Study 
 
1. What facilitators and barriers influence the process of implementing high fidelity 
ACT services from existing ACT-like services?  
Research Question 
 
A Priori Predictions 
Based on previous research it was hypothesized that leadership, staff attitudes, 
training, staff turnover, agency culture supportive of ACT, monitoring progress (e.g., 
fidelity assessment), and policy/funding would be identified as factors that influence re-
implementation of ACT at Thresholds.  
 
1. The two teams chosen to implement ACT were predicted to have higher ACT 
fidelity according to the DACTS than the CST team. 
Quantitative Hypotheses 
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2. If there was a difference between the fidelity of the two ACT teams, the team with 
higher fidelity was predicted to have more positive attitudes toward EBPs  
3. If there was a difference between the fidelity of the two ACT teams, the team with 
higher fidelity was expected to rate their team leader and middle management 
higher on leadership. 
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METHODS 
 
 
 
The study used a mixed-method, longitudinal design to assess the strategies and 
barriers associated with one agency’s implementation of a state-wide initiative (Rule 132) 
as it related to the definition of ACT services.  Two service delivery teams chosen by the 
agency to implement ACT services were studied.  They were compared to another service 
delivery team at the agency serving similar clients but implementing a service model with 
less stringent program standards (i.e., the CST team model).  The CST team served as a 
partial control for changes as a result of reimbursement mechanisms that were also 
encompassed in Rule 132.  With multiple changes to Illinois policy it was important to 
include a CST team as a comparison to account for the impact of these other 
modifications.   
Study Design 
 
Rationale for Mixed Methods 
 Mixed methods involve incorporating both qualitative and quantitative methods in 
the study design.  Including qualitative methods provided a holistic view of the process of 
ACT implementation as rich dialogue between the researcher and staff members yielded 
information that could not be predicted by quantitative measures alone (Munhall, 2007).  
Quantitative methods frequently play the leading role in assessing program outcomes and 
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seek the measurement and analysis of causal relationships between variables, not 
processes (Caracelli & Greene, 1993; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).  In contrast, qualitative 
methods are chosen for the supporting role of examining program processes (Caracelli & 
Greene, 1993).   
The researcher assessed ACT fidelity, collected clinician ratings on 
questionnaires, and conducted semi-structured interviews with the Clinical Director, staff 
from middle management, and staff from the three teams at two time periods after the 
formal launch of Rule 132 in October 1, 2007.  The assessments were at 6 months (April 
2008; Time 1) and 14 months (December 2008; Time 2) post-implementation of Rule 
132. 
 
This study was conducted at Thresholds, a large, urban, psychosocial 
rehabilitation and recovery agency in Chicago.  The agency offers a wide array of 
evidence-based services, including supported employment, integrated dual disorders 
treatment, and assertive community treatment.  According to Thresholds’ records, the 
agency provided services to over 7,000 individuals with SMI in 2008, with 3,780 of these 
consumers receiving comprehensive, long-term services.  All Thresholds clients are 
assigned to one of several service delivery systems, including receiving the team-based 
approaches of ACT or CST services.  In regards to implementing EBPs, Thresholds has 
an internal training department and research department that is responsible for informing 
their implementation efforts (internal purveyor model). 
Setting 
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QUANTITATIVE METHODS 
 
 
 
Staff members from the three service delivery teams completed a packet of 
questionnaires at both time points.  At Time 1 there were 17 staff members on the three 
teams (6 on the North ACT team, 5 on the Homeless Outreach team, and 6 on the CST 
team).  At Time 2 there were 19 staff members on the three teams (7 on the North ACT 
team, 6 on the Homeless Outreach team, and 6 on the CST team).  Across the two time 
periods, 21 total staff members were present on the three teams. 
Participants 
Surveys were completed by 15 (88%) of 17 staff members at Time 1, including 6 
(100%) from the North ACT team, 5 (100%) from the Homeless Outreach team, and 4 
(67%) of 6 staff members from the CST team.  At Time 2, 16 (84%) of 19 staff members 
completed questionnaires, including 6 (100%) from the Homeless Outreach team, 5 
(71%) of 7 from the North ACT team, and 5 (83%) of 6 staff members from the CST 
team.  Questionnaires were completed at both Time 1 and Time 2 by 12 (57%) of the 21 
total staff members.  Only two staff members did not complete questionnaires at either of 
the time periods.  One of the staff members who did not complete the questionnaires was 
hired after Time 1 and was on vacation at Time 2.  The second staff member was 
employed at Thresholds at both time points but was not present in the office during either 
of the assessments and therefore did not participate.  
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The implementation effort was examined through ACT fidelity assessments, 
degree of staff turnover, and clinician-rated measures used to assess attitudes towards 
implementation of EBPs, leadership, and perceived factors that influence adoption of a 
new practice.   
Measures 
 
Team-Related Measures 
 
 
Fidelity 
 The Dartmouth Assertive Community Treatment Fidelity Scale (DACTS; Teague, 
Bond, & Drake, 1998) assessed fidelity to the ACT model.  The development of the 
DACTS was informed by the literature describing the model (e.g., Stein & Test, 1980), 
expert consensus, and previous research on the critical components of ACT (McGrew & 
Bond, 1995; McGrew et al., 1994).  The 28-item DACTS has been widely used in 
research, program evaluation, and policy-making and has been shown to differentiate 
ACT from other intensive case management services (Salyers et al., 2003).  The DACTS 
items assess critical components of ACT grouped under 3 dimensions: Human 
Resources/ Structure and Composition, Organizational Boundaries, and Nature of 
Services.  Examples of items grouped under each dimension include small caseload and 
psychiatrist on staff for Human Resources, 24-hour coverage of psychiatric crises for 
Organization Boundaries, and in-vivo services and no dropout policy for Nature of 
Services (Teague et al., 1998).    
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The DACTS instrument focuses more on the structural aspects of the ACT model 
(e.g., team composition) than the clinical aspects, which are more difficult to measure 
(Teague et al., 1998).  Instructions for using the scale make recommendations for which 
sources at the agency (e.g., interviews with supervisors or staff, documents reflecting 
program authority, etc.) may be relevant for each item.  The items are rated on a five-
point, behaviorally-anchored scale with an item rating of “5” representing close 
adherence to the model and “1” indicating a sharp departure from model standards for 
that element.  Twenty-six of the 28 items are then averaged to obtain a total fidelity score 
ranging from 1 to 5.  The total score was used in the analyses as the index of 
implementation success.  In keeping with the convention of the researchers from the 
National EBP Implementation Project, a total score of 4.0 or greater was considered high 
fidelity, while scores between 3.0 and 4.0 were considered to be moderate fidelity to the 
ACT model (McHugo et al., 2007).   
 
  
Staff Turnover 
Team leaders provided details of staff turnover during the 14-month 
implementation process.  The Team Leaders and researcher classified each turnover as 
either positive or negative, based on the Team Leader’s evaluation of the impact on the 
team.  A case of positive turnover would be if a staff member whose personal philosophy 
did not match those of the team; for instance, if the staff member was overly paternalistic 
rather than focused on recovery or if the staff member was not comfortable working with 
the SMI population.  Negative turnover would result if a highly skilled staff member 
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whose contributions to the team were valued resigned.  Previous studies have found 
turnover can have a major impact, either positive or negative, on the success of 
implementation (Woltmann et al., 2008).    
 
Clinician-Related Measures 
 
  
Demographic Variables 
Demographic variables obtained for program staff included age, gender, 
race/ethnicity, level of education, and tenure in current job/field.   
 
 
Clinician Attitudes toward EBPs 
The Evidence-Based Practice Attitude Scale (EBPAS; Aarons 2004) was used to 
assess the staff members’ attitudes toward adopting EBPs in general (See Appendix A).  
The EBPAS has previously been used in studies of EBP implementation at community 
mental health centers (Gioia, 2007).  The instrument was developed based on literature 
reviews, discussions with providers and researchers, item generation, data collection, and 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses.  The result of these efforts was a 15-item 
scale assessing four dimensions of attitudes toward the adoption of EBPs:  Appeal, 
Requirements, Openness, and Divergence (Aarons, 2004).  The Appeal subscale assesses 
the likelihood of adopting an EBP if it were intuitively appealing, could be used in the 
correct manner, or if colleagues were satisfied with its use.  The Requirements subscale 
refers to the extent adoption would occur if the EBP were required by the agency, 
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supervisor, or state.  The Openness subscale measures the provider’s openness to trying 
new interventions.  Lastly, the Divergence subscale assesses the extent to which the 
provider perceives clinical experience as more useful than research-based EBPs.  
The EBPAS total scale score is calculated as the average across all 15 items.  The 
overall internal consistency reliability for the EBPAS total scale score has been found to 
be good (Cronbach’s alpha=.77) and subscale alphas have been found to range from .59 
to .90 (Aarons, 2004).  In the present study, overall Cronbach’s alpha reliability for the 
EBPAS total scale score was good at both Time 1 and Time 2 (alpha=.85, .80, 
respectively) and subscale alphas ranged from .69 to .97 at Time 1 and .81 to .91 at Time 
2, as shown in Table 3.   
 
 
Attitudes toward ACT and Perspectives on Implementation 
Three quantitative rating scales entitled, How I Feel Personally about ACT (“ACT 
Feelings”), Aspects of Implementing ACT in My Workplace (“Workplace Aspects”), and 
Conditions That Can Help or Hinder the Implementation of a Practice (“Conditions”) 
were completed by staff members who were actively implementing ACT.  The CST team 
was also administered the Conditions scale.  All three scales were developed for the 
National EBP Implementation Project (Drake et al., 2001; Mueser et al., 2003).  The 
scales are tailored to the specific EBP being implemented and are rated on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree.  For the current study the wording 
of the items was modified to refer to “ACT” or “CST.”   
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The ACT Feelings scale assesses the staff’s personal support and commitment to 
the ACT model and the implementation effort.  Agency-wide support for ACT, including 
from upper management and fellow team members, is the main focus of the Workplace 
Aspects scale.  Lastly, the Conditions scale represents a combination of five diverse items 
ranging from availability of resources, feedback on consumer outcomes, and perceived 
stress on team members.  Item-level responses, particularly for Items 1 (adequacy of 
training and supervision) and 5 (perception of intense work pressure) on the Conditions 
scale and Item 9 (“It has been easy to implement ACT”) on the Workplace Aspects scale, 
were compared to the qualitative themes that emerged from interviews.  The responses to 
the scales served to supplement the qualitative data on what was considered a strategy or 
barrier to implementation.   
Four of the nine items from the ACT Feelings scale appear to assess staff member 
support for the ACT model (Items 2, 3, 4, 5).  These items were combined to create a 
subscale entitled Personal Support for ACT, which is also reported in the analyses.   
Similarly, 7 of the 10 items from the Workplace Aspects scale have face validity 
measuring agency-wide support for ACT (Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8).  The subscale created 
from these items is entitled Agency-Wide Support for ACT.   
No psychometric data on reliability and validity have been previously reported on 
the three measures.  Internal consistency coefficients for total scores and the two 
subscales are displayed in Table 4.  In the present study the total scores for the ACT 
Feelings and Workplace Aspects scales demonstrated adequate internal consistency at 
Time 1 (alphas=.78 and .95, respectively), while the Conditions scale had poor internal 
consistency (alpha=.39 at Time 1 and .58 at Time 2).  Items from the three scales used in 
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the present study can be found in Appendix B.    
 
 
 
Leadership 
The Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ form 5; Bass & Avolio, 1995) 
contains 45 items assessing leadership style.  The items are rated on a 5-point Likert 
scale, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (frequently, if not always).  The MLQ was 
developed to measure transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire (recently termed 
passive/avoidant) leadership concepts.  Transformational leaders inspire and motivate 
followers in ways that go beyond exchanges and rewards to do more than is expected.  In 
contrast, transactional leadership is based on “exchanges” between the leader and the 
followers that occur when followers receive valued outcomes, e.g., wage or prestige, 
when they behave in a manner than would please the leader (Den Hartog, Van Muigen, & 
Koopman, 1997).  Transformational and transactional leadership styles are distinct but 
not mutually exclusive in that the most effective leaders possess varying degrees of both 
types of characteristics (Holtz & Harold, 2008).  The passive/avoidant leader avoids 
making decisions, which could be seen as a lack of leadership (Den Hartog et al., 1997).   
The MLQ generates a nine factor model that includes four dimensions of 
transformational leadership (represented in five factor scores; inspirational motivation, 
individual consideration, intellectual stimulation, idealized influence behavior and 
idealized influence attributes), two dimensions of transactional leadership (contingent 
reward and active management-by-exception), and two forms of passive/avoidant 
leadership (laissez-faire leadership and passive management-by-exception) (Antonakis, 
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Avolio, & Sivasubramaniam, 2003).   
The MLQ is one of the most widely used instruments to measure leader behaviors 
in the organizational sciences (Tejeda, Scandura, & Pillai, 2001) and is largely 
considered the most validated measure of transformational leadership currently available 
(Awamleh & Gardner, 1999).  The MLQ has also been used to study leadership in mental 
health and other public-sector organizations (Aarons, 2006; Corrigan & Garman, 1999; 
Garman, Davis-Lenane, & Corrigan, 2003).  In the present study the MLQ was used to 
rate leaders from middle management as well as team leaders.  Previous research has 
found that internal consistency estimates (coefficient alpha) across the nine leadership 
factors ranged from .74 to .94 (Antonakis et al., 2003).  The nine factor scores were used 
in the analyses for the present study.  Internal consistency coefficients for ratings of 
middle management were comparable to those previously reported at Time 1, ranging 
from .76 to .94 at Time 1, but ranged from .41 to .93 at Time 2.  Alphas were lower than 
those reported in previous studies for ratings of Team Leaders at Time 1 with internal 
consistencies ranging from .20 to .84 at Time 1, but were comparable at Time 2 (.73 to 
.91).  The small sample size likely influenced the internal consistency coefficients of the 
MLQ in the current study.  Internal consistencies for the MLQ are presented in Table 5.  
A selection of MLQ items is listed in Appendix C. 
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QUANTITATIVE PROCEDURES 
 
 
 
 
  The researcher conducted ACT fidelity assessments of the three teams at both 
time points.  The first fidelity assessment was conducted in March 2008 for the Homeless 
Outreach team and April 2008 for the CST and North ACT teams.  The second fidelity 
assessments occurred in December 2008 for all three teams.  The researcher along with 
two staff members from Thresholds’ research department conducted the March 2008 
assessment of the Homeless Outreach team.  The Homeless Outreach team was being 
assessed internally by Thresholds at that time as a requirement of the SAMHSA grant 
that provided funding to the team.  The researcher participated in this assessment for 
training on the DACTs.  Prior to the Time 1 assessment of the Homeless Outreach team, 
the researcher had been trained on the techniques and procedures of the DACTs by an 
expert (Gary Bond), but had not formally conducted an assessment of a team.  Inter-rater 
reliability was not determined due to the training nature of the fidelity assessment.  The 
remaining five fidelity assessments (North ACT and CST at Time 1 and all three at Time 
2) were completed solely by the researcher. 
Quantitative Data Collection 
Additionally, staff members from the three teams completed questionnaires 
consisting of the demographics questionnaire, the EBPAS, and the MLQ at Time 1 (April 
2008) and Time 2 (December 2008).  Two copies of the MLQ were provided as the staff 
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members were asked to rate their Team Leader on one form and the Program Manager 
with the other.  The Team Leaders rated themselves on one form and the Program 
Manager on the other.  Of interest, the initial plan was to have the staff members rate 
upper management, i.e., the Clinical Director, in addition to their Team Leader.  
However, all of the staff members across the three teams reported that they did not have 
enough contact with the Clinical Director to make these ratings (even teams that were 
housed down the hall from her office).  One staff member stated that he did not even 
know who the Clinical Director was.  Therefore, the data collection procedures and 
design were modified to have staff rate the Program Managers who were considered 
middle management within the agency.  At Time 1 the West Program Manager was 
serving as the acting Team Leader for the Homeless Outreach team.  Therefore, this team 
rated the direct supervisor of their Program Manager (West Regional Manager) as upper 
management on the MLQ.  However, due to a reported lack of familiarity with the West 
Regional Manager, these ratings by the Homeless Outreach staff members were largely 
unusable.    
Teams that were in the process of implementing ACT also completed the ACT 
Feelings and Workplace Aspects scales.  This included two teams at Time 1, North ACT 
and Homeless Outreach, but only the North ACT team at Time 2.  In addition, all three 
teams answered the Conditions scale, however the items read as “CST” or “ACT” 
depending on the service delivered by that team.  Staff members were paid $25 at each 
assessment period for completion of the surveys. 
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The questionnaires were inspected for data integrity and data were deemed invalid 
if a respondent rated every item with the same answer.  The usable data and fidelity 
ratings were entered into a SPSS database and checked for accuracy of recording.   
Reverse scoring was then applied to items as necessary.  Subscale and total scores were 
then calculated for respondents who completed greater than 80% of the items.  Table 6 
lists the quantitative instruments that were used and how these were analyzed (i.e., total 
score, subscale score, item-level analysis). 
Quantitative Data Analysis 
 
Missing Data 
Respondents were treated as missing if less than 80% of the items on a scale were 
completed.  Data were considered invalid if a participant marked all items with the same 
answer.  The MLQ was the only quantitative measure to have any missing data and the 
degree of data missing was substantial.  Of the 30 MLQ questionnaires administered at 
Time 1 (15 staff members receiving 2 forms each), only 18 (60%) were returned.  The 
North ACT team had the poorest return rate of the three teams at Time 1 (33% for ratings 
of the Team Leader and 50% for ratings of Program Manager).  Additionally, the Team 
Leaders and only one other staff member from both North ACT and CST teams 
completed the Team Leader version of MLQ at Time 1, which resulted in insufficient 
data to conduct any analyses or draw any conclusions.   
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Analysis of Measures 
The small sample sizes and missing data limited the utility of the quantitative 
measures for statistical comparisons between teams and across the two time periods.  
Therefore, the analyses of the staff surveys were limited to descriptive statistics; no 
formal statistical tests are reported. 
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QUALITATIVE METHODS 
 
 
 
In addition to the quantitative measures, the staff members were administered 
semi-structured interviews to gain a rich understanding of the barriers and facilitators of 
implementation as well as the perceived impact of the policy change on services provided 
and their jobs in general.   
 
The study examined staff members within four levels of the organization; upper 
management (Clinical Director), middle management (Program Manager and Assistant 
Program Manager), Team Leader, and line staff.  Figure 2 illustrates the relevant 
organizational chart for the positions interviewed in the study.  Individual interviews 
were conducted with the Clinical Director, two staff members from middle management, 
three Team Leaders, and 14 different line staff. 
Qualitative Sampling 
A total of 20 staff members were interviewed, resulting in 28 transcripts across 
the two time points with 16 occurring at Time 1.  Staff turnover and scheduling conflicts 
resulted in some team members represented in one time point only.  Of those interviewed, 
8 (40%) of 20 staff members were interviewed at both Time 1 and Time 2.   
The North ACT team had a total of eight staff members on the team between the 
two time periods, all of whom were interviewed at least once.  Additionally, five out of 
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six (83%) staff members from the Homeless Outreach team were interviewed at least 
once.  The one staff member not interviewed was new to the team and the mental health 
field at the time of the Time 2 assessment and was still shadowing her teammates to learn 
the job.  Of the six staff on the CST team, four (67%) were interviewed for the study. 
In addition to the staff members from the three teams, the Clinical Director and 
two staff from middle management were interviewed.  The Clinical Director was 
interviewed regarding how the decision to implement the new definition of ACT was 
made, the details of the implementation plan, and the facilitators and barriers to 
implementation from an upper management perspective.  She was interviewed at both 
time points.  Two staff members from middle management, one at each time point, also 
participated in the interviews.  At the 6-month data collection (Time 1), the West 
Program Manager was the acting Team Leader for the Homeless Outreach team and was 
interviewed from both the perspective of Program Manager and Team Leader (not 
included in the above count of Homeless Outreach staff members).  At the 14-month 
assessment (Time 2) the Assistant North Program Manager over the North ACT and CST 
teams requested the opportunity to share his observations with Rule 132 implementation, 
fee-for-service, and the differences between the ACT and CST models from a 
supervisor’s perspective. 
 
 
Qualitative Interviews 
The protocols for the semi-structured interviews were informed by EBP 
implementation studies found in the literature.  While individuals with SMI are referred 
to as “consumers” by this author, staff members at Thresholds use the terminology 
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“members” and therefore this term was incorporated into the interviews.  All interviews 
began with the same broad question that asked the staff to describe their experiences with 
the policy changes of both Rule 132 and fee-for-service.  Follow-up questions then 
elicited how the changes in policy impacted their jobs and the services they provide to 
consumers.  Facilitators and barriers to the implementation process were also asked about 
first in a broad manner, e.g., “what are the biggest challenges?” and “what helped you 
through this process?” The identified facilitators and barriers were then narrowed down 
with specific follow-up questions to either clarify or elaborate on the staff member’s 
comment.  The interviewer also inquired on specific topics (e.g., training/supervision, 
turnover, leadership, DMH policies, agency culture/commitment to implementing EBPs) 
that were informed by previous implementation studies.  For instance, to elicit the 
individual’s perspective on training, questions such as “how did Thresholds prepare you 
for the policy changes?” were asked.  If the staff member responded that “nothing was 
done,” the interviewer would specifically inquire on trainings.  In another example of the 
semi-structured nature, if leadership was not mentioned when asked “what helped?” the 
interviewer would attempt to determine who provided leadership by asking, “Was there a 
clear champion for these changes?”  When interviewing respondents from the team that 
chose to decertify from ACT, barriers to the implementation effort were uncovered by 
gaining their perspectives on why they feel decertification occurred.  General topics to 
discuss were formulated based on the literature beforehand.  However, the staff member 
largely dictated the course and content of the conversation on the basis of how the broad, 
process questions were answered. 
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QUALITATIVE PROCEDURES 
 
 
 
Staff members from varying levels within the organization were interviewed in 
order to triangulate the data, which better ensures comprehensiveness and encourages a 
more reflexive analysis of the data (Mays & Pope, 2000; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007b).  
Triangulation involves incorporating various sources in the data collection and should be 
thought of as an alternative to validation in that it adds rigor, richness, and in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon in question rather than directly adding validity to the 
interviews (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Flick, 2002).  Additionally, conducting interviews 
with individuals at various levels within the agency reduces the chance of bias from any 
one informant (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993).  However, one problem that can arise 
when sampling multiple informants is the frequent dissimilarity of reports (Kumar et al., 
1993).  Although, dissimilarity of reports is less of an issue in qualitative research as each 
person’s perspective is viewed as adding to understanding the quality or process 
(Munhall, 2007).   
Qualitative Data Collection 
When conducting the interviews the researcher employed the standards of 
qualitative methods by checking for understanding and encouraging the interviewee to 
disclose more detail through member checking (i.e., reflective listening), summarizations, 
and probing (Mays & Pope, 2000).  This helps to ensure an adequate sample of words are 
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collected from each individual and that the researcher is interpreting the words as the 
interviewee would intend (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007a).  The interviews were recorded 
on audiotape in order to capture the exact wording used by the subjects and to enhance 
descriptive validity, as this allows readers to be certain that there is no recall bias on part 
of the researchers (Maxwell, 1992).  The researcher took notes on any observations that 
occurred during the interview such as the individual’s body language, the level of privacy 
for the interview, or any strange occurrence that might have influence the interpretation 
of the results.   
The researcher conducted all interviews.  The interviews were completed face to 
face in a quiet room at the mental health center and ranged in length from 30 minutes to 
80 minutes, with the average interview lasting approximately 45 minutes.  Scheduling 
conflicts resulted in 5 of the 12 interviews at Time 2 occurring over the telephone.  The 
interviews were transcribed in order to aid in recall of information, coding, and 
interpretation.  A professional transcriber was hired to complete the task of transcription.  
The agency was reimbursed a total of $4,000 for the time required to complete the 
interviews.   
 
The transcribed interview data was checked for accuracy by the primary 
researcher through comparison of all 28 transcriptions to the audiotapes.  The assistance 
of a fellow graduate student was then enlisted to develop the codebook for the qualitative 
interviews.  Coding schemes in qualitative research may be developed a priori, 
inductively as themes in the data emerge (e.g., grounded theory), or by a combination of 
Qualitative Data Analysis 
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the two (Ryan & Bernard, 2003; Weitzman, 1999).  In the current study, themes 
generated a priori were themes found in the literature, such as ‘staffing’, ‘attitude’, 
‘leadership’, ‘fidelity monitoring’, and ‘training/consultation’ (Rapp et al., 2008).  
However, one cannot anticipate all the themes that will arise prior to analyzing the data 
(Dey, 1993).  With the grounded theory technique, the researcher keeps an open mind 
while analyzing the data and does not endorse any one explanation until all of the data 
have been analyzed (Munhall, 2007).  The current study used a combination of the two 
methods to derive appropriate codes for the interviews in an “inductive, iterative coding 
process” (Estroff, personal communication 2007).  In an intensive workshop attended by 
the researcher, Estroff outlined the following steps for developing a coding scheme: 
Identify a priori conceptual and empirical questions and topics.  Then 
identify sub-themes and specific dimensions of each of the larger 
questions.  As previously mentioned, Figure 1 lists the a priori 
themes that were expected to influence the implementation of 
ACT. 
Revise codes: add, delete, and modify based on the interview transcripts.  
The more the same concepts occur in the text, the more likely it is 
a theme (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). 
Test revisions on additional transcripts. 
Revise coding scheme again.  Continue this process until categories and 
specific dimensions reach saturation (i.e., no new concepts emerge 
from the data).  At this point in the process the more codes, the 
better as concepts must first be discovered before they can be 
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combined and condensed into larger categories and themes (Ryan 
& Bernard, 2003). 
The researchers then used a process termed “constant comparison,” in which each 
statement within a particular coding category was compared with the other statements in 
that category to determine whether the code was appropriate “as is” or was in need of 
revisions, e.g., forming two separate codes or condensing multiple categories (Pope  et 
al., 2000; Ryan & Bernard, 2003; Weitzman, 1999).  This process was completed 
independently by the two coders in order to incorporate different trains of thought (Ryan, 
1999; Ryan & Bernard, 2003).  Codes were thought of as “organizing principles that are 
not set in stone” (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996) and the coding process constantly redefined 
what constituted a category or theme (Munhall, 2007).  Therefore, various codes 
comprise the themes.  Once the two independent code generators consolidated and 
defined their ideas for coding, the process continued with the next set of steps: 
The two coders rated the same transcript independently.   
Any differences in coding assignment were reconciled and the code book 
was revised for overlap, ambiguity, and missing codes. 
Decisions were made regarding what constitutes coding units.  The 
researchers decided that thoughts, sentences, and paragraphs 
constituted the coding units. 
 Decisions were made regarding multiple coding.  The researchers decided 
that responses seen as containing multiple meanings could be 
coded into more than one theme.  Additionally, a coding unit could 
have more than one code assigned to it. 
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 Lastly, a coding manual was written that operationally defined each code 
and provided examples of what constituted the code to help 
improve reliability. 
After the above steps were completed to form the codebook, the primary 
researcher and the fellow graduate student then independently coded interviews in order 
to establish inter-rater reliability.  When specific difficulties and problems in rating 
agreement arose, further details were added to the codebook, helping to solidify code 
content and improve subsequent inter-rater reliability.  Additionally, with each interview 
that was examined, the codes were continuously reevaluated to assess the possibility of 
collapsing or adding additional codes.  When a code was added to the codebook, it was 
operationalized and specific details regarding how to rate responses made explicit.  After 
each change to the codebook, both raters re-rated the whole interviews.  This process was 
repeated as necessary until the two researchers felt confident that they had generated an 
exhaustive number of codes to capture possible responses and that they had reached an 
acceptable level of agreement.  At the conclusion of the process a total of 42 codes had 
been generated.  A list of all the codes is presented in Table 7. 
Content agreement among raters for how to apply the codes was defined as both 
raters selecting the same group of words to represent a particular code.  Inter-rater 
reliability was assessed using overall percentage of content agreement among the two 
raters across four interviews and was found to be good.  There were 171 events that were 
coded across the four interviews of which 136 (79.5%) were assigned the identical code 
(out of the 42 possible codes) by the two raters.  There was very little disagreement 
regarding whether a particular code should be applied to the text.  Importantly, the 
59 
 
 
discrepancies were primarily errors of omission in which, during the consensus process, 
the second coder immediately agreed that the code in question was indeed appropriate for 
the content.  The code that appeared to be omitted by one rater most frequently was 
“Positive Aspects of Change.”  Additionally, at times the coding discrepancies were 
related to the second coder's lack of familiarity with the organizational structure at the 
agency.  For instance, when staff members identified an individual in middle 
management as providing leadership, the second coder at times coded this as leadership 
from upper management.  Both raters had agreed that leadership was the appropriate code 
but the identified source of leadership was influenced by whether the rater was familiar 
with which roles the leaders served within the organization.  The second coder was then 
provided with a list of staff member names and their level within the organization to 
assist with subsequent coding.   
Once the acceptable level of inter-rater reliability was established, the primary 
researcher coded two-thirds of the remaining interviews.  ATLAS TI 5.2 was used to 
code, retrieve, and analyze the qualitative data (Atlas.ti, 2008).  The codes reported in the 
28 interviews were tabulated using a percentage reporting method in which each staff 
member was dichotomized on whether the code was reported (i.e., yes or no).  This 
procedure was completed in order to assist with understanding the impact of the codes on 
both the team level (i.e., which teams were affected) and on multiple roles within the 
organization (e.g., line staff vs. management).  The percentage of staff members reporting 
a code was utilized rather than frequency of the code in order to avoid inflated emphasis 
on a code in circumstances where only one staff member mentioned it, but did so several 
times.  The results of this tabulation assisted with the conceptualization of which factors 
60 
 
 
were relevant enough to be considered a theme. 
When identifying themes, the researcher also examined the quotations that were 
assigned with the various codes and conceptualized how the codes interrelated to describe 
the process of implementation at Thresholds.  For instance, following the coding process, 
the quotations that were labeled with the code of “Too Many Changes at Once” informed 
the identification of 3 themes: “Ambiguity of Rule 132,” “Implementation Overload,” 
and “Conflicting Regulations from Funding Sources.”  The code of “Lack of 
Communication” was broken down into “Ambiguity of Rule 132,” “Lack of 
Communication by Thresholds” (which did not emerge to the level of inclusion in the 
report), and “Lack of Guidance from DMH.”  The researcher used this process of 
examining how the codes interrelate to group the codes into themes that influenced 
implementation of Rule 132 in general and ACT in particular (Table 8).  Themes could 
be based on a combination of several codes and a particular code could contribute to 
multiple themes.  The codes that contributed to the conceptualization of each theme are 
presented in Tables 9, 10, and 11 for common barriers, ACT-specific barriers, and 
facilitators, respectively.   
A second type of methodology was employed to ensure that the essence of the 
stories was well represented in the theme identification and findings.  The primary 
researcher independently read all of the transcripts without the coding marked and 
immediately wrote a paragraph detailing the main ideas that emerged from each 
transcript.  Each summary paragraph was then compared to the database that listed the 
dichotomized reporting of codes to ensure that the coding and identified themes captured 
the “big picture.”  The summary paragraphs were also used to guide interpretation as to 
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which themes were most relevant. 
The themes that emerged from the three teams at Time 1 were compared.  Since 
all three teams shared the implementation of certain aspects of Rule 132, e.g., the change 
in funding mechanism, themes that were expressed across all three teams were 
considered representative of implementing Rule 132 in general rather than ACT 
specifically.   
At Time 1 the themes that were unique to the two teams implementing ACT were 
considered representative of the ACT implementation process.  Because the two teams 
had differential success in implementing ACT, the themes for these teams were also 
compared.  Lastly, the themes and percentage of staff members who reported these were 
compared at Time 1 and Time 2 to determine whether the facilitators and barriers had 
changed over time.   
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RESULTS 
 
 
 
Historical information is presented here in order to provide a context for the 
state’s decision to redefine services and Thresholds’ decision to re-implement ACT 
services in accordance with the new state standards.  The primary focus of the study and 
data analysis involves the process and outcome of early implementation (i.e., the first 14 
months). 
Historical Context 
 
Origins of Rule 132 
As described in the introduction, the DMH in Illinois conducted a “System 
Restructuring Initiative” (SRI) to evaluate mental health services.  In 2006, DMH funded 
fidelity assessments of ACT teams throughout the state.  At that time, Thresholds was 
operating 14 ACT teams through their Bridge program, which was developed at the 
agency in 1978 as an adaptation to the Madison ACT model.  The 2006 DMH report 
concluded that the ACT teams at Thresholds (and other agencies throughout the state) 
had either experienced program drift or had not appropriately implemented the model, as 
the DMH fidelity assessors did not observe high fidelity to the ACT model.  At 
Thresholds in particular, most of the ACT teams did not have the required frequency of 
contact and percent of services delivered in the community to meet the proposed ACT 
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criteria (DMH, 2006).  At the time of the report the Homeless Outreach team had 59% of 
their contacts in the community while the North ACT team had 74% in the community 
(DMH, 2006), which fell short of the model’s recommended 80% in-vivo contact.  An 
earlier study of the North ACT team indicates that in-vivo contact is one aspect that has 
drifted in fidelity over the years as this team once had 95% of contacts outside the 
program office (Bond et al., 1990).   
The DMH report found that other areas of discrepancy between the ACT model 
and the practices at Thresholds included a high reliance on group services (e.g., some 
Bridge teams had nearly one-third of their ACT contacts in group format), minimal 
evidence of developing family support and involvement, and no 24-hour crisis coverage 
by the primary team (DMH, 2006).  Furthermore, DMH assessors concluded that the 
ACT teams at Thresholds served many individuals who were not in need of intensive 
services.  While the majority of consumers enrolled in ACT presumably met the proposed 
ACT admission criteria at the time of admission, DMH assessors concluded that only 20-
25% of the consumers met admission criteria at the time of the review (DMH, 2006).  As 
a result of their findings, DMH developed new state standards for ACT and tied funding 
to fidelity of these standards. 
With guidance from the SRI task force, DMH developed a set of guidelines 
entitled Rule 132.  The state then officially issued Rule 132 as a prescriptive set of rules 
guiding state funding for adult mental health services.  Rule 132 modified service 
definitions (e.g., ACT and CST), implemented a fee-for-service (FFS) funding 
mechanism, and stipulated that services be driven by the concept of “recovery.” The 
stated rationale for restructuring the existing services was that the previous service 
64 
 
 
definitions did not fully promote recovery and resiliency, which was the stated goal of 
DMH (DHS, 2007).  The DMH instructed that all types of services provided to mental 
health consumers should concentrate on “teaching how” rather than completing the 
activity for the person and also incorporate shared-decision making.  Additionally, DMH 
instituted a FFS funding mechanism and added new billing categories with various rates 
in order to be in compliance with federal rules for billing federal dollars, i.e., Medicaid.  
By aligning billing practices with the federal requirements and billing through Medicaid, 
the state was able to reduce their financial burden.  
 
Changes at Agencies as a Result of Rule 132 
The Department of Mental Health acknowledged that Rule 132 would result in 
several changes at mental health agencies, including new staffing requirements, 
additional assessments to determine eligibility for ACT, and prior authorization 
requirements for all consumers receiving services (e.g., CST and ACT).  In addition, all 
agencies were required to monitor fidelity to Rule 132 to ensure compliance with all 
service definitions in order to receive reimbursement for services under Rule 132 (DMH, 
2006).   
Staffing requirements for CST and ACT teams are presented in Table 1.  Prior to 
Rule 132, the Bridge program ACT teams at Thresholds were not required to have 
licensed Team Leaders, nurses or peer specialists.  Under Rule 132, all three positions 
were required for ACT licensing.  In 2006 DMH assessed the predicted impact of Rule 
132 on the Bridge ACT teams and concluded that two or three Bridge teams, with 
relatively minor adjustments, could meet Rule 132 requirements for ACT, but that the 
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remaining Bridge teams would need to make significant changes to qualify.  The latter 
teams had significant staff deficits, including nursing staff and credentialed team leaders.  
Further staffing gaps in Bridge services included minimal involvement of psychiatrists, 
vocational specialist, and recovery/peer staff (DMH, 2006).  DMH assessors also judged 
that these latter Bridge ACT teams would require few staffing changes to fit the 
definition of CST under Rule 132.  This was based on the fact that the Bridge teams at 
Thresholds scored above 90% for program review on Rule 132 CST criteria (DMH, 
2006).  In essence, what Thresholds program leaders previously considered to be ACT 
was now classified as CST by the state standards. 
Rule 132 instituted two further requirements specific to ACT services that 
involved locus of responsibility for services and prompt hiring for staff vacancies.  The 
first requirement stipulated that consumers served by the newly defined ACT teams had 
to receive all services from the team itself and could not receive services from other 
programs within Thresholds (e.g., they could not attend substance abuse groups led by 
non-Bridge staff or live in Thresholds housing).  The second requirement specific to ACT 
services was that staff positions could not remain vacant for more than 30 days.  The 
consequence of allowing a staff vacancy to exceed 30 days was severe.  If an ACT team 
experienced turnover and a replacement was not on the job by the 31st day, DMH rules 
stipulated that the team would lose its ACT certification.  As a decertified ACT team, the 
team would essentially need to go through the process of initiating CST services.  First, 
the team would then have to conduct assessments on all of their caseload.  Second they 
would need to receive authorization to offer CST services for these consumers.  These 
requirements were draconian, given that the admission criteria were less stringent for 
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CST than ACT.  The process of recertification as an ACT team was similarly 
problematic.  When the staff position triggering the decertification was filled, the 
assessments and paperwork would again have to be completed to re-certify the consumers 
for ACT services (even if only a matter of a few days had passed).  If this were not done 
and federal Medicaid officials performed an audit, the contracting mental health agency 
would have to pay back all of the money for services provided during that period of time 
when the team was not properly staffed.  Therefore, the Clinical Director reported during 
both interviews that there was a constant pressure on upper management to ensure that 
the staffing requirements were maintained.   
Rule 132 also stipulated that contracting mental health agencies restructure their 
billing system for all service delivery to conform to FFS.  A list of the objective changes 
at Thresholds that resulted from FFS is presented in Table 12.  Prior to FFS, Illinois was 
a grant-funded mental health system, which provided agencies with a yearly contract for 
services that was paid out monthly (one-twelfth of the contract paid each month).  With a 
grant-funded mental health system, mental health agencies did not need to document or 
monitor type or volume of services provided by individual staff members.  After the 
introduction of FFS, the regulations required agencies to submit bills for each service 
provided in order to be reimbursed.  Moreover, the total monthly amount for which they 
could bill was capped.  As a result, Thresholds, like other service agencies, established 
individual productivity standards for staff on service teams.  These productivity standards 
stipulated how many services each staff member had to deliver.  To illustrate with a 
simplified example, if DMH had previously agreed to pay $12,000 per year for a service, 
the agency would have been paid $1,000 each month.  After FFS, rather than a fixed 
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amount, DMH would reimburse up to $1,000 per month or the amount of the original 
contract.  If the itemized billing added up to $850, the agency would be reimbursed $850 
rather than the $1,000 maximum allowable and the agency would not recover $150 for 
which they were eligible.  In summary, to maximize their billing and receive the full 
contracted amount, the upper management at Thresholds developed productivity 
standards for the number of billable direct services hours that each staff member is 
required to provide to consumers.  According to the Clinical Director, in setting 
productivity standards, the Thresholds administration took into consideration agency paid 
time off and non-billable activities (e.g., travel, paperwork, and meetings) associated with 
providing ACT and CST services.  Because ACT has a greater number of required 
weekly team meetings, the standard was set slightly lower for ACT (925 billable direct 
service hours per year compared to 950 for CST).  The productivity standard equates to 
approximately 4.2 to 4.5 hours of billable direct service hours required per workday, 
respectively, for ACT and CST.  Conversation with an individual from upper 
management at an Indiana-based agency indicates that this figure for direct service hours 
may not be unusual.  However, it is possible that differences between Chicago and 
Indianapolis, such as traffic, may impact the staff members’ ability to meet the standards. 
In addition to the formation of productivity standards, the level of detail required 
in documentation of services provided changed drastically.  Prior to FFS, the Bridge 
teams used a generic service code of “ACT services” for all of the services that they 
provided to the consumers.  Under FFS, the specific type of activity and its relationship 
to the treatment plan had to be itemized (e.g., “support of activities of daily living, 
medication monitoring, assist client with social/interpersonal relationship,” etc.) in order 
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to be in accordance with Medicaid billing.  Staff members were required to learn the 
nuances of each billing code and to itemize all activities that occurred during each visit.  
The change to FFS funding mechanism also resulted in the requirement that all billing 
and notes be completed within 72 hours, whereas there was not a strictly enforced time 
limit prior to FFS.  Lastly, under FFS, billing was now restricted to the time spent with 
the consumer and therefore travel time was not considered billable. 
 
The Clinical Director of Thresholds provided details of the decision to implement 
ACT in accordance with Rule 132 and the initial steps taken to formulate the 
implementation plan, which are outlined here.  DMH hired consultants to interview 
selected administrators from agencies, including Thresholds, to determine the impact of 
the proposed new regulations.  Because Thresholds was involved in discussions with the 
state’s consultants, they were cognizant of what DMH was considering and began 
making preparations even before the decision to adapt Rule 132 was finalized.  As the 
Clinical Director described: 
Thresholds’ Decision Process 
“We were one of the pilot sites for the state.  The consultants that were 
working for the state came here to sort of talk to us.  So I don’t think that 
was any way meant to help us. It was sort of meant to help the state figure 
out where they needed to go in terms of the Rule change for ACT.  But 
that was kind of beneficial.  It had some secondary benefit to us because 
then we got sort of the ear of the expert and some understanding of what 
was going to happen and so we were sort of prepped I think in a way that 
some other institutes weren’t” (Clinical Director, Time 1). 
 
The agencies throughout the state were officially notified on July 1, 2007 that 
Rule 132 had to be implemented by October 1, 2007.  Prior to this announcement, 
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Thresholds had already formed an ACT steering committee, had developed an 
implementation plan (e.g., determined which teams would implement the services), and 
had made Program Managers aware of the restructuring requirements to staffing.   
Though initially Thresholds administrators considered converting as many as 6 
Bridge teams to the new Rule 132 ACT standards, in the end, Thresholds administrators 
decided to pilot the Rule 132 ACT with just two Bridge teams, the Homeless Outreach 
and North ACT teams, leaving the option open to expand to more teams later.  The 
Clinical Director assumed that the actual direct service contacts would not require major 
modification under Rule 132, in that the Bridge program teams were accustomed to 
providing ACT-like services.  However, staffing changes would be needed.  Specifically, 
very few of the Bridge teams were staffed with nurses, which was now required under 
Rule 132.  Thresholds administrators had to decide whether to commit internal resources 
to hire the appropriate staff as there was no additional start-up funding from the state to 
implement ACT.  As the Clinical Director explained, the higher financial cost for ACT 
teams associated with hiring advanced degree personnel (e.g., licensed Team Leader and 
nurse) limited the number of teams that they were willing to implement under the new 
rule.  Additionally, the state’s requirements for ACT teams were much more rigid than 
for CST teams, such as the stipulation concerning staff vacancies.  With uncertainties 
surrounding how the new policies would impact the agency, the upper management at 
Thresholds made the decision to lower their risk by first implementing ACT on two 
teams and changing 12 of the Bridge teams to CST.  Less up-front financial commitment 
was required to switch the Bridge teams to CST teams than to ACT teams.   
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Thresholds had an even more compelling reason not to convert more than two 
Bridge teams to the Rule 132 ACT model.  Put simply, there was no economic incentive 
to do so and a substantial disincentive to make further conversions.  Even though 
agencies could bill at a higher rate under Rule 132 for ACT than CST ($122.80 vs. 
$83.60 per hour; Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services 2007), the state 
placed a limit on the amount of money an agency could receive and therefore Thresholds 
would not receive more revenue for services with additional ACT teams, yet would have 
more costs associated with the required professional staff with higher salaries than the 
CST line staff.  The Clinical Director explained how economic considerations impacted 
their decision: 
“We had to make a decision as to which services we were going to provide 
under the new Rule [132] and get approval from the state for that.  They 
weren’t giving us any more money.  So it was the same amount of money 
they were giving us ongoing but it costs more money to do ACT the way it 
is defined under the new Rule. So you had to add a nurse, a full time 
nurse, you had to add a certain amount of psychiatric time.  So the agency 
basically committed resources that we had from, we decided to reallocate 
resources internally to do two ACT teams even though the state was not 
going to give us any more money. And they said well you know what it’s 
a higher rate.  Yeah, but you’re only giving us the same amount of money 
so it just helps us get to our cap sooner.  So that’s why we decided to do 
two ACT teams.  We also weren’t really sure how it was going to be with 
putting the ACT teams together and going through the ASO process 
[authorization process] so we decided two would probably be a good pilot 
for us to see if it could be done in the environment” (Clinical Director, 
Time 2). 
 
According to the Clinical Director, Thresholds chose to re-implement ACT 
according to state standards on the Homeless Outreach because they were closest to 
fidelity in terms of staffing as this team already employed a nurse through funding from a 
SAMHSA grant.  The North ACT team would require the hiring of appropriate staffing 
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(e.g., nurse) but was selected because this team was housed where the original Bridge 
ACT team was located.  As such, the Thresholds North Regional Manager had expressed 
to the Clinical Director a strong commitment to maintain the service in this location.  
Thresholds decided to pilot ACT in accordance with Rule 132 in these two teams with 
the consideration of later implementing ACT in additional service delivery teams 
throughout the agency if the efforts were successful.   
 
Fidelity to the ACT model, as measured by the DACTS, was used by the 
researcher as the criterion for successful implementation.  DACTS scores for the three 
teams across time periods are presented in Table 13.  The two teams that attempted ACT 
implementation had differential success.  The North ACT team was able to successfully 
implement ACT services within 6 months and sustain high fidelity throughout the study, 
as measured by a DACTS score greater than 4.0 (4.29 at Time 1 and 4.46 at Time 2).  
Conversely, the Homeless Outreach team was not successful at reaching high fidelity.  
For reasons that will be discussed later, Thresholds made the decision to decertify the 
Homeless Outreach team from ACT status and instead provide CST services.  The 
decision to decertify occurred 10 days after the fidelity assessment (March 2008) was 
conducted at Time 1, but before the qualitative interviews were completed (April 2008), 
which enabled the interviewer to assess perceived reasons for decertification.  The 
Homeless Outreach team had not reach high fidelity prior to decertification (3.89, Time 
1) and, as would be expected, continued to decrease in fidelity once it was determined 
that this team would provide CST services (3.61, Time 2).  
ACT Fidelity after the Introduction of Rule 132 at Thresholds 
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As was expected, the CST team displayed a moderate level of fidelity to the ACT 
model throughout the study.  Intensive case management teams, such as the services 
provided by CST teams, have been found to score around 3.5 on the DACTS (Teague et 
al., 1998), which is consistent with the CST team’s scores in the present study (3.39 at 
Time 1 and 3.50 at Time 2). 
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QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
Staff Characteristics 
Of the 19 staff members surveyed, mean age was 40.3 years (SD=11.2), 12 (63%) 
were female, 12 (63%) were Caucasian, mean length in the mental health field was 9.6 
years (SD=8.2), and mean tenure in their current position was 2.0 years (SD=1.6).  The 
majority of the staff members (11; 58%) had a bachelor’s degree as their highest degree 
and eight (42%) had a master’s degree. 
Staff composition on the three teams was relatively similar in terms of 
demographics but the make-up of the team differed depending on the type of service.  
Staff characteristics by team are described below. 
 
North ACT Team 
 The North ACT team consisted of a Team Leader, a substance abuse specialist, a 
case manager who specialized in housing, a case manager who specialized in benefits, a 
supported employment specialist, and a peer specialist.  At the time of the Time 1 
assessment, the team had recently filled a nurse vacancy with a replacement from a temp 
agency.  This stop-gap decision was made to avoid decertification.  The temporary nurse 
had no experience in mental health.  The Time 1 interviews were conducted on the 
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nurse’s first day at Thresholds and as such she was not interviewed in regards to the 
implementation effort. 
 Of the six team members on the North ACT team at Time 1 (excluding the 
temporary nurse), mean age was 46.0 years (SD=11.6), four (67%) were female, four 
(67%) were Caucasian, mean length in the mental health field was 10.4 years (SD=8.4), 
and mean tenure in their current position was 1.5 years (SD=0.6).  The Team Leader and 
two line staff had master’s degrees.  The other staff members had bachelor’s degrees.  
 
Homeless Outreach Team 
The Homeless Outreach team had difficulty finding a licensed clinician to satisfy 
the Team Leader position.  As a result, the West Program Manager had temporarily filled 
this position in addition to her existing program manager responsibilities.  At Time 1, the 
team consisted of a case manager, an IDDT specialist, a nurse, and a peer specialist.  In 
addition to lacking a dedicated Team Leader, two case managers had unexpectedly left 
the team in the 3 weeks prior to the Time 1 assessment, leaving the team understaffed.   
Of the five staff members on the Homeless Outreach team at Time 1 (West 
Program Manager included), mean age was 41.2 years (SD=7.9), three (60%) were male, 
three (60%) were African American, mean length in the mental health field was 10.8 
years (SD=8.6), and mean tenure in their current position was 3.4 years (SD=2.1).  The 
West Program Manager/acting Team Leader had a master’s degree and the other staff 
members had bachelor’s degrees. 
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CST team 
 The CST team consisted of a Team Leader and five additional case managers.  In 
accordance with the staffing requirement for CST, this team did not have specialized 
roles for the case managers.  It also differed from the other two teams in that half of the 
team members were consumers themselves, though not formally identified as peer 
specialists to the clients.  Rule 132 specified that a peer specialist on CST teams was 
optional.  No regulations exist as to the number of peer specialists permitted on one team.   
Of the six team members on the CST team at Time 1, mean age was 36.2 years 
(SD=10.8), four (67%) were female, five (83%) were Caucasian, mean length in the 
mental health field was 10.2 years (SD=10.3), and mean tenure in their current position 
was reported to be 2.1 years (SD=1.3).  The Team Leader as well as one staff member 
had a master’s degree with all others holding bachelor’s degrees. 
 
 The three teams varied considerably on staff turnover during the 14 month study 
period.  The North ACT team experienced four staff departures including two nurses, one 
peer specialist, and one Team Leader.  The first nurse left the team approximately five 
months into the implementation (prior to the Time 1 assessment) over a salary dispute.  
The second nurse was hired from a temp agency in order to fulfill the DMH requirement 
that vacancies could not exceed 30 days.  Thresholds ended the contract of the second 
nurse after one month due to her inexperience and lack of comfort working with the SMI 
population and the high cost of employment through a temp agency.  At the time of the 
Time 1 assessment, the peer specialist had decided to take another role within Thresholds 
Staff Turnover 
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and left the team.  Finally, the Team Leader had resigned from the team with her last 
week of employment occurring during the Time 2 assessment.  Two of these four 
turnovers were judged by the Team Leader to be positive, i.e., benefiting the team, due to 
conflicting personalities and/or inability to work well with the SMI population.   
The Homeless Outreach team experienced five staff departures including two in 
the Team Leader position, two case managers, and a vocational specialist.  The first 
Team Leader was reassigned prior to October 1, 2007 to meet the DMH regulation that 
ACT teams employ licensed clinicians as team leaders.  Her replacement resigned very 
early in the implementation (prior to the Time 1 assessment) after approximately 1.5 
months in the position.  Thresholds was then unsuccessful in hiring another Team Leader 
during the course of ACT implementation.  The West Program Manager served as the 
acting Team Leader for 7 months.  As previously stated, the Homeless Outreach team 
decertified from ACT status March 20, 2008.  After decertification the vocational 
specialist role was no longer funded on the team, resulting in this staff member being 
transitioned to another position within Thresholds.  Finally, in the three weeks prior to the 
first interviews (April 2008), two case managers left the team for employment at other 
agencies.  The West Program Manager and acting Team Leader judged all of these 
turnovers to be negative, i.e., disruptive to the team.   
Unlike the two teams that attempted ACT implementation, the CST team did not 
experience any turnover throughout the study period.   
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Because formal statistical analyses to evaluate differences across teams were 
judged to be unsuitable, the results are limited to presentation of descriptive summary 
statistics.  
Staff Surveys 
 
Staff Attitudes 
 
 
Evidence-based Practice Attitudes Scale (EBPAS) 
In general, the three teams appeared to be similar in their acceptance of EBPs and 
manualized treatment options, as measured by the EBPAS (Table 14).  Although sample 
sizes were too small to determine whether slight variations were statistically significant, 
at face value the differences do not appear to be clinically significant.  For instance, at 
Time 1, the Homeless Outreach team produced a higher total score than the North ACT 
team (2.8 vs. 2.4), though both scores were in the range indicating that endorsement of 
EBPs was between “moderate” and “to a great extent.”  Additionally, EBPAS scores 
were high (i.e., averaging at least a moderate level of EBP acceptance) for all teams at 
Time 1 and showed very little variation over time.   
 
 
National EBP Implementation Project Scales 
 The ACT Feelings, Workplace Aspects, and Conditions scales inquired 
specifically on attitudes toward ACT and the ACT implementation process.  Table 15 
contrasts the North ACT team and the Homeless Outreach team on the ACT Feelings 
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scale at Time 1, while Table 16 shows change over time on this scale for the North ACT 
team.  On three items, the mean ratings for the Homeless Outreach Team were higher 
than for the North ACT team:  perceived understanding of the ACT model (Item 1), their 
belief that ACT was consistent with their personal philosophy (Item 5), and personal 
commitment to implement ACT (Item 3).  Conversely, the Homeless Outreach Team had 
a lower mean rating on the statement that implementing ACT required a significant 
change to daily practice (Item 7) than the North ACT team.  Scores on the ACT Feelings 
scale remained relatively unchanged over time for the North ACT team. 
As with the ACT Feelings scale, the North ACT and Homeless Outreach teams 
recorded similar responses on the Workplace Aspects scale at Time 1 (Table 17).  Staff 
from both teams perceived that there was agency-wide support for the implementation 
effort, particularly from supervisors.  However, across the two teams, the majority of the 
staff members (9 of 11, 82%) indicated disagreement with the statement, “It has been 
easy to implement ACT” (Item 9).  The North ACT team members produced similar 
ratings at Time 2 (Table 18), including still perceiving implementation as difficult. 
 The Conditions scale items were tailored to the service being provided by the 
team, i.e., ACT or CST.  The results for all three teams at both time points are presented 
in Table 19.  The North ACT team and the CST team rated the items in relation to the 
same type of service at both time points (ACT and CST, respectively), while the 
Homeless Outreach team rated ACT at Time 1 and CST at Time 2.  Responses at Time 1 
suggest that inadequate training and supervision as well as staff skepticism of the added 
value of the service may be potential problems for ACT, but not for CST services.  
Moreover, in comparison to their responses while providing ACT services (Time 1), the 
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Homeless Outreach team rated training and supervision more positively under CST 
service (Time 2).  However, this finding may be explained by the fact that the team did 
not have a full-time Team Leader at Time 1 (the West Program Manager was serving as 
an acting Team Leader), but did have a designated, full-time Team Leader who was 
integrated into the team at Time 2.  All three teams at both time periods reported 
experiencing intense work pressure (item 5), indicating that this factor was not unique to 
ACT implementation. 
 
 
Leadership 
Leadership style ratings as well as outcomes of leadership (i.e., satisfaction, 
motivation to put in extra effort, and effectiveness of the leader) are presented in Tables 
20 and 21, for Time 1 and Time 2, respectively.  The CST team generally rated the North 
Program Manager more favorably than did the North ACT team, despite the fact that this 
was the same middle manager for the two teams.  In particular, the North ACT team 
perceived the North Program Manager to be more passive/avoidant in his approach than 
what was perceived by the CST team.  Also, the CST team members endorsed a higher 
level of satisfaction with their interactions with this person.  However, all the rated 
leaders, including the North Program Manager, were rated higher in transformational and 
transactional leadership characteristics than passive/avoidant traits.  Additionally, all 
leaders were rated on the MLQ as at least moderately effective. 
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The results of the study supported Hypothesis 1, which predicted that the two 
teams implementing ACT would have higher DACTS scores than the CST team.  The 
fidelity scores were consistent with the goal of implementing high fidelity ACT in the 
North ACT team, however neither of the other teams achieved high fidelity.  The 
Homeless Outreach team did not achieve high fidelity but did have a higher fidelity rating 
than the CST team (even after decertification to CST services) due to ACT-like 
requirements of the SAMHSA grant (e.g., a nurse on the team). 
Examination of Quantitative Hypotheses 
  Hypotheses 2 and 3 made predictions involving the EBPAS and MLQ, 
respectively.  Due to the small sample sizes on the three teams and the frequent missing 
data, Hypotheses 2 and 3 were not examined.
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QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
 
 
 
Staff members shared their experiences with implementing Rule 132 for both 
CST and ACT services.  As previously stated, the themes for implementation are 
presented in Table 8.  The interviews revealed that nuances of Rule 132, such as 
implementing a FFS funding mechanism and ACT team requirements beyond what is 
specified in the model (e.g., decertification if staff vacancies exceeded 30 days), 
introduced unique challenges for the teams at Thresholds.  The common themes that 
emerged from the coding across all three teams (CST and ACT) are discussed first.  The 
common themes were related to implementing Rule 132 in general rather than ACT 
specifically, but lend a perspective on the challenges at Thresholds during the re-
implementation of ACT.  Unless specified as occurring at Time 1 or Time 2, the stated 
figures of those reporting a particular theme in the text of this manuscript represent a 
summation across both time periods.  At times the figures reported in the text may not 
appear to align with the tables.  For instance, a particular staff member may have reported 
a theme at both time periods, which would be listed in the tables under both Time 1 and 
Time 2.  However, the tables do not specify which line staff member reported the themes.   
82 
 
 
The primary barriers that were common across all three teams, and therefore not 
specific to ACT implementation, were the perceived negative impacts of FFS, ambiguity 
of Rule 132 standards and lack of guidance from the DMH, and difficulties with the 
manage care organization that the state hired to manage Rule 132.  Common themes of 
leadership, positive staff attitudes, and familiarity with the services outlined by Rule 132 
represented facilitators to implementing the changes.  Additionally, the themes of good 
communication and preparation through a gradual process of change were also early 
facilitators to the implementation of Rule 132. 
Common Themes for the Three Teams 
 
The Perceived Negative Impact of FFS 
As previously mentioned, Table 12 lists the objective changes at Thresholds as a 
result of instituting a FFS funding mechanism.  In order to ensure the agency was able to 
receive the maximum allotted funding from DMH, management at Thresholds 
established productivity standards for billing purposes.  Additionally, FFS restructured 
the billing system to be in alignment with Medicaid billing.  In response to these changes 
that resulted from the switch to FFS, many staff members reported a strong negative 
impact on their jobs and morale.  In particular, they reported an inability to meet the 
productivity standards in an eight-hour day, pressure for billing and perceived lack of 
support and understanding from management, concern for their jobs as a result of 
productivity standards, and the perception of decreased quality of services. 
As evidence of the negative impact of FFS, the majority of staff members (17 of 
20, 85%) reported a perceived inability to accomplish all required tasks (i.e., productivity 
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standards) in an eight-hour day (see Table 22 for percentage of staff reporting each 
barrier at Time1 and Time 2).  The only staff members who did not complain about this 
standard were management staff.  In response to FFS, the management staff at 
Thresholds established productivity standards regarding direct face-to-face contact with 
consumers for line staff members to achieve each day in addition to their meetings, travel 
time, and note writing.  Staff members overwhelmingly reported at both time periods that 
it was challenging for them to meet these productivity standards in an eight-hour 
workday.  One staff member explained: 
“The main challenges have been trying to fit everything in an eight-hour 
day.  Everything that we have to do---the billable hours, the service 
reporting, and then all the hundred other little tasks that we have like 
meeting, making sure that the medications are taken care of, making sure 
that our paperwork’s done.  I think that’s probably the biggest challenge is 
that it’s not really a job that can be done in an eight-hour day and we’re 
kind of forced to do that or work more hours after that” (CST, Time 2). 
 
Another staff member described how it is difficult to accomplish all tasks even 
when accommodations were made to their work schedule: 
“When I first got here we were meeting [staff meeting] once in the 
morning and once in the evening and then try to do your notes and then try 
to get out and see them [consumers] and it’s unrealistic.  Now we meet 
once [staff meeting] and it’s still very hard to have time to get back and 
get your notes in and then you have to have them in within a window of 72 
hours.  Support-wise in that area, it’s very hard to get it all done.  So 
you’re always rushing to get it all done” (Homeless Outreach, Time 1). 
 
 A member of the CST team indicated how these accommodations to their work 
schedule that are intended to help staff meet productivity standards can actually have a 
negative impact the team: 
“Well they cut, we used to have an afternoon meeting where we would, at 
four o’clock at the end of the day we would be able to sit and talk about 
our visits for that day and any other work that we did and they cut that out 
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so that we could spend more time in the field and would have more time 
doing notes.  And that’s one thing that was pretty stressful.  It’s kind of 
reduced kind of the team feeling that we had and we had to lead a really 
kind of, I can’t think of the word, but just come down after a day.  Kind of 
de-stress and talk about what was going on that day and getting input right 
then about what we might have done.  That’s one example of a change that 
has made things more stressful because we don’t have that kind of team 
feeling anymore.  We’re in a rush all the time.  Just get out of the office 
and get the hours in” (CST, Time 1). 
 
A member of the North ACT team explained how the work load can then 
accumulate over time and become overwhelming: 
“When you go out or you leave here 10:30 or 11 in the morning and you 
schedule your day to try to accommodate the 4-5 hours you need, you may 
get back here 3:30-4:00 and I’m personally drained, physically and 
mentally and it’s difficult for me to try to sit there and type notes because 
I’m not the greatest typist in the world so it takes some effort, some 
thought for me to do that.  And then you may not get all your notes in 
during an afternoon and then the next day it starts again with the meetings 
and then you have to be out of here at 10:30-11 so you get behind and it’s 
almost a snowball effect.  There’s no way to get caught up.  And if it’s not 
documented, it didn’t happen.  It’s sort of a catch 22.  Pressure for billing 
and lack of support” (North ACT, Time 1). 
 
Several factors were identified as contributing to the inability to meet the 
productivity standards in an 8 hour timeframe, including the inability to bill for travel and 
consumers not being home or not wanting to meet for long periods of time (see Table 
22).  Prior to FFS, staff were permitted to bill for travel time if the consumers or property 
of the consumer (e.g., money or medications) were in the car.  However, this allowance 
was removed once Illinois instated a FFS funding mechanism to comply with Medicaid 
billing.  In a city the size of Chicago, staff members reported that this created a major 
challenge to achieving the required number of direct service hours in an eight-hour 
workday.  Moreover, if the consumer is not home after the staff member has traveled to 
visit them, staff members indicated that it becomes increasingly difficult to amass the 
85 
 
 
mandated number of direct service contact hours for that day.  One staff member 
described the challenge of attaining hours due to travel and consumers not being home 
for appointments: 
“I mean you’re in the car, which you can’t bill for from one side of the 
city to another.  Sometimes it takes an hour in travel.  Which puts the 
pressure on you because you have to meet the criteria of a certain number 
of hours per day.  And if you’re in the car and can’t bill for that, what are 
you going to do.  It’s tough to be able to develop enough hours basically 
for billing…Because a lot of times people aren’t home or people aren’t 
communicative so it’s difficult with that and not being able to charge for 
travel time so that is a major issue” (Homeless Outreach, Time 1). 
 
A staff member from the CST team explained how the productivity standards 
make staff feel pressured to spend more time (i.e., longer visits) with consumers even if 
this is not desired by the consumer: 
“Sometimes members don’t like you in their space.  You’re being invited 
into their personal lives and it’s really intrusive when you say hey, I need 
to spend more time, you don’t say that but hey, you kind of push to spend 
more time” (CST, Time 2). 
 
A second factor that contributed to a perceived negative impact of FFS was the 
pressure for billing, which was perceived as a priority of the management at Thresholds.   
All of those interviewed (20, 100%) acknowledged an increased pressure for billing at 
either Time 1 or Time 2 (see Table 22).  As one staff member explained: 
 “We’re a lot more focused on getting our billable time.  It’s become a 
major focus of the agency and the pressure is on us to make sure that we 
get our hours in and to still provide quality service but to work around the 
limitations that have been put on us with that” (CST, Time 2). 
 
 Another staff member voiced the perception that billing was the top priority rather 
than quality of services: 
“Over the years I’ve seen, and not just Thresholds but other agencies as 
well social service-wise, have looked at the dollar and have lost a little 
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luster for the quality of what they do for folks.  In other words, the mission 
is not driving them anymore, it’s the money” (Homeless Outreach, Time 
1). 
 
The increased pressure for billing led the majority of team members (10 of 17, 
59%) to perceive a lack of support and understanding from upper management in terms 
of productivity standards and billing (Table 22):  
“I think it sometimes it’s hard for them to understand what we’re going 
through.  A lot of the upper management, before also did direct service 
and feel like okay, we [upper management] were able to do this but it’s a 
little different.  The population and the job are totally different now.  
They’re asking us to do too much” (Homeless Outreach, Time 2). 
 
 Another staff member commented on pressure for billing in particular: 
“But then you come back and you’re dealing with more challenging 
members and then you come back and you’ve got this building permeating 
pressure to get your notes in, to do all your paperwork, and it’s like, it 
doesn’t feel like it’s a very supportive agency-wide for anybody” (North 
ACT, Time 2).   
 
Another staff member voiced a strong opinion of the agency’s pressure for billing 
and perception that management does not consider the welfare of the employees: 
“We always had to do notes but now that it’s FFS it’s get the money, get 
the money, get the money.  And I feel like that’s what they’re concerned 
about; they’re not concerned about those on the forefront, us out here, the 
difficulties and the places that we go in to…if this is ACT, this is FFS, do 
this, you have to have 4 hours, if you don’t we write you up and that’s it, 
get our money and we’ll worry about you later” (Homeless Outreach, 
Time 1). 
 
Another staff member described the impact of this pressure for billing on his 
relationship and perception of those in management: 
“That’s the message that I walked away with in most of the meetings was 
still about the billing, the billing, how to bill, and get it done.  So, yeah.  
That was still the primary focus of everything I was ever talked to 
about…I think overall it certainly made me wonder about the integrity of 
the agency that would cause that to be their primary focus.  While I 
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understand it, of course, and as many people do, it still made me think 
about the integrity of the agency and to what extent then my importance 
was as an employee.  What extent the importance of the clients’ lives 
were, the members’ lives were.  I mean are we doing this so we can get, so 
we can bill to get paid to keep doing it?  Or, you know, I don’t know.  I 
questioned that.  I questioned the integrity of the agency.” 
 
He further added: 
 
“I try to stay focused on what the whole mission statement is here—I 
mean it’s a wonderful mission statement but I wonder sometimes if 
somebody shouldn’t sit down and re-write it a little bit given this FFS 
thing, really…I mean I think it creates in this work culture, animosity, 
frustration.  I think it creates distrust between management and myself.  
Always second guessing what their motives are” (North ACT, Time 2). 
 
Nearly half of those who were held to productivity standards, i.e., team members 
(8 of 17; 47%) reported being reprimanded or feeling concern for their jobs as a result of 
productivity standards (Table 22). 
 One staff member stated: 
“But the FFS and making sure that we have a certain amount of hours 
logged and we make a certain percentage, it’s been pretty stressful…I 
know just within the last few months they’ve really cracked down on our 
hours and meeting a certain percentage and people are getting written up 
and not meeting those percentages and our jobs are on the line because of 
that” (CST, Time 1). 
 
Another staff member described the impact of feeling reprimanded based on 
productivity standards: 
“If after a day of doing what you feel like you’ve been called on this earth 
to do and then you get back here and you’re punished, this can’t be good.  
I mean any professional worth their weight is going to tell you this is not a 
good healthy work environment and it’s because of that reason.  Because 
of the punishment that goes on… Don’t punish us when we don’t meet 
those expectations that are somehow just completely unrealistic” (North 
ACT, Time 2).  
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When asked about FFS, the Team Leader from the North ACT team provided a 
thorough description of the impact that highlights the various codes represented in this 
theme such as the inability to complete all requirements in an eight-hour day, the 
pressure for billing, and the perception that upper management does not understand the 
consequences of their demands: 
“It’s [implementation of FFS] been far harder than the implementation of 
ACT.  We can’t do it in the eight-hour day over and over and over 
again…But it’s been really, really hard and it’s not a question that my 
team isn’t getting their billable hours, they are.  But finding the time in the 
day to get the notes in has been a nightmare.  And I think the agency could 
have done a lot better job in showing support.  Everybody’s feeling the 
pressure so, so, so strongly…. But the big deal is the pressure to get in the 
billing, to get it in on time, and then while you’re at it you can do this, 
this, and this and then a pile of assessments we weren’t expecting to have 
done and we feel like we’re constantly getting thrown off guard and I feel 
bad because I’m putting in ten hour days.  [Names another team member] 
is putting in ten hour days.  Everybody else is trying to juggle with the 
eight [hours] and it’s not working and management doesn’t realize that 
what they’re asking from us is a ten hour day…And many of my team 
feels like they’re not being heard…It’s like the demand is there and that's 
it and we have nothing to say about it.  Okay, that’s fine if it really was an 
eight-hour job.  But it’s not.  They never take lunch, never.  I’m nibbling 
on finger food from location to location and my team is doing the same 
thing.  They’re [upper management] not accounting for enough transport 
time…I mean there aren’t enough hours.  I’m putting in ten hour days.  
I’m not even scratching the surface…I’m working at home on the 
computer on the weekends.  If my husband knew how many hours I was in 
front of the computer at home he’d kill me.  But it’s getting bigger and 
bigger and I don’t see it stopping.  And that is probably the biggest 
problem we’ve got and unless they can take away some of the billing 
hours or figure out a faster way for us to be able to get in their notes, I 
don’t see any big changes” (North ACT Team Leader, Time 1). 
 
The stressful workplace atmosphere that was created by the demands of a FFS 
funding mechanism, contributed to nearly half of team members reporting staff burnout 
(8 of 17, 47%) over the course of the study (Table 22).  One staff member indicated that 
he had enrolled in college courses with the intent of switching careers after 22 years in 
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the mental health field.  When asked of the reason for the decision to change careers, he 
stated, “You know what, I think really this FFS thing is just killing me, really” (Time 2).  
Moreover, the Clinical Director described burnout as a major problem throughout the 
entire agency.  She indicated that burnout was likely the result of multiple changes 
occurring at once (discussed later) and the poor financial situation within the state of 
Illinois that then contributes to pressure within the agency for billing: 
“I think that that’s an issue [burnout] that we’re struggling with here.  It 
seems to be that there are a lot of changes in a very short period of time 
that have been quite challenging and I think what we try to do is we try to 
increase communication around what’s happening.  We keep looking at 
that.  We keep listening.  It feels like there hasn’t been very much that 
we’ve been able to do.  I mean, you know we’ve had to take away some 
things.  We’ve taken away staff recognition day.  We’ve taken away staff 
development day because we just can’t afford it.  I think we’re trying to 
overly communicate with people about the real challenges that we’re faced 
with here in the State of Illinois and that, these are not things that 
Thresholds is necessarily imposing.  But this is as a result of the economic 
environment in our state situation that we’re in right now…I think morale 
is a real issue right now.  One manager just called me to say it’s [morale] 
the most difficult thing they’re dealing with now.  Realities are you still 
got to get your numbers [productivity standards] in” (Clinical Director, 
Time 2). 
 
Therefore, changes that came about due to FFS rather than the implementation of 
ACT, such as productivity standards and pressure for billing, contributed to staff burnout.  
Staff burnout was a factor in the decisions of staff who resigned, including the Team 
Leader for the North ACT team at Time 2.  As discussed later, staff turnover, particularly 
in key positions such as Team Leader, was a major barrier to ACT implementation.   
In addition to being concerned for their jobs due to an inability to meet 
productivity standards and a poor financial situation within the state, the pressure to meet 
billing requirements contributed to the staff’s perception of reduced quality of services 
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(11 of 20, 55%), which was viewed as another negative impact of FFS (Table 22).  One 
staff member commented: 
“You’re talking about taking the human factor out of it and saying we 
need this many number of hours for billing.  So, it becomes quantity 
instead of quality.  You spend more time trying to meet your hours 
whereas prior to that you may have had some time to sit down and really 
go in-depth with someone.  Between the traveling and trying to meet the 
hours, it makes it more quantity versus quality.  I think that you can’t get 
the true quality that you would like to have or to achieve from that aspect” 
(Homeless Outreach, Time 1). 
 
Another team member of the Homeless Outreach team expanded on this concept 
by tying the reduced quality specifically to concerns for her job: 
“I don’t think that there’s any quality in the service that we provide now.  I 
don’t think that we have, like I said, there’s no quality.  We’re not giving 
quality service to the members that I think that we can, that we have the 
potential to do.  Because we’re thinking about we have to get out here and 
then most of us are thinking about getting back in, getting our notes in so 
when that quarter comes up, we’re not being written up” (Homeless 
Outreach, Time 2). 
 
Another line staff reported: 
 
“I have noticed the impact it has on members the way I seem to experience 
it which is members don’t get, because we have to rush back and bill, or 
we have to make sure we take the time to bill and do that plus provide the 
services, the delivery of the services, plus create a plan so we can figure 
out how we’re going to deliver those services, at the end of an eight-hour 
day there’s no time to do all that.  So what doesn’t get done is the delivery 
of the services the way I think they could be if we weren’t FFS” (North 
ACT, Time 2). 
 
A member of the Homeless Outreach team had also noticed a decrease in the 
quality of progress notes since the change to FFS: 
“It seemed like when we were putting notes in the computer [prior to 
FFS], it was more for the members’ progress so if I came in and I want to 
see what they were doing a week ago I could see where they’re at, what 
advances are going on.  Whereas now it’s just like we did this so we could 
get the billing.  It’s like coding.  So it’s, I’m reading a note, I’m not really 
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knowing where this person’s at in the recovery process.  I just know that 
they did this for the day to get the billing…You don’t get anything like a 
narrative proportion to it anymore.  It’s more like we’re going to meet this 
objective for payment and then move on” (Homeless Outreach, Time 1). 
 
The Clinical Director acknowledged the potential for a temporarily reduced 
quality of services and increased pressure for billing in the following statement: 
“It’s been a huge change for us…When all of a sudden you have to start 
paying attention to productivity I think the quality of the service tends to 
take a back seat and trying to maintain because it’s all about productivity 
here.  That’s what it’s turned into and trying to maintain the balance of 
making sure staff achieve their billable targets but that they’re also not 
committing fraud and that we’re also trying to pay attention to quality.  I 
think as somebody in my role it’s been hard to try to manage both and I’m 
hoping, we’re still not where we need to be in terms of productivity and as 
soon as we get that taken care of then we can pay more attention to sort of 
the evidence based practices and best practices and quality of services 
which isn’t to say it’s taken a total back step but it has.  I think if you were 
to talk to staff and if there’s not a research project happening in their 
particular program, which is focused on some service, clinical service, or 
evidence based practices they would say, “It’s all about productivity, it’s 
all about productivity”.  And that’s true because we haven’t been able to, 
haven’t been able to account for that just yet” (Clinical Director, Time 1). 
 
At the Time 2 assessment the Clinical Director had felt that the focus on 
productivity standards was lessening: 
“We’re trying to move ahead with EBPs and I think the staff are wanting 
to get back to the business of providing good clinical services and having 
to focus on that rather than on productivity, productivity, productivity.  So 
I think, I don’t want to say that we’re totally over the hump in terms of 
never having to worry about productivity again but I think we’re in a 
position now where we can also focus, provide a little bit more balance in 
terms of let’s focus on the clinical issues and not every conversation we 
have need to be about productivity” (Clinical Director, Time 2). 
 
 However, this perception of lessened stress for billing was not generally endorsed 
by team members.  Of the 10 team members, i.e., Team Leaders included,  interviewed at 
Time 2, 8 (80%) still complained of pressure for billing (see Table 22) and only 1 staff 
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member spontaneously reported that the adjustment to productivity standards in particular 
was going well: 
“I think initially it was really hard to switch over to FFS because we had 
to get accustomed and learn to adapt to that and make our days different.  
Sometimes not having lunch or whatever it may be to get those hours in 
and then finding the time to do your notes.  But I think it transitioned quite 
well.  I think we, you know, it started off we were expected to do 70% of 
the expected hours, then 80%, then 90% and eventually 100% and I think 
a lot of people have been making that.  The slow transition helped that and 
I think people are use to it now” (CST, Time 2). 
 
Therefore, the switch to FFS was viewed by all, including the Clinical Director, as 
a major change for staff members that resulted in many difficulties such as the formation 
and enforcement of productivity standards.  Staff members perceived FFS as having 
varying negative impacts on their jobs, which led to an environment in which they felt 
increased pressure and lack of upper management support for handling these challenges. 
In addition, those interviewed expressed frustrations with the ambiguity of Rule 132 
standards and lack of guidance from the DMH. 
 
Ambiguity of Rule 132 Standards/Lack of DMH Guidance 
 According to half of those interviewed (10 of 20, 50%), a barrier to Rule 132 
implementation was that the standards and interpretations of Rule 132 changed often, 
particularly early in the implementation (i.e., Time 1; see Table 22).  The ambiguity of 
the standards and constantly changing rules contributed to confusion and frustration for 
staff members and made it difficult to be in compliance, e.g., with the authorization 
process (discussed in next section).  As a member of the CST described: 
“And then adjusting to…just learning the rules.  The rules are constantly 
kind of being revised or how we are interpreting them for CST services. I 
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think it is so new that new changes are coming about.  And that’s a 
challenge because you don’t know if you’re doing something this week 
and then next week they tell you, “Ok, now you have to do it a different 
way or this change is coming in a week.” It’s all very confusing” (CST, 
Time 1).  
 
 A staff member from the North ACT team indicated that the constant change was 
the biggest challenge and that the ambiguity gave the impression that no one knew how 
to properly interpret Rule 132: 
“I suppose the biggest challenge would be continually hearing about 
changes coming down and just always kind of waiting for something to 
change.  Because there’s always something new, almost every day it 
seems.  I feel like none of us are comfortable with it just 
yet…[information on changes] trickle down I felt like.  Just sort of piece 
by piece and I think that every, from what I have heard it seems like 
nobody is the real expert or anything on it [Rule 132]” (North ACT, Time 
1). 
 
The Clinical Director indicated that the confusion regarding the interpretation of 
Rule 132 was complicated by a lack of guidance from DMH.  She explained: 
“So there’s FFS and there was the Rule [132] change.  So those were two 
huge changes for us.  Unfortunately the state, there’s nobody in the state 
who can make any decisions right now.  So when you have a question 
about how to proceed, there’s nobody who can make a decision, there’s 
nobody who has the answers, and it just feels like the providers are being 
left with all of the risks and we’re left holding the ball because the state is 
not assuming any role in kind of helping is figure this out” (Clinical 
Director, Time 1). 
 
 The lack of guidance from DMH was infrequently reported by line staff (1 
of 14, 7%) in contrast to the comments made by those in management positions, 
particularly the Clinical Director (see Tables 22 and 23).  It is likely that the 
problems interpreting the regulations were better understood by those in 
management positions who had the responsibility of interacting with the state, 
while line staff may not have understood the nuances. 
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Difficulties with the Managed Care Organization 
A particular area of poor guidance from the DMH involved a lack of coordinated 
effort with the managed care organization (referred to as “the ASO” by staff members) 
that the state hired to monitor the roll out of Rule 132.  Among other things, the ASO was 
responsible for approving the authorizations for services.  While this theme was reported 
by a small percentage of those interviewed (4 of 20, 20%), the ASO was judged to have 
created significant barriers to providing services for both the CST and ACT teams at both 
Time 1 and Time 2.  Similar to the theme of lack of guidance from DMH, this theme was 
largely identified by those in management positions (see Tables 22 and 23).  Team 
Leaders and Program Managers were responsible for interactions with the ASO and 
therefore, this barrier appeared to be largely hidden from the line staff.  The Clinical 
Director and Team Leaders described the difficulties with the managed care organization 
as substantially impacting the implementation of Rule 132 due to the ASO presenting 
conflicting information from DMH and instituting an unorganized, tedious authorization 
process. 
According to the Clinical Director, one problem for implementation of Rule 132 
was that DMH and the ASO often presented conflicting information concerning Rule 132 
to the agencies: 
 “And they say well, you know, that’s the other thing that they did to, is 
they kept publishing documents and we have three documents that we 
need to use currently to know whether we’re doing ACT right.  There’s 
the Rule [132], there’s the ASO protocol which was different than the 
Rule.  So, for example, the Rule did not state the number of team meetings 
that the psychiatrist had to be present at but the ASO protocol does.  And 
then at the last phone call we heard that they’re going to be using the 
DACT when they review us.  So there’s three, you know, and each one of 
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them and so what we did is we sort of took the Rule and the DACT and 
we sort of looked at it initially but then here came the Protocol which had 
different stuff in it and now they are saying they are going to use the 
DACT which, so nobody really knows what tool, what they’re eventually 
going to use when they come in [to evaluate fidelity] and we have to pay 
back if we’re out of compliance” (Clinical Director, Time 1).   
 
She further described a couple of the challenges with interacting with the ASO, 
including a lack of guidance on their regulations: 
 “We don’t have enough time to really go into all the problems with the 
ASO but the ASO sort of, at the state’s bidding, went ahead and rolled out 
the first managed care gatekeeper option before they were ready to do it.  
So there were some challenges associated with that and one example is, 
you know, we have to submit faxes for authorization and they couldn’t 
accept batch faxes so that meant you had to submit each fax separately 
with its own separate cover sheet.  That kind of stuff is very, very painful.  
They also, we have to reauthorize every six months but we don’t really 
know for them how they define six months.  We’ve asked them a couple 
of times.  In fact, I organized a meeting with the ASO and they came here 
because there were multiple problems that we were having.  They’d been 
unable to answer those questions.  It’s been kind of strange and I think 
that’s because the state isn’t providing them with any answers.  So we’re 
sort of wondering these questions and we’ve asked a couple of times.  
Who is making these decisions?  Who’s in charge?  Can you just tell us so 
that we can go and talk to them.  There is nobody.  So I think the 
management staff-the Team Leaders and the Program Managers are the 
ones who are primarily dealing with those challenges that the CST team 
and the ACT team are dealing with.  That has been challenging for them” 
(Clinical Director, Time 2). 
 
The Clinical Director further described a lack of guidance on an ASO 
authorization rule that conflicted with Rule 132 stipulations specific to CST 
teams: 
“So our community support teams, they [ASO] require that for 
authorization you have a service plan done but the Rule 132 says that you 
have 45 days in which to complete the service plan.  So we’re wondering 
why they’re requiring something over and above the Rule.  Why can’t, and 
how do you do a service plan when you first meet somebody?  How do 
you get a service plan done that makes sense?  And so we asked them and 
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oh, hmm, yeah that’s a good question but they still don’t come back to us 
so we still have those teams who are struggling to get the service plans 
done before they can get the person authorized.  They don’t do that for the 
ACT team.  They allow them more time to get the service plan done 
maybe that’s because it’s a different population.  I don’t know” (Clinical 
Director, Time 2).   
 
 The Team Leader of the North ACT team described how interacting with the 
ASO has impacted her job in terms of confusion with previous DMH regulations, 
additional paperwork beyond what was required by DMH, and lack of flexibility: 
“My working for the state was really the, my initial authorizations were 
very easy to do.  The guy from the state was a breeze to work with, very 
nice, very helpful.  With the ASO coming in there’s more confusion.  
They don’t have their policies down yet.  I think that’s where the problem 
is right now.  And then their [ASO] changes are coming down and then 
sometimes there’s confusion connected with the changes that we already 
heard [from DMH] and so it’s just a lot of chaos right now… Because 
their [ASO] demands got flung on us at the last second.  They, the state 
wanted one form [paperwork] with the diagnosis, name, MRN number.  I 
mean when I had done the initial authorization in September they were a 
breeze.  I had to do the LOCUS, we got diagnosis, it was a two-page sheet 
to fill out, faxed it over to the state…But the ASO insisted that a full 
mental health assessment be done with every single person.  So basically 
you’re talking a two-hour—and that's if you're experienced doing it—a 
two hour assessment care plan and then the authorization is literally two 
hours solid of work to enter in, in order to submit to the ASO [4 hours 
total of work per member to submit to get them authorized to receive 
ACT].  That was thrown at us a month before they, a month before I had 
all of these due.  We hadn’t even touched them.  We hadn’t even gone into 
our computer system.  They still hadn’t even done the training on them 
yet.  So that wasn’t the state.  That was the ASO that did that.  And here 
we are panicking trying to get them all in.  I get them in by the skin of my 
teeth and it was exhausting me.  I was literally locked in this office for 
days on end, two months.  I mean, that part of it has been a nightmare.  
I’m still not finished with them.  I’m sending over a ten page assessment, 
care plan, and everything for each individual [instead of the two page form 
originally required by DMH]” (North ACT Team Leader, Time 1). 
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She further describes a lack of understanding from the ASO regarding the 
level of work involved with their regulations and the challenges of interacting 
with them as leading to burnout: 
“And the one day I sent two [assessments for authorization] at once they 
called and said, oh no you can’t do that.  Shame, shame, shame.  Well 
there’s nothing written that I couldn’t… Everybody’s under enough 
pressure already, we don’t need that pressure of every six months having 
to do essentially 34 care plans at the same time.  And I’ve been trying to 
get it through their heads.  You guys don’t want the flood [of authorization 
forms] either, yeah.  That’s been the roughest part.  Now we’ve got all of 
these people on the same cycle and so every six months we’re going 
through that.  How much longer will staff stay” (North ACT Team Leader, 
Time 1)? 
 
The Clinical Director also provided an example of how the current authorization 
process can put the agency at financial risk: 
“Like one thing that the ASO says when we submit an authorization we 
fax it to them.  Then they’re supposed to send out a letter to us, but they 
were sending our letters everywhere [e.g., sending North ACT team’s 
letters to the Homeless Outreach team] and it was a real mess and so we 
say to them well, can you let us know.  And we got, “Oh, well if you don’t 
hear from us you can just assume that the person’s been approved.”  Well, 
you know what, that’s just not good enough because if we don’t have the 
approval and we get audited then it’s a pay back risk for us.  So no, we 
can’t accept that…And nobody quite seems open to input from the 
providers either [on authorization process].  I think that’s painful.  We 
could have avoided a lot of these snafus that caused us a lot of 
administrative problems if they had sort of piloted the authorization 
process with one agency first.  It was rolled out without any input or any 
foresight to some extent” (Clinical Director, Time 2). 
 
 Therefore, the ambiguity of the procedures and stipulations of Rule 132, including 
interactions with the ASO, coupled with the lack of guidance from the DMH, contributed 
to frustration and hampered implementation of Rule 132 at the agency level.  These 
common barriers along with the perceived negative impact of FFS, particularly 
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demanding productivity standards and pressure for billing, resulted in an agency-wide 
atmosphere full of chaos and stress. 
 
Positive staff attitudes, leadership, and familiarity with services were identified as 
common facilitators to implementing Rule 132 across the three teams. 
Common Facilitators 
 
Positive Staff Attitudes regarding Rule 132 Changes 
Over half of the those interviewed (12 of 20, 60%) were able to identify some 
positive aspects of either FFS, such as more accountability and becoming more creative 
with the type of service provided, or implementing the recovery-centered concepts 
intended by program criteria in Rule 132 for both CST and ACT services.  This positive 
outlook was expressed by all three Team Leaders and all three of those in management 
positions and nearly half of the line staff (6 of 14, 43%).  Of the 6 line staff to mention a 
positive aspect to implementing Rule 132 at either time period, 3 were represented on the 
North ACT team, 1 was from the Homeless Outreach team, and 2 were on the CST team 
(see Table 24).  The Team Leader from the CST team explained the potential benefit of 
the funding mechanism change as forcing the clinicians to really consider the services 
that they were providing to the consumers: 
 “Well, it’s [FFS] made us think a lot more about money and how our 
agency runs and basically billing…But as far as the services provided to 
the members, I don’t think that has changed.  I still think we’re providing 
very good services, quality services to the members.  We have to look at it 
differently and really think about the services that we’re providing.  Okay, 
are we providing community support?  Are we providing case 
management?  Are we providing that training?  It makes you think about 
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that more.  We can’t just lump it under ACT anymore.  Have to break it 
out and say okay, this is what I’m doing.  It also has made us think about 
what more can we do with this person?  It’s just not a money and med 
drop.  It’s like what other things can we assist this person with and kind 
of, I think has helped us have longer visits with people or you know, more 
quality visits and getting to know people more” (CST Team Leader, Time 
2). 
 
Another staff member from the CST team was able to find a positive aspect of 
being unable to bill for travel: 
“We aren’t able to bill for travel time.  We used to be able to bill for travel 
time.  So that’s changed where we can see the members and in a good way 
it’s worked out for us to be a little more creative with how we do our visits 
and trying to find ways to spend more time with members” (CST, Time 2).  
 
The West Program Manager and acting Team Leader for the Homeless Outreach 
team discussed the benefits of introducing recovery concepts to ACT services to both 
staff and the consumers: 
“With Rule 132, since we’re no longer maintaining, we’re not doing 
things for members.  We’re showing them how to do it so they can be 
independent.  It just naturally gives you the opportunity to spend more 
time with people because maybe you’re modeling them making the phone 
call to the psychiatrist or when you go to the grocery store you’re 
modeling what you need to do so I think if they use that time as it was 
meant for as in skill training and not doing things for members then it’s 
easier to get that time [productivity standard] and I think it’s easy to spend 
more time with members…We’re not doing a member a service by doing 
it for them.  You know, our goal is to be able to gradually remove 
ourselves from the members’ lives and have them reach their goals and do 
things that they want to do and to know how to do that without us” (West 
Program Manager, Time 1). 
 
 
Leadership and Support 
Another common facilitator to implementation of Rule 132 was leadership and 
support.  All 20 staff members who were interviewed identified leadership from one or 
100 
 
 
more sources as instrumental for overcoming or coping with the challenges of 
implementing changes to the service delivery system (see Table 24).  However, the 
source of leadership and support varied depending on the level of the staff member within 
the organization (see Table 25).  When asked of the support that she provides to the 
teams, the Clinical Director indicated that Thresholds follows a top-down communication 
chain.  Therefore, upper management interacts almost exclusively with middle 
management, who then communicated the information to the Team Leaders and finally 
the line staff.  Consequently, while upper management was viewed as highly supportive 
by middle management (2, 100%), the upper management staff members were largely 
unknown to the line staff.  One Program Manager (middle management) described the 
communication, support and commitment from upper management as: 
“We had constant contact with [names the Clinical Director] and my 
supervisor [names the West Regional Manager] and as soon as they heard 
things coming down the pipe they would let us know and we would rally 
around how to address every step.  I felt like there was always ongoing 
support…[names the Clinical Director] I think was a champion for us.  
She was always at each and every meeting.  She was very hands on and 
enthusiastic” (West Program Manager, Time 1). 
 
However, when a line staff member was describing leadership from 
“management” he was asked who he considered “management” to be and the name of the 
Clinical Director was mentioned by the researcher as a possibility.  The line staff member 
replied, “I don’t know who [names Clinical Director] is.  I don’t even know who she is” 
(North ACT, Time 1).  The respondent considered his Team Leader to be “management.” 
  The line staff identified the Program Managers (labeled as middle management 
in this study) as the highest authorities that they interact with on a regular basis.  
Consequently, the line staff reporting receiving leadership and support mainly from 
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middle management (i.e., Program Managers and Assistant Program Managers; reported 
by 10 of 14, 71%) and their Team Leader (9 of 14, 64%), as well as emergent leadership 
from other teammates (9 of 14, 64%).  The line staff identified middle management as 
providing significant leadership, guidance, and a source of buffering from the demands of 
upper management: 
“I think we have a really good Program Manager and Assistant Program 
Manager and so they help us, they help buffer us from a lot of the critical 
stuff going on and the numbers [productivity standards] and all that but 
they’ve been forced to bring that to our attention a lot….our supervision is 
really good kind of keeping our focus on providing services but still letting 
us know that we’re being pounded on the head from people above [upper 
management] saying that we still need to meet these [productivity 
standards] and we still need to do this and come back to the office and 
input all these notes and it has to be on time” (CST, Time 1). 
 
 The support from middle management was also reported by all three Team 
Leaders (including the Homeless Outreach Team Leader who was hired after 
decertification): 
“The support that we get from our bosses like the Assistant Program 
Manager and the Program Manager really helps.  And just the ability to 
communicate and share with each other.  I think that’s the most important 
thing and the main thing that has helped us get through it [Rule 132 
changes]” (CST Team Leader, Time 2). 
 
Team Leaders were also a source of support for line staff: 
“[Names Team Leader] is really diligent about making sure we get 
supervision.  She’s demonstrated that she has an open door policy.  We 
can call her on weekends.  We can call her after work.  She’s available at 
any time…she’s really dedicated to making ACT work on this team” 
(North ACT, Time 1). 
 
Support from other team members was also identified by line staff as instrumental 
to implementing change and to dealing with challenges that emerge: 
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“… I feel that with collegial support I’m able to do this job and handle all 
the challenges, and as the weeks go by I get a little bit better at it and I 
understand some of the administrative aspects of it-the paperwork, etc.  
And that’s good and it looks like, you know, I’m looking forward to 
staying with the ACT team for some time” (North ACT, Time 2). 
 
One staff member on the North ACT team was also acknowledged by her 
teammates for becoming an emergent leader in regards to researching the ACT model 
and stipulations of Rule 132 and sharing this information.  When asked what facilitated 
implementation, one of her teammates stated: 
“I would say that [names team member] was instrumental to implementing 
the Rule [132] changes.  Because she was the one that was really like, OK 
guys this is a very precise model and looked at it very thoroughly.  She 
even provided us with articles [to read]” (North ACT, Time 1). 
 
 The support of line staff to assist with implementation was also mentioned by two 
of the three (67%) Team Leaders:  
“Having a team that’s willing to go with the flow and be adaptable helps 
me out quite a bit.  Because if you had people that weren’t willing to make 
these changes or fought you on the changes every step of the way that 
would make it much harder but the team is open to these changes and I 
mean it’s a learning process for them too.  So, the team helps a lot” (CST 
Team Leader, Time 1). 
 
In summary, leadership and support from others in the agency provided assistance 
with adjusting to and coping with the policy changes.  The top-down organizational 
structure of Thresholds influenced the perceptions of line staff in terms of their 
relationship with those in upper management and reporting more support from Team 
Leaders and those in middle management. 
 
 
 
103 
 
 
Good Communication and Preparation 
 While at Time 1 the stipulations of Rule 132 were in a constant state of change 
and many elements had to be implemented with short notice, staff members did report 
that Thresholds generally provided good communication surrounding the changes (12 of 
20, 60%) and sufficient time to adjust to the changes whenever possible (9 of 20, 45%) 
(see Table 24).  A member of the North ACT team explained: 
“I think the amount of time we took to get ready for that day to come 
[October 1, 2007] was very helpful and I would give the management 
team credit for that.  We talked about it ad nauseam about how this was 
going to look.  I think our Team Leader worked really hard at getting us 
ready for that.  So months before an actual start date we were talking 
about it.  And on our own, reading about it and finding about what it 
meant and listening to whatever anyone told us through the agency.  Also, 
the preparation to get on our team who needed the services [appropriate 
consumers] and off of our team onto another team who didn’t, that was all 
done very well in advance and I think that was key.  When that day came 
[October 1, 2007] we were as ready as we could be” (North ACT, Time 
1). 
 
 Staff members were informed of the upcoming changes and the elements of the 
service delivery models (e.g., ACT or CST) when hired into the positions.  When asked 
about preparation for the changes, a member of the Homeless Outreach team explained: 
“Just communication, that’s really it.  They just let us know this is what’s 
going to happen.  We knew, I knew we were going to become an ACT 
team once I got on the team and they had talked to us about it prior to it 
happening” (Homeless Outreach, Time 1).   
 
The Team Leader from the North ACT team added: 
“And each person that came onboard understood that this is the model that 
we were going to follow so I guess they were attune with that prior to even 
taking the position…We began making preparation well in advance and 
were more or less forewarned of the changes that were about to happen so 
it really wasn’t that big of a surprise” (North ACT Team Leader, Time 1). 
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Thresholds also allowed a gradual process of change for staff members to learn 
the new billing system required under FFS and to attempt to become accustomed to the 
productivity standards.  Staff members began tracking their hours several months prior to 
the date that the productivity standards were required to be in place.  A CST team 
member describes the process by which management at Thresholds prepared them for the 
establishment of productivity standards: 
“We were prepared for the changes [to FFS] fairly well.  They starting 
pretty slowly as far as us being part, I’m assuming we were part of this 
pilot program and taking charge of our hours and counting them up every 
day and then it got a little more strict as time went on making sure and 
then when it was implemented then they started coming up with targets 
and percentages we had to reach.  So in the beginning they had us start 
becoming aware of our hours but there were no direct consequences if we 
didn’t meet it and they slowly added in consequences” (CST, Time 1). 
 
 Therefore, good communication and allowing a gradual process for the 
change to occur whenever this was possible was perceived by staff members to be 
a facilitator.  However, as mentioned in the barriers, the ambiguity of Rule 132 
and lack of guidance from DMH often resulted in “constant” changes that often 
had to be implemented with little or no warning. 
 
Familiarity with Services 
A final facilitator common to all three teams was that the actual type of services 
provided were not considered to be much different from the type of services they 
provided under the Bridge program prior to the establishment of Rule 132.  Staff 
members communicated a familiarity with the requirements of ACT and CST services 
and perceived that the main change would be to learn how the billing was completed.  Of 
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the 20 people interviewed, only 2 (10%) felt that the type of services would require a 
large change to the previously provided services (Table 24).  Both of these individuals 
were on the North ACT team and had been transferred from other programs within 
Thresholds that were not team-based.  Therefore, the majority (18 of 20, 90%) of staff 
members interviewed, including middle and upper management, believed that both CST 
and ACT services in accordance with Rule 132 were similar to what was provided under 
the Bridge program, with the exception of placing more emphasis on recovery and 
providing a higher intensity (i.e., frequency) of services for ACT.  The Team Leader from 
the CST team described her understanding of the changes to their service philosophy 
model: 
“I think the services we provide stayed the same mostly but I think what 
has really helped is how we see it and how we provide the services more 
towards teaching and modeling instead of doing for.  I mean sometimes 
you’re still going to have to do something for the member but now you’re 
more cognizant of ok well if I do this for the individual all the time, 
they’re never going to learn how to do it for themselves.  So, to be more 
willing to teach them and show them and have them do it on their own.  In 
that sense I think that has changed.  But we still do a lot of the same things 
like helping people get benefits, getting them set up with doctors, we 
provide those services still.  It’s more in the minds of the individual 
worker going out there to how to actually provide the services to teach the 
person to do stuff on their own” (CST Team Leader, Time 1). 
 
The Program Manager and acting Team Leader for the Homeless Outreach team 
explained the team’s familiarity with ACT-like services: 
“Aside from having to have a team leader that was a licensed clinician and 
working on the weekends, everything else were things that we were used 
to doing.  We were use to having people on call, we were use to seeing 
members three times a week…we were use to being the center of the 
services-kind of linking members to where they needed to be.  We were 
use to doing that…Cause we’ve always had the team approach” (West 
Program Manager, Time 1). 
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Therefore, a common facilitator to implementation of Rule 132 was that CST and 
ACT services were viewed to require little actual change to the delivery of services.  
Consequently, staff members had to learn new regulations such as a new billing system, 
but they did not also have to completely learn a new type of service.   
In summary, Thresholds was in a stage of transformation and uncertainty 
regarding the change in funding mechanism when they were also initiating the new 
service definitions for ACT.  The workplace environment was filled with negativity in 
relation to staff members feeling overwhelmed, unable to meet their requirements, 
concerned for their jobs, and perceptions that leadership in the management roles did not 
understand or care about their perspective.  Additionally, the stipulations for Rule 132 
and billing under FFS were constantly being redefined, leading to frustration and 
uncertainty on the part of staff.  A common facilitator was that, when possible, the 
agency attempted to provide staff with communication and adequate time to prepare for 
the changes.  Moreover, the actual services in accordance with Rule 132, whether CST or 
ACT, were perceived by staff to be similar to the services already being provided by the 
teams.  Additionally, leadership was viewed as essential for overcoming any of the 
challenges of implementing a change to the service delivery system.  However, as 
anticipated, the source of leadership and support varied depending on the level of the 
individual within the organization.  Implementing ACT in accordance with state 
standards on two service delivery teams during this time period brought with it unique 
challenges and facilitators for overcoming these barriers.   
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When implementing ACT in accordance with Rule 132, the two teams had the 
challenges of implementing Rule 132 in general, such as ambiguity of rules and lack of 
guidance from DMH, but they also experienced barriers related specifically to ACT 
implementation.  Because one team had decertified from ACT approximately three weeks 
prior to the first interviews, the two teams were compared at Time 1 to determine factors 
that influenced the implementation effort.  The CST staff members (N=4) were not 
included in the comparisons as they did not attempt to implement ACT.  Consequently, 
16 staff members were involved with the process of implementing ACT (13 were 
members of one of the two teams, 3 were in management roles). 
Themes Specific to ACT Implementation 
Several themes emerged as perceived barriers and facilitators that were specific to 
the implementation of ACT at Thresholds.  As previously mentioned, staff turnover was 
significant for the two teams that attempted to implement ACT.  Staff turnover was 
identified in interviews by the majority of staff members (13 of 16, 81%) as creating 
barriers to implementation, particularly when coupled with the DMH regulations, which 
were perceived as the main barrier for both teams.  Other barriers included lack of 
resources and implementation overload.  A unique barrier to the Homeless Outreach team 
was the misalignment of requirements across two funding sources, a SAMHSA grant and 
ACT services in accordance with Rule 132.  Negative staff attitudes specific to the ACT 
model represented a barrier to the process of implementation on both teams and positive 
attitudes were a facilitator on the North ACT team.  Finally, upper management’s 
commitment to EBPs and ACT in particular was viewed by staff members as a facilitator. 
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DMH Regulations, Staff Turnover, and Lack of Resources 
 
There were three categories of DMH regulations that created substantial barriers 
for the implementation of ACT at Thresholds (see Table 22): Staffing requirements (i.e., 
licensed team leader and nurse on the team; 10 of 16, 63%), staff vacancies cannot 
exceed 30 days (4 of 16, 25%), and the ACT team has sole responsibility for all services 
provided to the consumers (10 of 16, 63%).  Separate themes, but having an impact on 
consequences of the DMH regulations, were themes of staff turnover (13 of 16, 81%) and 
lack of resources (10 of 16, 63%), including lack of resources in terms of training in 
advanced therapy skills (6 of 16, 38%).  These interrelated barriers are discussed and 
dispersed throughout the DMH regulations to which these had the greatest impact. 
 
 
 
Staffing Requirements 
The staffing requirement of a licensed Team Leader was problematic for the 
Homeless Outreach team (reported by all 6 staff members who were involved with this 
team at Time 1), while maintaining staffing in the nurse position posed complications for 
the North ACT team (reported by 3 of 7 who were involved with this team at Time 1, 
43%).  As a result of the staffing requirements, the Team Leader for the Homeless 
Outreach team had to be demoted.  As the West Program Manager explained, this 
requirement caused significant disruption to the functioning of the team: 
“Well, initially I thought the changes in the policies were awful because 
first of all, the policy stated that you had to be a licensed clinician to be a 
Team Leader for ACT teams.  And at that time I had a wonderful Team 
Leader who has been here [Thresholds] about almost 10 years now and 
she was doing a wonderful job but because she was not a licensed 
clinician we had to find a different position for her within the program and 
fortunately there was one but that was very traumatic so we lost a good 
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Team Leader.  And it just started off the chaos and disconnect and things 
like on the team.  For me, that was the biggest thing---to actually have to 
demote this Team Leader who was doing a wonderful, wonderful job” 
(West Program Manager, Time 1).   
 
Those in management (Program Managers and the Clinical Director; 3 of 3, 
100%) indicated that the staffing requirement was problematic because it was difficult to 
attract proper staff to positions that require an advanced degree, such as the nurse or the 
Team Leader position (see Table 23).  This difficulty had been communicated to line 
staff as it was reported by the majority of the line staff on the Homeless Outreach team (3 
of 4, 75%) and some of the North ACT staff (2 of 8, 25%; Table 22).  The pay grade that 
Thresholds was willing to offer individuals with these advanced degrees was not 
competitive for either of the teams implementing ACT:   
“I think the biggest barriers have been finding people who want to do this 
kind of work for the pay that we have to offer, finding the nurse positions 
and the team leader positions.  I think because of the Rule changes there’s 
more demand for LPHAs and for RNs and once again, it’s the same old 
problem we had before the Rule change.  There’s both nurses who, doing 
ACT, that’s not what they want to do with their nursing degree.  Same 
thing with the psychiatrists too.  So that’s been a real barrier” (Clinical 
Director, Time 1).   
 
As a result, the Team Leader position on the Homeless Outreach team was 
difficult to fill and the West Program Manager had to act as the Team Leader to avoid 
state-imposed decertification due to the rule on staff vacancies that will be discussed 
later.  A member of the Homeless Outreach team described the impact of losing the Team 
Leader on the team as well as on the consumers served by the team: 
“Some of these changes, the new classifications, I think it disrupts the 
functioning of the team.  The first one that I experienced was the team 
leader [had to be a licensed clinician].  We had some continuity going and 
then [names original Team Leader] was removed.  Given that some of our 
members have abandonment issues and the fact that it happened rather 
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abruptly, I think that that’s not good in therapeutic terms.  Changes happen 
but I think you need to do it in a way that it does not devastate folks…And 
because now you’re looking for another person that can come right in and 
with this population building rapport is not as quick.  They’re [consumers] 
not comfortable around a lot of folks.  Then we’ve had 3 team leaders 
since then, well 2 unless you count [names the Program Manager who was 
acting as Team Leader] then that’s 3.  That’s a very short period of time to 
have experienced this kind of turnover” (Homeless Outreach, Time 1).   
 
The Homeless Outreach team did not have a designated Team Leader throughout 
the period of time that they were attempting to implement ACT.  The West Program 
Manager held both positions for 7 months, which contributed to a neglect of certain Team 
Leader activities, such as formal supervision (3 of 4 line staff reported, 75%; Table 22).  
One Homeless Outreach team member explained: 
“I think not having a team leader was a major challenge.  What you had 
was the whole team taking on that role [Team Leader].  You want to have 
someone there that’s going to make that final decision rather than having 
the team make it.  I know that the Program Manager is making it but I 
think that a Team Leader is very important to provide support, direction, 
and guidance…we’ve had 3 team leaders if you count the Program 
Manager within a period of a little over 2 years so I think that you can’t 
get stability in that area, especially supervision.  I don’t think I’ve had 
individual supervision in quite some time.  I’ve had it maybe 3 times since 
I’ve been here.  You know what you have to do and so you went out and 
did it and [you] didn’t necessarily get any guidance in that area” 
(Homeless Outreach, Time 1). 
 
Another team member described the impact that turnover in the Team Leader 
position had on their workload in regards to increased paperwork (3 of 4, 75%; Table 
22), such as having to complete the assessments that are typically the responsibility of the 
Team Leader.  Additionally, only licensed clinicians are able to bill for assessments and 
therefore the work that the unlicensed staff members were completing would not count 
toward their productivity standards: 
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“And I find that we’re taking on a lot of the normal stuff that I think 
should be separated out from doing the actual work.  We go out and do the 
assessments and do all those things and I think Thresholds would benefit 
by having someone who just does the intakes.  When I first came the 
Team Leader was doing that.  Now we have to do the assessments and the 
paperwork and if you don’t have the skills, some of those questions are 
very invasive…but you can’t bill until you get this information so you 
have folks trying to get this information before you build rapport.  Very 
invasive questions before you even have any rapport with the individual” 
(Homeless Outreach, Time 1). 
 
 The West Program Manager for the Homeless Outreach team indicated the impact 
that turnover in the Team Leader position had on the team members in terms of burnout: 
“I think they have experienced burnout because, you know, we lost the 
first Team Leader and then we got a new Team Leader who had worked 
with Thresholds but she only worked for the team for about a month and a 
half and then she left the agency.  So I think the change, the staff turnover 
was more of a burnout than the actual implementation of ACT” (West 
Program Manager, Time 1). 
 
The Homeless Outreach team was not successful in hiring a Team Leader until 
after the team voluntarily decertified and became a CST team due to the inability to 
attract a licensed clinician for the offered pay grade.   
Similar to the Homeless Outreach team, staffing requirements created obstacles 
for the North ACT team.  The North ACT team experienced turnover in the nurse 
position and a qualified replacement was difficult to find.  A member of the North ACT 
team described the impact of losing the nurse: 
“Of course, we lost our nurse which was a shame, her being good at the 
job and her caring way and personality.  I mean that, it hurt the team in a 
more personal level than just work related but I think that also 
management found it harder to find a replacement that they anticipated” 
(North ACT, Time 1). 
 
Therefore, the staffing requirements of a licensed Team Leader and a nurse on the 
team created obstacles to implementation when the salary that Thresholds was willing to 
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offer was not competitive to attract individuals with these advanced degrees.  Though the 
West Program Manager, who was the acting Team Leader, was generally viewed as 
supportive by the Homeless Outreach team, the team went without the daily leadership 
that is provided by a designated Team Leader for the entire time that they attempted ACT 
implementation.   
 
 
 
Regulation on Length of Staff Vacancies  
 The turnover and then difficulty attracting advanced degree individuals to the 
required positions was particularly problematic due to the DMH regulation that staff 
vacancies could not exceed 30 days.  As the Clinical Director described: 
“Well, probably the biggest challenge is that if you lose a position on the 
team and you don’t fill it within 30 days, on the 31st day you cease to be 
ACT…You know with the 31 days, I mean do we really want have to go 
through the effort then of redoing all the care plans to the community 
support team, getting everybody then approved for CST through the ASO.  
It’s a huge shift in what we have to do.  It’s not like we can just say, okay, 
we’re not billing ACT, we’re going to bill community [CST].  But you 
can’t do that unless you change all of the service plans.  Do you know 
what I mean?  Get approval for all of those people, pre-approval, because 
you can’t just bill CST without the ASO’s approval.  So it’s huge for 
us…it requires a certain level of oversight too, to the Rule so that if the 
team were to forget that after 31 days we didn’t have a replacement, 
should an auditor come in and look at that and we’d have to pay that 
money back.  So there’s a financial risk to us with ACT that doesn’t exist 
with some other services” (Clinical Director, Time 1). 
 
Due to the severe consequences of a lapsed staff vacancy, staff turnover in the key 
positions requiring advanced degrees was problematic to sustaining ACT status.  The 
West Program Manager had to perform dual roles on the Homeless Outreach team and 
the North ACT team had to hire a nurse from a temp agency in order to avoid 
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decertification when replacements could not be hired within the 30 day limit.  The 
Clinical Director described the challenges with staff turnover and the DMH regulations: 
“Turnover in key positions was difficult, primarily the Team Leader 
position at the Homeless Outreach team which was intended to be an ACT 
team.  That was huge for us because at the time the position required 
somebody to be a licensed clinician, LPHA, and it’s very hard to find 
people who want to do this kind of work with that level of, or with that 
license.  So as you know, we couldn’t find anybody and the Rule states 
that if you don’t have that position filled within 30 days you cease to be an 
ACT team anymore.  So we had the Program Manager doing the Team 
Leader job for a very, very long period of time… We had a similar 
problem happen on the North side here where the nurse left and it was 
very hard to find another nurse who wanted to do this kind of work for the 
kind of pay we have to offer and once again we had to, after 30 days, we 
had to come up with a solution or else we were going to cease to be ACT 
so we went to a temp agency and hired a temp nurse.  That hourly rate that 
we had to pay for that temp nurse came to annual wise was a hundred 
thousand dollars a year.  Not only that but she was not experienced in 
doing this kind of work and didn’t want to go out by herself so she always 
went out with another staff person and therefore she couldn’t bill.  So we 
weren’t recognizing, not only were we paying her a lot of money but she 
wasn’t pulling her weight in terms of the billing and documentation piece 
of it.  So after we had her for awhile and it was becoming increasingly 
frustrating because she wasn’t really the kind of nurse that we would have 
wanted to have on that team, we decided hmm, well maybe we can just let 
her go and then we’ll have another 30 days to find somebody.  So it 
actually worked out okay.  We let her go and we were able to finally find a 
nurse to come in.  So those are some of the challenges associated with 
maintaining the ACT status” (Clinical Director, Time 2).  
 
 The Clinical Director further indicated that this particular DMH regulation may 
eventually result in Thresholds not having any ACT teams in the future: 
 “I like the ACT model but we eventually might not be able to do it should 
we lose another nurse or lose another team leader and after 31 days we 
can’t come up with a viable solution because we can’t really commit 
another Program Manager to the role of Team Leader or hire a temp nurse 
just doesn’t prove to be economically viable for us, we may decide that it 
doesn’t make sense to do ACT…But for right now we’re doing one [ACT 
team] and that seems to be working out but if our nurse left tomorrow I’m 
not sure what would happen” (Clinical Director, Time 2). 
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ACT Team Provides All Services 
When compared at Time 1, several line staff from the Homeless Outreach team (3 
of 4, 75%) and the North ACT team (4 of 5, 80%) expressed great concern regarding the 
stipulation that all services be provided by the ACT team, i.e., not able to refer out to 
other services within the agency (see Table 22).  Staff members felt that this stipulation 
resulted in consumer care being disrupted and individuals not receiving the care that they 
need due to lack of resources provided to both staff members (e.g., time to develop 
groups or skills, lack of training on advanced therapy skills) and consumers (e.g., 
inability for ACT teams to offer all available services to the individuals). 
“Some of it [the changes] doesn’t make a whole lot of sense.  A lot of our 
members experience trauma and have a lot of pathology in that area.  To 
be self-contained [requirement for ACT teams], I understand that concept 
but that person may need to be with a therapist but in order for them to 
remain with the team that person cannot go seek out a therapist.  That type 
of stuff doesn’t make sense.  I think you should meet the person where 
they are at in order to help get them to a better place and that rule doesn’t 
speak to that… Some people on the team are more skilled than others but 
some folks are not…I found that a lot of our members as they get more 
stable a lot of stuff floods back in, even going back to childhood.  I 
thought that we should do something about getting them help with the 
trauma and get people stable around how to operate normally now.  But 
it’s difficult because ACT is all self-contained, everything is suppose to be 
all self-contained.  You can’t reach out for help outside of that 
team…When you’re talking about outreach, I think that you’re talking 
about the basics.  Some staff might have brought higher skills with them 
from other places but you’re not getting that here and I don’t see a lot of 
staff having the higher skills.  And a lot of our members have those 
issues” (Homeless Outreach, Time 1).   
 
 Another staff member discussed her own lack of training in therapeutic skills, 
frustrations with not being able to refer consumers to those that can help, and lack of 
resources: 
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“I’m so new to the field.  I don’t have a lot of training outside of what 
Thresholds has provided.  So I don’t feel comfortable doing anything 
really intensive as far as like trying any kind of therapy and stuff like that.  
I don’t feel that would be appropriate…If anything’s it’s kind of been 
frustrating because we can’t refer members to certain services because of 
billing conflicts.  So like the Dincin Center where there’s groups, people 
can’t participate in and do like a drop in program.  We can’t send them 
there anymore.  So that’s really frustrating in my opinion.  It’s like okay, 
well we’re supposed to be really intensive but we’re really in a way 
limiting their services.  Because we have to provide as a team all the 
services they get.  And I understand the reason behind the model but I 
don’t feel like there was the support or resources to implement it 
successfully to be quite honest.”   
 
When asked about what resources or support were lacking, she added:   
 
“I guess just like support of services like we’re so busy just doing 
paperwork and stuff like that that it’s hard to, you know, you can get the 
time billing.  We wouldn’t have time to do groups if we wanted to just 
because of like okay, doing notes.  So I don’t know if it’s an issue of not 
having enough staff or if it’s financial resources or what.  I don’t know.  I 
mean I love the team.  Everyone I work with is great but it’s just, we just 
don’t have enough time in the day to successfully do this in my opinion” 
(North ACT, Time 1). 
 
 Another staff member added: 
 
“ Well, to me the biggest problem became the lack of resources.  When we 
were a CST team we could link people to anything.  You want a therapist?  
You help find them a therapist.  If they wanted to go to a day program, we 
could link them to a day program.  Not a problem.  They could receive 
services from multiple providers for a few different things.  If they had 
family issues, they go to the family institute.  So you had resources that 
you can set them up with.  Because we didn’t do that stuff for whatever 
reasons and so but at least we had opportunity to do that [refer out] and we 
had people who were seeing therapists and we had people who were in 
day programs and things like that.  We had members who went to Dincin 
all the time, participated in groups.  We had a lot of members who were in 
groups at various places and that was probably the first complaint I heard 
from the members.  Like well I can’t go to groups anymore?  I was like 
guess not” (North ACT, Time 1).  
 
When the above staff member was asked about the availability of group therapy 
through the ACT team, she replied: 
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“Well I mean, you look at the Rule, you’ve read our Rule [132].  [It] says 
groups.  I mean in the laundry list of services that we are to provide it 
includes groups and it only makes sense because if you restrict someone 
from going to groups elsewhere then you’re either going to have to make 
the ACT team do it or you’re just basically cutting that as an available 
resource to the member and I don’t, I just, I refuse to believe the state 
really meant to cut services from these people.  You’re restricted to, I 
don’t even know what it is that we would if we didn’t have all this array 
services for them.  To me, like well what are these people getting out of it 
then.  What the hell is ACT about if we're not providing all the array of 
services” (North ACT, Time 1)?   
 
This person and another staff member from the North ACT team 
attempted to advocate for the formation of groups, but found resistance due to a 
lack of resources, particularly the resource of time: 
“Good old [names team member] said well why don’t we ask [names the 
Program Manager] if we could start some groups.  I went Yes, finally.  So 
I talked with her about that and then she sent an email and we worked 
together and [names Program Manager] thought about and I’m sure he 
went to his superior but the problem is time constraints giving all the stuff 
we were going through and he says well, we really don’t have time for that 
now.  Yeah, I mean and he’s right in the sense that we’ve got crises on our 
hands every day.  If you hung around, you see, I mean the dire state of our 
members.  It’s really, really, really bad and so we aren’t able to achieve 
nearly as much as I would have hoped that we could have achieved.  But I 
think in part it’s because we’re not giving those kinds of services.  I think 
if we did have groups, if we did have family, did have psychotherapy, if 
we did have daily programming for activities.  You know, a lot of these 
things that are in there—psychoeducation.  If we had classes for god’s 
sake.  If we had a lot of this stuff, I think that our members would be 
faring better and we wouldn’t have as many crises…But the resources 
were not there in order to provide them [consumers] with all that they 
really needed in order to make more of a recovery than just reduced 
hospitalizations” (North ACT, Time 1). 
 
In addition to this DMH regulation of having to provide all services being viewed 
as decreasing appropriate care to consumers, the Homeless Outreach team found that 
individuals were refusing their ACT services and instead requesting the “old services 
(i.e., now labeled CST)”  due to this stipulation.  Thresholds has housing options 
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available through the agency, but the homeless individuals who were approached by the 
team were unable to take advantage of these housing options in addition to advanced 
psychotherapy due to the fact that these services would be provided by a section of the 
agency removed from the team.  As described by the West Program Manager and acting 
Team Leader: 
“Several members were moved [from the ACT team] although they might 
have been more appropriate for ACT.  The team felt as if the need of the 
individual therapy outweighed the ACT services.  So members were 
transferred to CST teams so that they could get the therapy.  People didn’t 
feel as if they were qualified to do that therapy.  Now we do counseling all 
the time.  But it’s not really therapy…a lot of our members who, you 
know, have histories of chronic homelessness, there is a lot of trauma, you 
know, other things in their past that they really need to work through and 
we didn’t feel as if we were qualified to do that it and that was a disservice 
and we couldn’t refer them out for it.  Because ACT won’t allow you to.  
And they couldn’t move into our housing, you know, and our group homes 
or our nicer apartments.  They couldn’t take advantage of that because 
they had the ACT service.  And that housing [Thresholds’ housing], as 
you know, is better than like the SROs and the hotels that a lot of our 
members tend to reside in” (West Program Manager, Time 1).   
 
Consequently, the strict adherence to the principle that all services must be 
provided by the ACT team resulted in less treatment options (e.g., housing, groups, 
advanced therapy) available to the consumers who were considered to be the most 
severely impacted by mental illness.   
 
Misalignment of Requirements from Two Funding Sources 
 As previously mentioned, the Homeless Outreach team was also funded through a 
SAMHSA grant that required a certain number of referrals for homeless consumers each 
month.  The primary goal of the SAMHSA grant was to provide homeless individuals 
with better housing.  However, as the above quote from the West Program Manager 
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highlights, ACT in accordance with Rule 132 stipulated that consumers could not receive 
the housing options available through Thresholds.  Therefore, ACT clients were 
ineligible for Thresholds housing, which were perceived as better housing options, which 
contradicted the intent of the SAMHSA grant.  With consumers declining the Homeless 
Outreach team’s ACT services in favor of CST services, the team was not receiving 
enough referrals and intakes that were required by the SAMHSA grant (reported by 5 of 
the 6 staff members who were involved with the team at Time 1; see Table 22).  This 
theme coupled with the above theme that the ACT team alone was required to provide all 
services, was identified as two of the major reasons that the Homeless Outreach team was 
decertified:  
“The other part of it [reason for decertification] is that members who 
qualified based on the LOCUS were unwilling to only get ACT.  They 
also wanted to have access to other services that they knew about from the 
former agency [i.e., Bridge teams prior to Rule 132].  So that’s the other 
piece of it too is that some people aren’t willing to only accept, they can 
see our doc and only the ACT staff.  They want to go to groups or they 
want to see a therapist on the outside and they can’t do that [and be served 
by the ACT team]… Well, they [Homeless Outreach team] weren’t getting 
the numbers [referrals] because of that and they also weren’t getting the 
numbers too because when the whole system shifted, agencies that 
decided to provide CST weren’t prevented from seeing people who met 
the definition for ACT [i.e., CST teams who could refer out to groups and 
other services were selected by the consumers over this ACT team].  So, 
there just weren’t enough referrals and because this team was funded by 
SAMSHA we were getting into, we were getting on SAMSHA’s bad side 
because we weren’t meeting our end per the requirements of the grant that 
we had written for them.  So because we weren’t able to fill the Team 
Leader position and because we weren’t able to get the people in the door 
and because SAMSHA was threatening to pull our funding, we de-
certified the team” (Clinical Director, Time 1).   
 
Consequently, unique to the Homeless Outreach team was the barrier of 
misalignment of requirements from the two funding sources.   
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Implementation Overload 
 
 In addition to themes that were common to implementing Rule 132 in general 
(e.g., ambiguous rules and a lack of guidance from the DMH), and DMH stipulations that 
created havoc (e.g., staff vacancy rule), some staff members (6 of 16, 38%; Table 22) 
who were associated with the two teams implementing ACT (includes those in 
management positions) felt that there was implementation overload, i.e., they were 
attempting to implement too many things at once.  One staff member felt that it was too 
much for the state to require a change to both the funding mechanism and service 
definitions at the same time: 
“I think it’s [ACT] a great model and I think that over time it could be 
adapted better with more resources but I think doing ACT at the same time 
they’re switching for FFS and doing other things in conjunction with, was 
just extreme.  Too many changes and a lot of stress.  You know, you feel 
the tension but I do think the model, I think that with more support it 
[ACT model] could be really good” (North ACT, Time 1). 
 
Within Thresholds, the agency was also attempting various implementation 
efforts at this same time including IDDT implementation on the teams and throughout the 
agency in general.  As the North Assistant Program Manager explains: 
“There were all sorts of changes with Rule 132 and FFS and then recovery 
[component of Rule 132].  The fact that we’ve always been trying to have 
more of a recovery based outlook, what we do with members.  So we’re 
trying to be more on top of that.  Being less paternalistic and things.  All 
these were different changes and then we, then when we really focused on 
the EBPs and just implemented IDDT, those have been a sea of change.  
In two years it’s really, not any one thing but altogether it’s kind of just 
changed things…Change is hard and it’s hard to implement change and 
where I’m very comfortable helping people implement the IDDT or the 
ACT model per se, you throw in the other pressures like FFS and it’s 
many, many things.  It’ just too many things at once.  They kind of all 
happen exactly at once” (North Assistant Program Manager, Time 2). 
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He further described the additional obligations for the North ACT team in 
particular: 
“If anything the team has had too much, it’s like Fidelity [measurement] 
overload.  You know, ACT Fidelity and then the state [fidelity to Rule 
132] and then ACT Fidelity from Indiana [current study].  Then ACT team 
Fidelity from Thresholds and then IDDT Fidelity from Dartmouth and 
internal from Thresholds.  And supportive employment Fidelity from 
Dartmouth and Thresholds.  Because they have all of those, [names the 
Team Leader of North ACT] used to just kind of say, just let them in, 
whatever, Fidelity…And so they’ve had little additional time.  One or two 
doesn’t make it, but it kind of adds up…So they have little extra that way 
which I think puts a lot of pressure on them and leads to burnout” (North 
Assistant Program Manager, Time 2). 
 
Therefore, focusing on multiple implementation efforts at once was perceived by 
some staff members as a barrier to implementing ACT in accordance with Rule 132. 
 
 
Negative Staff Attitudes/Criticisms Specific to ACT 
 
Staff attitudes specific to the ACT model were also observed to have both a 
negative and positive impact on implementation in terms of morale on the team.  Dislikes 
regarding the population served by ACT or certain aspects of the ACT model, such as 
weekend shifts, the team-based approach, mandated number of visits, and rotating which 
staff member visits a consumer, were expressed by 8 of the 13 (62%) team members who 
attempted ACT implementation (note that the Team Leader for the Homeless Outreach 
team at Time 2 is not included in this figure as she was hired after the team decertified 
from ACT status).    
The West Program Manager for the Homeless Outreach team indicated that 
enforcing the weekend shift was an area that had lapsed in fidelity under the Bridge 
program and she had concerns regarding how her team would react to this stipulation. 
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 “With the true definition [of ACT] coming out, we actually had to have 
staff work Saturdays and Sundays.  So that was a big change for the team.  
We have a lot of folks who either work other part-time jobs or are parents 
so that was kind of a difficult transition for people to have to juggle and 
work Saturdays and Sundays.  My biggest fear was that we wouldn’t get 
buy-in [from the team] for the weekend shift.  That I would have a mass of 
people saying, “No, I can’t do this job”…I think having to work weekends 
kind of affected morale slightly” (West Program Manager, Time 1).   
 
In addition to the requirement of weekend shifts, other components of the ACT 
model were criticized by staff members.  For instance, one staff member even indicated a 
lack of support and understanding of the rationale for the team-based approach of the 
ACT model: 
“Rule 132, the way it’s written as I understand, you have to do a team 
approach and I think that’s, I guess after being in this business for 20 years 
I can’t believe how short sighted that is to make that such a deliberate part 
of that rule.  I think services aren’t delivered as well [in a team-based 
approach]. I think continuity of care is absolutely breached every day.  I 
hear from members every day why do I have to see another person.  That’s 
just a real difficult thing.  I mean I think the whole basis of good mental 
health is about seeing one professional that you can develop trust, develop 
a relationship with” (North ACT, Time 1). 
 
The majority of the staff members who had concerns with the ACT model itself (7 
of 8, 88%) complained of the perceived lack of flexibility (see Table 22).  Specifically, 
that there was a mandated three visits per week for each consumer and more than one 
staff member must visits a particular consumer each week.  The North ACT team 
enforced a strict rotation of visits to comply with the rule that multiple staff members 
visit each consumer each week.  Four line staff (of 7, 57%) on the North ACT team were 
particularly concerned with this strict rotation and felt that it led to a “breach of 
continuity of care”.  As one of the North ACT team members explained: 
“I mean even if we didn’t have any other resources, just us caseworkers, 
just make do with what we have, the minimum, the ante for getting into 
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the game [providing ACT services] for me is regular, consistent visits.  If 
we can’t even do that with someone I don’t see how we can really be 
effective.  And they weren’t willing to do that because of this rotation 
because it’s a strict team model and that just got me…And the thing is that 
oftentimes I’d see someone and we’d have this wonderful conversation.  
They just felt okay, comfortable, and they opened up.  I wouldn’t see them 
for a month, a month and a half.  That sucks.  There’s no other way to put 
it and who knows what they’re imagining.  God, I shouldn’t have said it to 
[names herself], she probably hates me now.  Bet that crossed their minds.  
She thinks I’m an idiot.  She thinks I’m stupid.  She doesn’t like me 
anymore.  I mean that’s the natural reaction of a lot of people, especially 
our members.  Many of them told me that.  I hear you don’t like me 
anymore.  I’ve heard that a million times” (North ACT, Time 1). 
 
 Another staff member explained how mandating the number of visits each week 
can have a negative impact on the consumers: 
“We go and visit people one-on-one where they live so it can be limiting 
for them just trying to do things they want to do ‘cause if you meet 
someone 3 times a week, it could hinder them because they just don’t want 
that much contact and it just limits maybe something they want to do 
without involvement from an ACT team” (Homeless Outreach, Time 1). 
 
A staff member from the Homeless Outreach team also expressed a negative 
attitude towards the population of consumers served by the ACT team: 
 “There were maybe like three I wanna say that were chronic cases of 
mental illness as well as drug abuse going on with it and these were people 
who were continuously in and out of the system as far as the justice 
system, in and out of the hospital. We had one guy who actually had a run 
in with the sheriff department and it was just a lot of stuff that we were 
like, “whoa should we really be taking this person on” you know 
considering our safety and things of that matter. They were never 
stable…So I’m thinking why are we getting this person? …So that’s the 
only thing ‘cause I feel like Thresholds is picking up people for the 
numbers.  We have to have so many numbers; referral, referral, referral.  
And we’re getting some people who are not even fit to be in the 
community and that’s pretty scary for me as a woman” (Homeless 
Outreach, Time 1).  
 
There were three staff members across the two teams (2 on the North ACT team) 
that held particularly negative attitudes towards the components of the model.  At Time 2, 
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one of these staff members had resigned and the remaining two indicated that they 
intended to leave Thresholds in the near future.   
 
 
Positive Staff Attitudes Regarding the ACT Model 
 
Unique to the North ACT team was spontaneous reporting of the positive aspects 
of the ACT model itself.  Across both time periods seven of the eight North ACT team 
staff members (88%) mentioned some benefit to the model (see Table 24).  One team 
member explained: 
“I think the ACT model is great and after working previously I know that 
it’s very effective and it really does work well and many more [ACT 
teams] are needed.  We definitely don’t have enough [ACT teams] out 
there to assist all of those that are in need… But I just feel that having this 
team approach makes it fantastic because if nothing else, everybody 
knows what’s going on [with the consumer] and anybody can go out and 
continue [to help the consumer], take that ball and move it to further and 
that’s the most excellent part that came out of having that team approach.  
And when you’ve got a good team working together it makes a difference 
and this is a good team” (North ACT, Time 2). 
 
Another member of the North ACT team described the team’s belief in the model 
and commitment to implementation: 
“We understand the charge [providing ACT services] that we’ve been 
given and we take it seriously.  We show up and we try to find something 
that works about this team and the program ACT.  I think we all believe in 
it 100%.  There’s examples I could tell you—many, many examples of 
why it works and how it works in people’s lives…So I think the team 
champions that” (North ACT, Time 1). 
 
 In contrast, none of the members of the Homeless Outreach team spontaneously 
reported a benefit to the ACT model.  However, the team’s decertification from ACT 
status may have influenced their reporting of any perceived benefits. 
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Management Supportive of EBPs 
Staff members (13 of 16, 81%) communicated in the interviews that there was 
agency-wide support for implementing ACT and cited the support of upper management 
as a facilitator to the implementation (Table 24).  The North Assistant Program Manager 
described the support for ACT and other EBPs from upper management: 
“We wouldn’t be doing it [implementing ACT] if it wasn’t for [names the 
Clinical Director] and [names the North Regional Manager] deciding to do 
it and I think that they certainly support the team.  So we don’t have a 
problem with the ACT model not being supported by upper management.  
And generally we’ve had, and all the EBPs, a big part of many EBPs is 
getting upper management buy-in when they tell you all the kits 
[SAMHSA toolkits], you know all the things like that and we don’t have a 
problem here at Thresholds.  They buy into it [EBPs].  IDDT, strong buy-
in.  Supportive employment, strong.  I don’t know much about IMR but it 
seems like it’s got a strong support too from what I hear.  So yeah, they’re 
behind it” (North Assistant Program Director, Time 2). 
 
A line staff member of the Homeless Outreach team commented on the 
support and commitment for ACT implementation agency-wide even though his 
team was not successful at implementation: 
“There was commitment and support, I think a lot of effort put in to make 
sure each criteria was met to be an ACT team and when we weren’t able 
to do that there was still a big push to get that done.  Not only from like on 
our team but from management on up that even though we didn’t have a 
Team Leader but higher up than that, it was really stressed and really 
worked on to make it work but it just didn’t… it just seemed like they 
really wanted to make it work but it just didn’t for our organization, at 
least on this team” (Homeless Outreach, Time 1). 
 
When asked what factors facilitated the implementation of ACT, the Clinical 
Director perceived that the agency-wide commitment to providing EBPs was the sole 
facilitator: 
“What have been the facilitators for this?  You know, I think probably just 
the agency’s commitment to wanting to do EBPs, a long history of 
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working with the people who need these services the most.  Whether we 
find out it’s worth doing ACT in the future or that can we continue to 
serve those people [ACT consumers] on CST teams.  I think we will 
always be committed to working with those highest needs.  But I’d say 
sort of the agency was the big facilitator—our passion for doing that total 
team approach and working with those with the highest needs…So I think 
it was sort of our history and our current ongoing passion for believing in 
that approach helped.  Is there anything else that facilitated it?  No.  
External?  No, not really” (Clinical Director, Time 1). 
 
 In summary, the agency had a culture that valued EBPs and the leadership 
expressed commitment to providing ACT services in particular. 
 
There were no barriers specific to the CST team.  As previously mentioned, the 
former Bridge teams at Thresholds were judged by DMH assessors to be 90% compliant 
with CST regulations prior to the initiation of Rule 132.  Therefore, for the Bridge team 
to transition to a CST team was largely a change in how the team was labeled.  The 
elements of Rule 132 that were a change for the CST team examined in the study were 
the focus on recovery principles (i.e., “teaching” consumers rather than doing for and 
shared decision-making) and the implementation of FFS, both of which were also 
experienced by the two teams implementing ACT. 
Themes Specific to the CST Team 
However, there was a unique facilitator to the CST team in that this team did not 
experience any turnover during the study period.  The Team Leader for the CST team 
described how her team was adjusting to the changes at Time 2: 
“I think people are starting to get the hang of everything and adjusting 
well.  I mean we’ve had a year and we’ve kind of, we know what we have 
to do now.  And it’s still hard like, but it’s getting easier I think.  At least 
for myself I think it is and I think for most of the people on the team it’s 
getting easier.” 
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When asked what has made the process easier, one aspect that she highlighted 
was the lack of staff turnover: 
“…The fact that we’ve had the same team for over two years now.  At 
least with my team that has helped a lot.  So we haven’t had the staff 
turnover that some of the other teams have had so everyone knows their 
job and it’s not like we’re retraining someone every few months or every 
year of whatever.  People know the job well.  They know what have to do 
and that’s a big help for me and the team in general” (CST Team Leader, 
Time 2).   
 
 
Changes on the teams between Time 1 and Time 2, such as hiring a Team Leader 
on the Homeless Outreach team and a permanent (i.e., not from a temp agency) nurse on 
the North ACT team, influenced the reporting of some of the factors and overarching 
themes that were perceived to impact implementation of Rule 132 and ACT specifically. 
Changes to Themes over Time 
Of the 12 staff members interviewed at Time 2, 8 (67%) were also interviewed at Time 1.  
However, 3 (25%) were hired after Time 1 (2 on the North ACT team and 1 on the 
Homeless Outreach team) and therefore did not experience the early implementation 
phase, which may have influenced their responses.  As previously mentioned, the CST 
team was the only team that did not experience any staffing changes during the study. 
Overall, the primary themes were quite similar between Time 1 and Time 2.  
There were no totally new content factors to emerge at Time 2 that were not present at 
Time 1 (see Tables 22 and 24).  Additionally, some factors that supported the concepts at 
Time 1, such as “cannot bill for travel,” were not mentioned at Time 2 (Table 22).  One 
factor was hardly mentioned at Time 1 but was moderately important at Time 2 and is 
described below as a new facilitator.  While the primary themes remained relatively 
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constant (with the addition of one new facilitator), there was some movement in the 
intensity and pattern of reporting within the overarching themes.  The movement that 
occurred within the themes (see Table 8 for a list of themes) is presented in this section 
for the barriers and facilitators.  As previously referenced, Tables 22-25 provide a 
breakdown of the concepts coded in the interviews by team, staff member role with the 
agency (i.e., line staff compared to leadership positions), and time point. 
 
Barriers 
 Many of the barriers that were common to implementing Rule 132 (e.g., 
difficulties with the ASO and lack of guidance from DMH) as well as those that were 
specific to ACT (e.g., DMH regulations) remained relatively unchanged from Time 1 to 
Time 2, which created challenges for the agency.  However, there was some movement 
within themes across time, staff roles, and across teams as will be discussed below 
Additionally, changes at Thresholds (e.g., hiring staff) helped reduce some of the 
barriers, at least in the short-term. 
 
 
Movement within the Common Barriers  
On the surface the perceived negative impact of FFS theme and the four perceived 
components (i.e., inability to fit all in an 8-hour day, pressure for billing, concern for 
one’s job, and reduced quality of services) continued to receive a great amount of 
attention from staff members throughout Time 1 and Time 2.  Line staff continued to 
identify productivity standards (i.e., inability to fit all in an 8 hour day) as a major 
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stressor and barrier to implementing Rule 132.  Additionally, those in middle and upper 
management continued to insist that the productivity standards were reasonable (see 
Tables 22 and 23).  Similarly, the intense pressure for billing continued to be widely 
reported by all levels of staff members and across all three teams throughout the study.  
However, the statements from the staff members suggest that this pressure became even 
more intense at Time 2.  Those in management positions indicated that the state’s 
financial situation had become much worse at Time 2 as grant funding was further 
reduced, which prompted the need for more FFS dollars:   
“The state is in a funding crisis.  They cut over a half a million out of our 
budget for grant funded programs from what they were… the driving force 
in the State of Illinois now is trying to get enough billable 
time…Everyone’s a nervous wreck about funding” (North Assistant 
Program Manager, Time 2).   
 
 While financial concerns within the state were discussed by a greater percentage 
and in greater depth by those in leadership positions at Time 2 (4 of 5, 80%) than line 
staff (3 of 7, 43%), line staff were becoming more aware of the external conditions than 
they were at Time 1 (1 of 12, 8%; see Table 23).  One line staff explained how the 
financial uncertainty within the state contributes to pressure within the agency for billing: 
“The state has cut us [the budget] even more.  There’s a lot of [financial] 
problems on the state level and I know the agency’s freaking out over 
it…It makes us feel even more pressure for the hours” (North ACT, Time 
2). 
 
The increasing external financial concerns and state-wide budget cuts not only 
further intensified the pressure for billing and pressure to meet productivity standards, but 
also contributed to staff members having more concern for their jobs.  Over half of the 
line staff (4 of 7, 57%) expressed concern for their jobs at Time 2 (see Table 23).  While 
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the majority of those in leadership positions (4 of 5, 80%) also voiced concern for job 
security, this was primarily in relation to line staff rather than their own jobs.  Although, 
the management staff also acknowledged that recent lay-offs had included individuals in 
management positions as well.  Several agency-wide lay-offs had occurred during Time 2 
and those in management positions expressed concern that the state’s financial situation 
would contribute to more cuts: 
“The State of Illinois is broke so they haven’t been paying us on time and 
that’s one thing that’s just put us in a really difficult position.  We’ve 
managed to make payroll but it’s gotten iffy a couple of times and it will 
probably remain that way for awhile.  Then on top of that, because we 
haven’t gotten any cost of doing business increase in four years and 
because they’ve actually instituted some cuts to our budget this year, 
we’ve had to lay off staff which has been demoralizing I think for 
everybody.  So that’s been really hard and that’s, it’s not like we’ve gotten 
through that and things are getting better.  There will probably be more 
layoffs and so people are now living with the question of “Who’s next?  
Am I next?  Who’s going to be next?” (Clinical Director, Time 2). 
 
The Team Leader for the North ACT team identified the uncertainty with state 
finances as the primary reason she chose to leave Thresholds for federal employment in 
the VA system, with burnout as secondary, but still a large component of her decision.  
Also related to the persistent focus on billing, line staff continued to report the 
perception that the quality of services was reduced (5 of 7, 71%) while this was 
mentioned much less by those in leadership positions (1 of 5, 20%) at Time 2 (Table 23). 
Ambiguity of Rule 132, was a less commonly cited barrier at Time 2 (4 of 12, 
33%) than Time 1 (9 of 16, 56%; see Table 22).  One staff member explained how policy 
changes were less common at Time 2: 
 “I think when the change to ACT was initially being implemented, the 
team felt like they were getting a new piece of information every day. You 
know, just something new every day.  And it was just like really?  One 
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more thing?  One more weird little change.  It was just kind of like we’ve 
got enough going on.  We can’t handle all this instability.  So now that 
things have settled in a little bit…there’s still some confusion but it’s not 
daily” (North ACT, Time 2).   
 
 However, as previously mentioned, the challenges with the ASO and their 
differing interpretations of Rule 132 remained. Those staff members who had to interact 
with the ASO, such as the Clinical Director and Team Leaders, indicated that there was 
still ambiguity to many of the stipulations enforced by the ASO at Time 2.  The Team 
Leader of the North ACT team reported at Time 2 that the ASO had recently imposed a 
slight change to authorization process, but that the change was not “to the level that I 
need to inform the staff” as she was primary person who was responsible for completing 
the authorizations.  Therefore, the perception that the ambiguity of Rule 132 was 
lessening at Time 2 was largely held by the line staff (1 of 7, 14% reported continued 
ambiguity of regulations compared to 3 of 5, 60% for those in leadership positions like 
the Team Leader; see Table 23). 
 
 
Movement within the ACT-Specific Barriers 
The barrier of implementation overload (i.e., implementing too much at once) was 
perceived by ACT team members across the two teams to have been more of a problem at 
Time 1 (3 of 10, 30%) when the implementation effort was still in its early stage than at 
Time 2.  None of the line staff reported implementation overload at Time 2, but middle 
and upper management (2, 100%) continued to identify this as a factor that had 
negatively impacted the team (Table 22).  Four DMH regulations (i.e., licensed Team 
Leader, required nurse on the team, staff vacancies cannot exceed 30 days, and ACT 
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team provides all services to consumers) created barriers to implementation throughout 
the follow-up period.  However, the impact of these regulations on the team members 
varied depending on staffing and turnover on the teams at each time point.  At Time 2 the 
one remaining ACT team was fully staffed as a full-time nurse who intended to remain 
with the team long-term had been hired and a replacement for the resigning Team Leader 
had been found prior to her departure (her last week of work occurred during the Time 2 
assessment).  Consequently, even though the North ACT team was experiencing turnover 
in the Team Leader position at Time 2, the team was not in a current state of crisis 
regarding the stipulations and the requirements of a licensed Team Leader, a nurse on the 
team, and staff vacancies must be less than 30 days were not mentioned by the team 
members (Tables 22 and 23).  However, the Clinical Director still reported that these 
requirements remained a substantial barrier to the implementation of any additional ACT 
teams and to the sustainability on the remaining team.  She had previously commented on 
the level of oversight required for the one remaining ACT team at Thresholds as a result 
of the DMH regulations: 
“One team.  So much energy for one team and I’m hoping we can do it 
[continue with ACT]…The state’s just made it impossible for us and we’ll 
keep letting them know that” (Clinical Director, Time 1).  
 
At Time 2 she indicated that maintaining ACT status still created a substantial 
level of oversight on her part and speculated on the impact of the DMH regulations on 
ACT in general throughout the state: 
“…Because of all the hoops that you have to jump through to maintain the 
ACT status, I think we could very soon be a state where there is no ACT” 
(Clinical Director, Time 2). 
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The decertification of the Homeless Outreach team from ACT status enabled this 
team to concentrate on the requirements of the SAMHSA grant and therefore the barrier 
of conflicting regulations from funding sources no longer existed.  Moreover, because the 
team no longer had to follow the DMH regulation that ACT teams provide all the 
services utilized by their clients, the Homeless Outreach team was once again able to 
refer their clients to groups and other treatment options as well as to Thresholds housing.  
Consequently, at Time 2 the Homeless Outreach team members were no longer reporting 
having a lack of resources to provide all services to consumers and they had an adequate 
number of referrals for their CST services.  By contrast, lack of resources was still 
reported by the North ACT team at Time 2 (3 of 5, 60%).  The North ACT team staff 
members were also still reporting the negative impact of being required to provide all 
services (2 of 5, 40%) and not having the resources available to develop group therapy 
options for the consumers (see Table 22).  
 
Facilitators 
Many of the facilitators, such as leadership, remained of great importance to the 
implementation effort throughout the study.  However, when examined by team and staff 
member role (see Tables 24 and 25), there was some movement within these themes.  
Additionally, a concept that was briefly mentioned at Time 1 emerged into a common 
theme at Time 2.   
 
 
 
133 
 
 
 
Movement within the Common Facilitators  
The staff member’s familiarity with the type of services and belief that the service 
delivery component of their job did not change substantially with Rule 132 was widely 
perceived as a constant facilitator throughout the study (14 of 16, 88% at Time 1 vs. 10 of 
12 at Time 2, 83% at Time 2; Table 24).  Staff members indicated a benefit to not having 
to learn a whole new method of delivering services while also learning new regulations 
and a new billing system.  Also the familiarity with the new regulations appeared to 
provide some benefit at Time 2.  The passage of time or being accustomed to aspects, 
such as the new billing categories, through practice was identified as a facilitator by 
nearly half (5 of 12, 42%) of the staff members at Time 2, compared to a minority (2 of 
16, 13%) at Time 1 (Table 24).  One staff member explained how the team members had 
become more accustomed to working as a team over time and that this coupled with not 
having a current staff vacancy provided was helpful to the functioning of the team: 
“I think things are running much more smoothly now I would say.  I think 
it has something, I mean, something to do with just time and getting used 
to how we all work together as a team and sort of what the expectations 
are.  And having a full staff of people that are pretty much, a little more, I 
don’t know if I want to say happy but a little more content with how we 
operate.  Other than that I don’t know.  I think just trying out new things to 
see how it will work more effectively as a team and kind of settling in I 
suppose” (North ACT, Time 2). 
 
Therefore, concept of the things getting better with the passage of time reached 
the level of becoming a theme at Time 2, although this facilitator was expressed more by 
those in leadership positions (Table 25). 
Leadership was identified as a facilitator by staff members on all three teams at 
both Time 1 and Time 2.  Of the three teams, the Homeless Outreach team reported an 
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increased influence of leadership on implementation at Time 2 than Time 1.  Leadership 
was identified by only one (25%) staff member from the Homeless Outreach team at 
Time 1, compared to all three line staff and all three managers at Time 2.  As previously 
outlined, at Time 1 the same staff member (West Program Manager) was filling both of 
these roles and consequently leadership responsibilities were compromised.  Because the 
Homeless Outreach team decertified from ACT status, the team was not subject to the 
barriers created by the ACT regulations at Time 2 and was successful at hiring a 
designated Team Leader after 7 months without one.  The line staff reported a great 
benefit to having a Team Leader on the team in terms of providing guidance: 
 “Having the team leader helps quite a bit.  She keeps things organized 
answers and also really help finalize a decision that one person might not 
think that they can make on their own” (Homeless Outreach, Time 2). 
 
 Another staff member commented on support she provides in terms of assisting 
with workload and paperwork, specifically the authorizations, and reducing overall stress: 
“[Names the Team Leader]’s been with us for a short while and she’s been 
great.  She helps out when she can.  She’s been very active in trying to 
reach the guy over in SSI for us as well.  When we need assistance in 
something or like members that we can’t bill for or, she takes that role in 
having that done or getting the authorizations done for us.  So since she’s 
been aboard, a lot of the stress has been taken off of the team because we 
can, all that administrative stuff that needs to be done, we can shoot 
through her now because she’s in place” (Homeless Outreach, Time 2). 
 
Consequently, having a designated Team Leader provided the Homeless Outreach 
team with a greater level of leadership at Time 2.  The theme of leadership as a facilitator 
to adjusting to and coping with any significant change was supported across time for the 
three service delivery teams. 
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In addition to leadership, good communication regarding changes and a gradual 
process of change allotted by upper management were perceived as facilitators at Time 1.  
However, with regulations more stable at Time 2, staff commented much less on 
communication on changes (reported as a facilitator by 10 of 16, 63% at Time 1 vs. 1 of 
12, 8% at Time 2) or a gradual process to implement changes (8 of 16, 50% at Time 1 vs. 
2 of 12, 17% at Time 2; Table 24).  However, when good communication is broken down 
by staff member role at Time 1 (Table 25), the perception of good communication was 
cited more by those in leadership positions (i.e., upper management, middle management, 
and Team Leaders; 4 of 4, 100%) than line staff (6 of 12, 50%). 
 
 
Movement within the ACT-Specific Facilitators  
Specific to ACT implementation, a high percentage of staff members on the North 
ACT team spontaneously reported valuing the ACT model throughout the study (all 6 at 
Time 1 and 4 of 5, 80% at Time 2).  Additionally, despite the challenges with 
maintaining ACT status (e.g., because of DMH regulations), upper management was 
viewed as supportive and committed to providing ACT services throughout the follow-up 
period.  The majority (4 of 6, 67%) of the staff members on the North ACT team reported 
this facilitator at Time 1 as well as at Time 2 (5 of 5, 100%; Table 24).  As the Team 
Leader of the North ACT team explained: 
“Well, we know the ACT team has the full support of everybody up the 
line.  All the way up to the president of the board.  Everyone is committed 
to providing the service” (North ACT Team Leader, Time 2). 
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The agency’s commitment to ACT was less frequently communicated by the 
Homeless Outreach team at Time 1 (2 of 4, 50%); however, this team had decertified 
from ACT status in the weeks prior to the interviews.   
In summary, while there were no new content factors that emerged at Time 2, 
there was some movement with regard to the intensity and importance of many of the 
themes, whereas others remained more constant.  Additionally, the perception that 
adjustment to changes becomes easier with the passage of time was reported by staff 
members and reached the level of being considered a theme at Time 2.  Many of the 
barriers (e.g., DMH regulation on staff vacancies) that were addressed by Thresholds in 
the short-term (e.g., through hiring appropriate staff) were noted as a possible future 
barrier to sustaining ACT at Thresholds in the long-term.   
 
 As previously outlined in the introduction, a priori themes were identified based 
on the previous implementation literature and included leadership, staff turnover, 
training/consultation, culture/upper management supportive of EBPs, staff attitudes, 
performance monitoring, and DMH policies/funding (see Figure 1).  The current study 
found that support for all but two of these predicted themes.  Training on the ACT model 
and monitoring performance were not employed by the agency to facilitate the 
implementation of ACT. 
A Priori Themes Not Found in the Interviews 
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Lack of Training on the ACT Model 
 It was anticipated that training on the ACT model, particularly for new staff, 
would have been completed to facilitate the implementation of ACT.  Line staff, 
including new hires did not receive any formal training on the ACT model.  When asked 
about their training, staff members indicated that all training for new hires was conducted 
“on the job” through shadowing the other team members.  The Clinical Director 
explained that formal ACT training was previously employed at Thresholds, but state 
budget cuts resulted in this being eliminated.  She also indicated that the fundamentals of 
the ACT model were relatively “easy” and therefore formal training was not viewed as 
necessary: 
“We used to have an ACT training institute, research and training institute 
with all the ACT people used to go off and get the history of ACT and 
training but the state defunded that of course.  So it [ACT] probably gets 
the short shrift here at Thresholds in comparison to the other EBPs 
because ACT is relatively easy to implement.  It gives you pretty concrete 
in terms of here’s how to teach it.  Here’s what you do but it doesn’t 
necessarily address the workers’ interventions.  I think that IMR, IDDT, 
supported employment really require the worker to sort of change how 
they’re doing things and ACT doesn’t.  So there’s not much attention 
focused on ACT…So I think there’s more attention [i.e., training] paid to 
those other EBPs on that team [North ACT] than there is to the ACT 
practice” (Clinical Director, Time 2). 
 
Moreover, because ACT in accordance with Rule 132 was perceived to be so 
similar to the services previously provided by the Bridge program (familiarity with 
services), many other staff members did not feel that training was required: 
“I don’t really remember if there was any special training since we were 
doing it all along kind of under the Bridge program.  There really wasn’t a 
special training needed to transition to being an “official” ACT team” 
(Homeless Outreach, Time 1). 
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 Two staff members from the North ACT team (one at each time point) indicated 
that they would have liked to receive more training on the ACT model (Table 22), but 
this was not perceived as having a substantial impact on the implementation.  While lack 
of training did emerge as a factor that influenced implementation, this was specifically 
lack of training on advanced clinical skills rather than on the ACT model.  During the 
interviews, staff members from all three teams indicated that they were receiving training 
on other EBPs such as IDDT. 
 
Lack of Performance Monitoring 
It was also anticipated that the agency would make efforts to monitor the fidelity 
in order to inform the implementation.  However, this was not done at Thresholds during 
the current re-implementation of ACT.  One staff member on the North ACT team 
reported that an ACT fidelity assessment occurred very early in the implementation but 
stated that the team was not provided with any information on how to improve their 
services.  The Clinical Director commented on the perceived ease of implementation, the 
concrete structure of ACT fidelity measurement (i.e., measures structural components 
such as number of visits and does not focus on higher clinical skills), and the agency’s 
long history of providing ACT services as reasons for why continual fidelity 
measurement did not need to occur: 
“You know, we’re not doing fidelity.  We don’t need to do internal 
fidelity.  Why don’t we?  Because the state does it.  They come in and they 
do it and if you’re out of compliance you don’t get paid.  It’s really not 
hard to do ACT.  You do this many visits and so once you get that sort of 
routine established and the meetings established you’re really not paying 
attention to the intervention that the staff person’s having [for fidelity 
measurement purpose], so and I think that’s been more of our focus is 
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better clinical practices and I think we’ve got sort of the ACT framework 
down” (Clinical Director, Time 2). 
 
The importance of conducting fidelity assessments to improve the delivery of the 
other more skills-based EBPs such as IDDT and supported employment was discussed by 
the Clinical Director.  Therefore, the agency does not ignore fidelity measurement 
altogether, but did not feel it was necessary to commit resources to monitor ACT fidelity 
throughout the implementation process. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
The current study of ACT implementation differed from many previous studies 
(Mancini et al., 2009; McDonel et al., 1997; Moser et al., 2004) in that implementation 
was occurring on teams that were already providing ACT-like services rather than newly 
formed teams.  With the substantial variability in fidelity to the ACT model and tendency 
for program drift (Bond, 1991), a study to examine how to re-implement ACT on 
established teams in an effort to reach higher fidelity was warranted.  In the present 
study, the quality of services provided by all three teams was at least moderate fidelity to 
ACT even in the team that did not attempt ACT implementation.  The CST team was 
comparable to many intensive case management teams (Teague et al., 1998).  The North 
ACT team achieved high fidelity ACT services and did so within 6 months of 
implementation, which is consistent with other studies (Mancini et al., 2009; Moser et al., 
2004).  While the Homeless Outreach team did not achieve high fidelity and decertified 
from ACT status, the type of services provided by this team reflected the moderate ACT 
fidelity range. 
 
The study sought to determine the barriers and facilitators of implementing high 
fidelity ACT in accordance with state standards (Rule 132) on existing ACT-like teams 
Methodological Considerations 
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through qualitative interviews with agency leaders and with staff members and 
supplemental quantitative measures administered at two time points.  The study 
employed a comparative method in which the themes were compared across three service 
delivery teams of which two were attempting to implement ACT.  The teams were 
operated by a single agency, providing partial control for organizational factors.  Because 
multiple changes to policy were incorporated at the same time, e.g., FFS, a service 
delivery team that did not attempt to implement ACT (i.e., the CST team) was studied in 
order to determine which factors were related to the policy change in general versus ACT 
implementation.  This comparative method worked well in the present study as several 
factors were common across the three teams and therefore were not directly related to 
ACT.  Without the comparison team, these factors may have mistakenly been attributed 
to ACT implementation rather than instituting the other components of the policy change, 
such as the change to the funding mechanism and the use of a managed care organization 
to monitor Rule 132.  Additionally, the serendipitous event of the Homeless Outreach 
team decertifying from ACT status, enabled a comparison of the unique challenges 
inherit to the two teams that initially sought ACT certification.  While unfortunate for the 
agency, the differential success of the two teams enhanced the present study in that it 
highlighted a barrier unique to the one team that when coupled with the other barriers to 
ACT implementation was insurmountable for the Homeless Outreach team to overcome. 
The study also attempted to incorporate mixed-methods, however small sample 
sizes and substantial missing data limited the utility of the quantitative measures other 
than the fidelity assessments.  Formal statistical analyses to evaluate differences across 
teams were judged to be unsuitable, and therefore the results were limited to means and 
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general trends for the instruments.  Though limited, some of the reporting on the 
quantitative measures was consistent with the qualitative findings. 
 
The staff members’ high initial ratings on the EBPAS and little variation over 
time, suggests acceptance of EBPs was present prior to the implementation effort.  This 
lack of variability is not surprising as Thresholds was observed to be an agency that 
prides itself on implementing EBPs.  Moreover, while the staff members did not receive 
training specific to ACT, they did receive training on the importance of other EBPs such 
as IDDT and supported employment prior to and during the study period, which would 
likely influence their perception of EBPs and elevate the EBPAS scores.  This finding is 
similar to another implementation study that found elevated initial EBPAS scores and 
subsequent little variation over time likely resulted from the agency training on the 
importance of EBPs prior to administering the instrument (Gioia, 2007).  Therefore, 
while the staff members’ perceptions of EBPs did not change as a result of the current 
implementation effort, the EBPAS findings indicate that staff member support of EBPs in 
general was relatively high.   
Quantitative Findings 
Support for ACT in particular was demonstrated by the Personal Feelings 
subscale (Feelings scale) and the Agency-Wide Support for ACT subscale (Workplace 
Aspects scale), which was consistent with the qualitative findings that identified 
management’s commitment to ACT as a facilitator.  Other ratings on the three scales 
used in the National EBP Implementation Project were also consistent with the 
qualitative themes.  For instance, while implementing ACT was not viewed as requiring a 
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significant change to how they provided care (Item 8 on Feelings; similar to the 
familiarity with services theme), the actual implementation effort was judged to be 
difficult (Item 9 on Workplace Aspects).  Additionally, as was expressed in the qualitative 
interviews, staff members from all three teams reported experiencing intense work 
pressure (Item 5 on Conditions).   
While the MLQ had substantial missing data, all of the leaders who were rated 
were judged to be at least moderately effective, which is consistent with the qualitative 
theme that leadership was viewed as important to coping with the policy changes.   
Therefore, though the utility of the quantitative measures was limited in the 
present study due to small sample size, much of the reporting supported the qualitative 
findings.  However, many themes arose that could not have been predicted by the 
quantitative measures. 
 
Staff members from four different levels within the agency shared their insights 
into the challenges and facilitators across two time periods (6 months and 14 months 
post-implementation of Rule 132).  At times there was a difference in reporting between 
line staff and those in management positions that was influenced by their role within the 
agency (e.g., management had contact with DMH while line staff did not, those in 
management positions were not subject to productivity standards, etc.).  All of the 
perspectives were considered valid and contributed to the conceptualization of the themes 
that influenced implementation. 
Qualitative Findings 
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The qualitative interviews revealed numerous barriers imposed by regulations 
promulgated by the state mental health authority rather than the ACT model itself.  
However, further challenges also arose from instituting other components of Rule 132 
that were not directly related to ACT, such as the change to the funding mechanism, i.e., 
FFS.  Consequently, though not the intended focus of the study, the results provided a 
description of the impact of transitioning to a FFS funding mechanism and 
implementation of policy change (i.e., Rule 132) in general in addition to factors related 
to ACT implementation.  The common themes of the impact of FFS and implementing 
Rule 132 in general provides a context for the environment in which ACT 
implementation was also being attempted. 
 
Challenges Common across Services 
While staff members reported an agency-wide culture that values EBPs and ACT 
in particular (through interviews, the Workplace Aspects scale, and suggested by the high 
initial ratings on the EBPAS), this atmosphere had been overtaken by pressure to meet 
the productivity standards that were instituted by upper management in response to 
switching to a FFS funding mechanism.  The workplace environment was filled with 
negativity in relation to staff members feeling overwhelmed, unable to meet their 
productivity requirements, concerned for their jobs (due to demanding productivity 
standards and the additional financial uncertainty within the state that emerged at Time 
2), and perceptions that leadership in the management roles did not understand or care 
about their perspective.  Staff members from all three teams reported experiencing 
“intense” work pressure (both in interviews and on the Conditions scale) and burnout at 
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both Time 1 and Time 2.  Those in management positions acknowledged that the line 
staff were experiencing burnout, but largely did not perceive that the productivity 
standards were unreasonable.  However, the management staff did not carry a caseload 
and therefore did not directly experience the challenge of productivity standards.  
Separate from the present study, an administrator at an agency in Indianapolis, IN 
indicated that their agency had a similar figure for productivity standards; however, it is 
possible that geographical differences between Chicago and Indianapolis may impact the 
feasibility of the standard. 
Similar to what rural ACT teams encounter because of geographic distances 
(Siskind & Wiley-Exley, 2009), the Chicago-based teams found that the time required for 
travel through traffic in a metropolitan area posed challenges for meeting productivity 
standards.  Other factors identified by line staff that made the standard difficult to achieve 
were the additional paperwork required by the state for service authorizations and 
consumers not desiring long visits.  Many staff members reported trying to drag out time 
in contact with consumers who were “less communicative” in an effort to meet their 
hours, even though briefer visits may be more effective (Bond et al., 1990).  Therefore, 
the pressure to obtain enough billable direct contact hours in an eight-hour workday 
affected staff morale, it was seen as compromising their ways of interacting with clients, 
it led to cutting corners (e.g., less detailed progress notes and CST decreased the number 
of daily team meetings), and it may have resulted in staff turnover.  Upper management 
at Thresholds indicated that all of the required activities for completing the job that are 
non-billable, such as travel and paperwork, were accounted for in determining the 
productivity standard.  However, an unpublished report found that the typical Thresholds 
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Bridge ACT team case manager in 1990 averaged 3.76 hours per day in direct service 
contact after the other responsibilities were completed (Hampton, Korr, Bond, Mayes, & 
Havis, 1992), a figure that is less than the 4.2 to 4.5 hours that is now required.  During 
this earlier era, the Thresholds Bridge team held daily afternoon team meetings (in 
addition to morning meetings), which the teams in the current study reluctantly 
abandoned because of productivity standards.  One line staff from the CST team, in 
particular, reported a negative impact on her sense of cohesion with the team and level of 
burnout as a result of eliminating the afternoon meeting.  Consequently, productivity 
standards that were viewed as demanding affected everyone and represented a barrier to 
retaining good staff and focusing on clinical care.  Moreover, the strict enforcement of 
productivity standards during ACT implementation also compromised fidelity to the 
model when staff members were not allotted time to develop dual diagnosis groups for 
the consumers being served by ACT.  Other studies of ACT implementation have also 
found that strict adherence to productivity standards impedes implementation (Mancini et 
al., 2009; Moser et al., 2004). 
In addition to the negative impact of productivity standards that were formed in 
response to FFS, there were other challenges that were common to implementing Rule 
132 in general rather than ACT specifically.  A significant barrier to implementing the 
policy change was the ambiguity of the regulations and lack of guidance from DMH on 
how to interpret aspects of Rule 132.  Additionally, the managed care organization that 
the state hired to roll out the policy changes presented conflicting information to agencies 
on these regulations than what was stated in Rule 132.  Consequently, early in the 
implementation staff members were receiving updated interpretations of the requirements 
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on an almost daily basis, which made it difficult to focus on their jobs of providing 
services to consumers.  Moreover, being out-of-compliance with the regulations meant 
that the agency was at risk for having to pay back money to the state.  However, it is 
difficult to be in compliance with rules that are unclear and frequently changed.   
Lack of guidance from DMH and difficulties with the managed care organization 
were largely reported by those in management positions as line staff did not have 
interactions with these entities and were often not privy to this information.  While much 
of the ambiguity of the regulations had resolved by Time 2 (14 months post 
implementation) and changes were no longer being thrown at line staff daily, the 
difficulties with the managed care organization remained.  In particular, the managed care 
organization continued to present conflicting information from what was stipulated in 
Rule 132 and the authorization process was viewed as poorly designed.  According to 
management at Thresholds, the managed care organization was not adequately prepared 
to manage the policy changes.  In retrospect, the managed care organization could have 
better anticipated the problems if the changes were piloted in a few agencies beforehand.  
Consequently, the implementation of ACT in accordance with Rule 132 occurred during 
a period of transformation and uncertainty throughout the state and the agency, which 
meant that the focus was not solely on the ACT implementation effort.   
 
Pre-Implementation Considerations 
 Prior to the implementation of ACT in accordance with Rule 132 standards, 
Thresholds had to first decide whether to provide ACT services and second how many 
Bridge teams to convert to ACT versus CST.  Financial considerations played a huge role 
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in these decisions.  The ACT state standards included specific multidisciplinary staff 
requirements (i.e., licensed clinician as Team Leader, a full-time nurse and increased 
hours from a psychiatrist) that were not part of the standards for CST teams.  The 
additional staffing requirements translated to higher personnel costs for the agency.  
However, DMH did not provide agencies with any additional start-up funding to hire the 
required staff needed to implement ACT.  Previous research has found that the success or 
failure of many social policies is contingent on whether an incentive structure is built into 
the policy (Rapp, 2002).  Moreover, while a fee-for-service environment generally 
encourages providers to increase the amount of service provided (Rapp et al., 2005), in 
the current study the state of Illinois placed a cap on agencies’ billing.  Therefore, even 
though ACT services were assigned a higher billing rate, this was not an actual incentive 
in that it did not increase total annual agency revenues but rather only resulted in the 
agency reaching the cap sooner.  While the lack of additional start-up funding or 
incentives to implement ACT services did not prevent the successful ACT 
implementation at Thresholds, it did influence the decision to implement (pre-
implementation).  As a result of a lack of financial incentive and initial uncertainties 
surrounding new state regulations for ACT, Thresholds decided to pilot the 
implementation on two teams, the North ACT and Homeless Outreach teams, rather than 
six as was originally conceived by upper management.  Thresholds’ decision-making 
process was consistent with Panzano and Roth’s (2006) findings that agencies base 
adoption of EBPs on risk assessments.     
 
 
149 
 
 
Challenges with ACT Implementation 
Once the effort to implement ACT in accordance with Rule 132 began several 
additional barriers became apparent that were specific to implementing ACT.  A few staff 
members felt that too many implementation efforts were occurring at the same time (i.e., 
implementation overload) at Time 1.  For instance, in addition to ACT, the teams were 
also implementing IDDT and supported employment.  This led to the focus being split up 
among these various implementation efforts.  While this created a challenge for some 
staff members early in the implementation, it was no longer identified as problematic by 
line staff at Time 2 after they were more settled into their roles.  In contrast, DMH 
regulations for ACT services were identified by those in management positions as 
significant barriers to maintaining ACT status at both Time 1 and Time 2.   
One tangible consequence of ACT in accordance with Rule 132 was substantial 
disruption in staffing in both teams seeking ACT certification.  These findings are similar 
to previous research that found turnover created challenges for achieving high ACT 
fidelity (Mancini et al., 2009; McDonel et al., 1997; Rollins et al., 2009).  In the current 
study, the functioning of the Homeless Outreach team was significantly disrupted when 
the DMH requirement that Team Leaders be licensed resulted in the removal of this 
leader.  Additionally, the pay grade that Thresholds was willing to offer did not attract a 
suitable replacement during the entire period of time that the team attempted to 
implement ACT.  The DMH regulation that staff vacancies could not exceed 30 days 
resulted in the West Program Manager having dual responsibilities when she was 
required to also serve as the acting Team Leader to prevent decertification.  Having one 
person complete two roles for 7 months naturally resulted in some responsibilities (e.g., 
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supervision) being neglected.  The North ACT team had a similar challenge at Time 1 
when the nurse left the team and the agency had to hire a nurse through a costly temp 
agency to avoid decertification.  Even more concerning is the fact that the temp nurse was 
not comfortable working with the SMI population and refused to visit the consumers 
alone.  Therefore, to avoid decertification as a result of the staff vacancy stipulation, 
Thresholds and other agencies may have to hire staff members that they would typically 
consider as not appropriate for the job, which does a disservice to the consumers who are 
being served by these staff members. Though the North ACT team was “successful” in 
that high fidelity was achieved and there were no staffing crises at Time 2, the staffing 
requirements of a licensed Team Leader and nurse on the team were identified by the 
Clinical Director as potential barriers to this team should turnover occur in the future.  
Moreover, high turnover is relatively common on ACT teams (Salyers et al., 2003; 
Siskind & Wiley-Exley, 2009; Woltmann et al., 2008).  Consequently, the strict 
regulation on staff vacancies will remain a challenge for ACT teams in Illinois.  The 
Clinical Director at Thresholds was aware of other agencies that were decertifying teams 
from ACT status as a result of these DMH regulations, particularly as a result of the 
severe consequences of the staff vacancy regulation. 
The fourth DMH regulation that was problematic at Thresholds was the 
requirement that the ACT team must provide all the services.  Because staff members 
were not provided with the resources needed to provide the full array of services (e.g., no 
training on advanced therapy skills and not granted time to develop group therapies), this 
element was not implemented with full fidelity and less treatment options were available 
to the consumers being served with ACT than those being served with CST.  The lack of 
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availability of group and trauma-focused therapy impacted ACT implementation when 
consumers began to refuse the Homeless Outreach team’s ACT services in favor of CST 
teams that would allow them to receive these services from other programs within 
Thresholds and other agencies.  The ACT model has previously been adapted to 
accommodate specific needs.  For example, the development of a capacity to serve 
people with substance use disorders grew out of the emergence of substance abuse as a 
major problem (Test, Wallisch, Allness, & Ripp, 1989) and the same was true for serving 
consumers with borderline personality disorder (Swenson, Torrey, & Koerner, 2002).  
However, the lack of flexibility in the DMH regulations and the lack of resources actually 
discouraged the adaptation of ACT to better serve consumers with trauma histories.  The 
Homeless Outreach team had better success in receiving referrals for their services at 
Time 2 after they had decertified from ACT status and had more resources (e.g., access to 
Thresholds housing and ability to refer consumers to outside services) available to offer 
consumers.  While the North ACT team also reported a lack of resources, they did not 
have the same experience of consumers refusing their services due to this factor.  One 
key difference between the teams is that the Homeless Outreach team was also funded 
through a SAMHSA grant, which stipulated that all of their consumers must be homeless.  
Therefore, it may be that the consumers served by the Homeless Outreach team 
represented a somewhat different population than the consumers served by the North 
ACT team.  Consequently, the inability of the homeless consumers served by the 
Homeless Outreach team to receive housing from Thresholds was likely the deciding 
factor to refuse services rather than the lack of group therapy.  At any rate, the DMH 
regulation resulted in less treatment and housing options available to the consumers who 
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were served by ACT.  Having fewer treatment options available is unfortunate given that 
those served by ACT have more severe symptomatology and functional deficits.  
Additionally, restricting the access to Thresholds’ housing contradicted the SAMHSA 
grant that was intended to provide better housing options to homeless consumers, which 
created a unique barrier to Homeless Outreach team.  Consequently, the barriers imposed 
by DMH stipulations coupled with a misalignment between regulations of two funding 
sources, resulted in the inability to continue to provide ACT services on the Homeless 
Outreach team.  This is not uncommon for agencies to receive funding from several 
sources (Riggs, 1996), however it becomes difficult when attempting to meet the 
demands of all of the funding sources. 
 
Facilitators to Implementation 
With the challenges of constantly changing rules, staff members reported that 
good communication surrounding these changes and a gradual process of change (when 
possible) were beneficial at Time 1.  Additionally, similar to previous implementation 
research, leadership (Bond et al., 2009; Mancini et al., 2009; McDonel et al., 1997; 
Panzano et al., 2005; Rapp et al., 2008) and staff attitudes (Aarons, 2004; Aarons & 
Palinkas, 2007; Mancini et al., 2009; Moser et al., 2004; Nelson & Steele, 2007; Rapp et 
al., 2008) were found to be facilitators for coping with the challenges of implementing a 
change in general.  However, the source of leadership and support varied depending on 
the level of the staff member within the organization.  Line staff reported receiving 
support and leadership from team leaders and those in middle management positions 
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rather than upper management. This finding is not uncommon for large organizations that 
have a top-down organizational structure.   
Anecdotally, the lack of first-hand contact between upper management and line 
staff resulted in a feeling of alienation and a lack of understanding and support from 
upper management, particularly in regards to the perceived demanding productivity 
standards.  Feeling unappreciated by upper management contributed to significant reports 
of burnout from line staff.  This qualitative finding that line staff felt distant from upper 
management is supported by the reporting on the MLQ.  While middle management 
identified the Clinical Director as the “champion” for ACT implementation and EBPs in 
general, all team members, including Team Leaders, felt that they did not have enough 
contact with the Clinical Director to be able to rate her on a measure of leadership.  
Periodic communication to line staff directly from upper management regarding the 
implementation effort and challenges of the agency may have eased some of the feelings 
of alienation, fostered a sense of team work, and resulted in those in upper management 
being perceived more as leaders.   
While line staff tended to feel unappreciated by upper management, they did feel 
supported by upper management in regards to commitment for ACT and other EBPs.  
The importance of commitment and support of upper management in terms of 
implementing EBPs has been found in previous studies (Bond et al., 2009; Fixen et al., 
2005; Mancini et al., 2009; McDonel et al., 1997; Panzano et al., 2005).  In fact, upper 
management’s strong commitment and support for ACT was identified by the Clinical 
Director as the sole reason the agency was continuing to provide ACT services on the 
North ACT team at Time 2 despite the vast challenges posed by the DMH regulations 
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and the lack of financial incentives.  The Clinical Director herself was identified as a 
champion for the ACT implementation.  The presence of a champion for a particular EBP 
and implementation effort may be especially needed in times of adversity as was the case 
in this study.  However, the agency’s commitment to providing ACT services may not be 
sufficient to sustain the practice at Thresholds in the long-term given the substantial 
barriers created by the DMH regulations. 
 
The ACT implementation effort at Thresholds highlights the importance of state 
administrators and program planners to set realistic program requirements and provide 
adequate funding to promote implementation.  Policy makers should have some 
understanding of the mental health field and inherent challenges associated with a 
particular job prior to developing state standards and should be better equipped to adapt 
policy when it becomes apparent that regulations are problematic to sustaining the 
practice.  For instance, the requirement of position gaps of less than 30 days proved to be 
very difficult to sustain ACT teams at Thresholds as the agency found that it was hard to 
attract qualified staff to fill the DMH staffing requirements (e.g., licensed Team Leader 
and nurse) after turnover had occurred.  These two challenges could have been predicted 
by DMH.  Previous research has found that ACT teams in general experience difficulty in 
maintaining staff continuity and full staff capacity (Salyers et al., 2003), which is not 
surprising considering the struggle of recruiting and retaining qualified staff in the mental 
health field (Peterson & Lippincott, 1993; Woltmann et al., 2008).   
Implications 
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In addition to making recruitment more difficult, the DMH regulations that the 
Team Leader be licensed resulted in the demotion of a good leader on the Homeless 
Outreach team.  Thresholds’ inability to find a suitable replacement for this Team Leader 
for the offered pay grade was one of the key reasons the Homeless Outreach team did not 
succeed in their implementation.  Thresholds likely would have received appropriate 
candidates if they had offered a higher pay grade.  However, upper management judged 
that this additional money was not within budget for the agency.     
In regards to re-implementing a service at the agency level, the belief that the 
teams were already very familiar with ACT services and that implementation would be 
relatively “easy” resulted in no monitoring of fidelity to the practice and no additional 
resources allocated to the two teams that were implementing the state standards.  The 
finding that Thresholds did not monitor fidelity to inform the implementation effort was 
surprising given the agency’s long-standing commitment to providing EBPs and their 
assessment of fidelity for other EBPs, such as IDDT.  According to one staff member on 
the North ACT team, the Thresholds did conduct a fidelity assessment at the beginning of 
implementation but no feedback was provided to the staff on the assessment.  Bond et al. 
(2009) found that frequent assessment of fidelity was a key element to the 
implementation model of implementing EBPs, which included ACT, in the National EBP 
Implementation Project.  Specifically, the previous research found that whether fidelity 
reports were used to improve practice influenced the level of fidelity to the EBP.  
Therefore, it was anticipated that fidelity measurement would have informed the current 
implementation process.  It is possible that the agency’s long history of providing ACT 
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services contributed to the perception that they know the principles well enough to not 
measure fidelity on a regular basis.   
Staff members also did not receive any additional resources to assist with 
implementation, such as training on the ACT model or the time required to learn new 
skills or develop group therapy.  A few staff members did not understand the rationale 
behind some of the components of ACT (e.g., team approach), and as a result 
demonstrated a negative attitude towards the model and implementation in general.  It is 
unclear whether training on the model components would have improved attitudes 
towards the model and influenced fidelity to those components. 
The lack of time as a resource was a barrier to providing high quality services. 
Several staff members were passionate regarding wanting to develop groups for the 
consumers.  However, the strict enforcement of productivity standards precluded staff 
from having the time to develop groups, and one manager refused to approve release time 
needed to pursue this idea.  The focus on productivity standards at the expense of 
developing group therapy was surprising given that Rule 132 permits the ACT team to 
bill for group therapy provided both on the agency grounds and off-site.  Previous studies 
of ACT implementation have also found administrative policies regarding unreasonable 
productivity standards were particularly significant in inhibiting the development of the 
ACT teams (Mancini et al., 2009; Moser et al., 2004).   
  In the current study the strict adherence to productivity standards during the 
period of time wherein the teams were attempting to implement ACT state standards 
contributed to the neglect of developing group therapy for dual disorders and lack of 
training in more advanced therapy skills.  This fact coupled with the stipulation that the 
157 
 
 
ACT team must provide all of the services to consumers resulted in the individuals with 
the most severe symptoms being denied interventions that might have addressed their 
needs.  Furthermore, the requirement that dual disorders group therapy be available 
through the team is stipulated in both the ACT model and in the state standards.  
Prohibiting staff members from developing these groups due to the focus on productivity 
standards resulted in this element not being implemented to fidelity as well as reduced 
treatment options for consumers.   
Therefore, even though the state standards for ACT were judged to remain similar 
to the services provided under the Bridge program, there were key differences that 
warranted attention.  Agencies should consider allowing some flexibility in productivity 
standards for training and program development.  In contrast to the effort at Thresholds, 
the Indiana ACT standards were expressly designed in 2001 to accommodate lower 
productivity standards to facilitate implementation (Moser et al., 2004).  If the ACT 
teams in Illinois are to be successful in properly providing all services to consumers, the 
staff members on the team require additional training and time to establish therapy 
protocols and advanced skills. 
 From the standpoint of a large mental health center, the allocation of resources to 
develop group therapies (e.g., for substance abuse) may not be appealing if there are 
already well-developed programs within the agency (i.e., not wanting to “re-invent the 
wheel”).  Thresholds has a wealth of services and programs to serve their consumers and 
developing a separate subset of these services for the one ACT team to deliver, may not 
make financial sense, particularly when the established programs are already providing 
high quality services.   
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While the intent of the ACT model is to prevent brokered services from resulting 
in individuals “falling through the cracks,” preventing all consumers from taking 
advantage of services within the same agency may impede recovery.  Moreover, 
requiring the consumers who are served by ACT to see a particular psychiatrist or attend 
particular treatment groups (if available) at the exclusion of others that may have been 
previously beneficial to the individual (e.g., substance abuse treatment groups at the 
Dincin Center), appears to be paternalistic and lacking in the spirit of ‘recovery’ and 
consumer choice.  The ACT model as defined by the DACTS does permit some 
flexibility in that 10-20% of consumers can receive outside services without dropping 
down to low fidelity on this item.  However, the agency’s interpretation of Rule 132 was 
that DMH did not allow any flexibility (i.e., 100% of services had to be provided by the 
ACT team), which was perceived by staff to be disruptive to consumer care.  As with 
many of the Rule 132 regulations, the wording of this stipulation is vague and open to 
interpretation.  Therefore, it is unclear whether Thresholds took a defensive posture to 
avoid penalties or whether it was the intent of DMH to not allow any brokered services.  
DMH’s lack of guidance when Thresholds posed questions and inflexibility and severe 
penalties when other regulations were violated (e.g., staff vacancy > 30 days), may have 
made the agency risk adverse on this stipulation.  At any rate, the ambiguous nature of 
the stipulations within Rule 132 was problematic to properly implementing the 
regulations.  Prior to instituting policy change, DMH should ensure that stipulations are 
clear and should provide guidance to agencies on interpretation.  Additionally, 
regulations become particularly problematic when there is inflexibility and strict 
enforcement without consideration for the impact.  Importantly, the researcher did not 
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interview anyone from the state level and therefore DMH’s perspective is not included in 
this report. 
Whether the stipulation that requires the ACT team to provide all services was 
over-interpreted by Thresholds or whether there was inflexibility in the hands of the state 
officials promulgating this regulation, Thresholds could have also taken several steps to 
lessen the consequence.  For instance, the ACT teams could have been expanded to 
include staff members who are qualified to conduct trauma-related therapy and the 
agency could have also provided the resources required to develop and maintain group 
therapy.  However, resources are particularly tight at local agencies in Illinois given the 
state’s financial concerns. 
A final consideration is whether the use of an internal purveyor model in which 
there was no external assistance provided to the agency could have contributed to the 
challenges with implementation.  Previous research has largely examined an external 
purveyor model and has found that successful EBP implementation was related to having 
access to a technical assistance center or outside consultant (Mancini et al., 2009; 
McFarlane et al., 2001; McGrew et al., 1995; Moser et al., 2004; Panzano et al., 2005).  
While having assistance from a technical assistance center would have likely resulted in 
more training on the ACT model being provided to the staff members, the presence of 
external assistance likely would not have made a difference with overcoming the barriers 
created by the DMH regulations and the interactions with the managed care organization.  
Therefore, the lack of an outside consultant is not likely responsible for the main barriers 
to implementing ACT in the present study.  However, an outside consultant might have 
provided Thresholds administrators with some perspectives on their blind spots, such as 
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demanding productivity standards during implementation tends to hamper the effort and 
the challenges of balancing regulations from two funding sources.   
In conclusion, strict enforcement of productivity standards within an agency 
during an implementation effort (and after) can significantly inhibit the adoption of key 
ingredients even when the type of services being implemented are considered to be very 
similar to the previous service.  Additionally, extensive regulatory requirements by DMH 
create barriers (Mancini et al., 2009) and dampen the enthusiasm and sustainability of an 
EBP.  Upper management’s belief in the ACT model and the support of one particular 
champion (i.e., the Clinical Director) was identified as the primary reason for continuing 
to provide ACT services despite the significant challenges imposed by the DMH 
regulations.  The DMH regulations alone were insufficient to overturn implementation on 
the North ACT team in the short-term, but may threaten the sustainability of ACT over 
time at Thresholds if belief in the model no longer outweighs the challenges.   
 The DMH regulations and lack of guidance/flexibility on the part of DMH 
coupled with the unique challenge of conflicting stipulations from two different funding 
sources resulted in the inability of the Homeless Outreach team to continue to implement 
ACT.  This highlights the importance of agencies examining all the principles of their 
funding sources prior to implementing a change to their services.  Additionally, if DMH 
desires to promote the implementation of an EBP such as ACT, support in terms of 
adequate funding and a partnership with the agencies to assist them with overcoming 
barriers must be in place.  While the current study only examined the implementation of 
ACT, many of the findings were consistent with previous studies of EBP implementation 
and are likely to generalize. 
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There are several limitations to the study.  Importantly, the research represents a 
case study on the experience of one agency’s implementation of ACT in accordance with 
state standards.  Therefore, the results may not be representative of all teams attempting 
to implement ACT services and causal inferences cannot be drawn from a single case 
study.  Additionally, the small sample size, both in terms of number of teams and number 
of staff on each team, limited the ability to interpret quantitative analyses.  Qualitative 
interviews were able to provide a rich description of the process.  However, it is likely 
that other CMHCs and different states would suggest distinct strategies and barriers to 
implementation of a policy change concerning the definition of ACT services.  A multi-
site study would have aided in the ability to generalize to other agencies.  Moreover, 
while many key informants were interviewed at the agency and the quality of the 
interviews was judged to be excellent, an ideal study would have also collected data at 
the state level as well as the consumer level to gain the full perspective of the policy 
change.  Nonetheless, because the data are longitudinal (occurring at 6 months and 14 
months post-implementation) and conducted in a naturalistic setting, the level of 
ecological validity is improved.   
Limitations 
There are also several unique limitations to the nature of qualitative methods that 
the researcher attempted to minimize.  First, even with in-depth interviews, the feelings, 
experiences, thoughts, and opinions expressed by the individual are never representative 
of the whole picture (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007).  In order to obtain a more accurate 
description of the whole picture the interviewer asked follow-up questions to help ensure 
a sufficient number of words and ideas were attained from the interviewee.   
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Second, the validity of interviews and interpretation can come into question with 
qualitative methods.  The researcher used triangulation of both the data (i.e., interviewed 
more than one person per team) and the investigator (i.e., more than one researcher 
assisted in developing the coding) and participated in member checking in order to ensure 
more opinions were obtained and the interpretation of these opinions was accurate.   
A further limitation with qualitative research is that there always exists a power 
differential between the interviewer and the interviewee that may influence the manner in 
which the interviewee responds (Mays & Pope, 2000).  In this study the interviewees may 
have felt that they had to provide certain, “correct” answers.  To improve the 
comprehensiveness of the qualitative research the interviews were triangulated (Mays & 
Pope, 2000) by interviewing staff members from four levels of the agency: upper 
management, middle management, the Team Leader, and the front line staff.   
When analyzing the qualitative interviews, the methodology of dichotomizing 
whether the staff members reported the codes (i.e., reported or not reported) also 
represented a limitation.  This methodology alone is inadequate due to the fact it does not 
consider the quality or intensity of the statement but rather just that it was mentioned.  
Consequently, strict reliance on the percentage of staff members reporting a particular 
theme is not an appropriate method for determining what impacted the implementation.  
The researcher analyzed the data using a second method in which each transcript was 
read without the coding marked and a paragraph was written on the essence of each 
transcript.  The summary paragraphs from each transcript were combined to deduce the 
main conclusions of the study.  The concepts that emerged from this second methodology 
were combined with the conclusions produced by the percentage of staff members 
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reporting the themes in an effort to better ensure that the story of the implementation was 
well represented.   
 
Panzano and colleagues (2005) have found all phases of the decision and 
implementation process are important in influencing whether an EBP is successfully 
incorporated into everyday practice.  The current study focused on the implementation 
process.  Future research should continue to examine all phases of implementation 
including the decision to adopt the practice and the maintenance phase.  For instance, 
once high fidelity services are implemented, it is important to understand how to maintain 
high fidelity over time.   
Future Directions 
Additionally, the re-implementation of EBPs is an area that requires further 
research as fidelity to EBPs can decrease over time.  Studies that demonstrate how higher 
fidelity can be achieved from existing, low fidelity services would be beneficial to assist 
with quality improvement at mental health centers. 
Thirdly, implementation of EBPs, such as ACT, should continue to be examined 
in various settings and using both internal and external purveyor models.  The current 
study differed from the majority of previous implementation studies in that an internal 
purveyor model (i.e., the agency was not provided with outside assistance) was 
examined.  However, because ACT was not a novel practice being implemented at 
Thresholds, this familiarity with the service likely influenced the actions of the agency 
during implementation (e.g., no fidelity monitoring).  Given that the vast majority of 
agencies do not have access to external assistance, future research should continue to 
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examine barriers and facilitators to using an internal purveyor model in agencies where 
the practice being implemented is novel.   
The current study also attempted to employ a mixed-method approach to studying 
the process of implementation.  However, small sample sizes and substantial missing data 
limited the utility of the quantitative measures.  Given that quantitative measures are 
typically quicker and easier to administer, larger scale studies of implementation using a 
mixed-method approach are needed to examine whether quantitative measures can 
provide utility in assessing the process in addition to the outcome. 
While not an intended or expected focus of the study, the results found that 
demanding productivity standards greatly contributed to burnout.  Because line staff and 
those in management positions had a difference in opinion regarding whether the required 
number of direct service hours were reasonable, a study to determine the optimal 
productivity standard is warranted.  If agencies were aware of at what point does burnout 
begin, standards could be set that maximum performance while reducing burnout and 
staff turnover. 
Finally, studies are warranted to continue to examine the relationship between 
high fidelity ACT and consumer outcomes given that “usual care” changes over time 
(Fiander et al., 2003).  As McHugo and colleagues (1998) point out, many usual care 
services have begun to incorporate some principles of ACT.  In the present case study, 
CST is not an EBP but yet the teams have many components that are characteristic of 
ACT teams (e.g., team approach and regular staff meetings).  It is important to determine 
whether the efforts to implement high fidelity ACT services are justified in terms of 
improved consumer outcomes over ACT-like teams (e.g., the CST teams).  A comparison 
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of consumer outcomes for ACT and CST teams controlling for level of symptom severity 
would be contribute to this knowledge base.  Future research should also continue to 
examine which aspects of ACT are most related to improved consumer outcomes.  
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Table 1.  Comparison of ACT and CST Team Requirements under Rule 132 in Illinois 
 
ACT Team CST Team 
 
1:10 staff to persons served ratio 
 
 
1:18 staff to persons served ratio 
Serves narrower range of people (LOCUS >4), 
i.e., only consumers with the most severe 
symptomatology and severe impairments in 
functioning can be served by ACT 
Serves broader range of persons, i.e., intended 
to serve consumers with moderate 
symptomatology and moderate impairments in 
functioning but not restricted from serving 
consumers who would qualify for ACT based 
on LOCUS score 
 
Requires at least 6.0 FTE staff 
 
Requires at least 3.0 FTE staff 
 
Requires Licensed Team Leader 
 
Licensed Team Leader not required 
 
Requires M.D., R.N., on team 
 
M.D., R.N. not required on team 
 
Requires Consumer in recovery to be a staff 
member on the team 
 
Consumer in recovery preferred but not 
required to be a staff member on the team 
 
Requires Substance abuse specialist 
 
Substance abuse specialist not required 
 
Requires Rehabilitative/vocational specialist 
 
Rehabilitative/vocational specialist not required 
 
Requires 24/7 crisis intervention 
 
May use auxiliary crisis center 
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Table 2.  Comparison of What Constitutes Full ACT Compliance on the DACTS versus Rule 132 
Items DACTS Rule 132 
Small caseload: 1:10 or smaller 1:10 or smaller 
Team approach: 
At least 90% of consumers have 
contact with 1+ staff in 2-week 
period   
Frequency of 
team meetings: 
At least 4x weekly, review all 
consumers At least 4x weekly 
Team Leader 
provides services: 10hrs+ of direct service weekly 
Team Leader must be licensed 
clinician and have contact with 
consumers 
Continuity of 
staff:  Less than 20% turnover in past 2 yrs   
Staff capacity:  95% capacity over past 12 months   
Psychiatrist:  1.0 FTE per 100 consumers 10 hrs/wk for every 60 consumers 
Nurse:  2.0 FTE RN per 100 consumers 1 full-time registered nurse required 
SA specialist:  2.0 FTE per 100 consumers 
At least 1staff member shall have 
special SA training and/or 
experience treating clients with co-
occurring SA disorders 
Voc specialist: 
 1.0 FTE who works with SE 
program or 2.0 FTE per 100 
consumers 
At least 1 staff member has training 
in vocational rehabilitation 
*Sufficient 
staffing: Minimum of 10.0 FTE staff Minimum of 6.0 FTE staff 
Admission 
criteria: 
Actively recruits and uses explicit 
admission criteria 
Explicit eligibility criteria plus 
approval by DHS 
Intake rate: 6 or less per month for past 6 months   
Full responsibility 
for treatment: 
90% or more consumers receive all 
services from ACT team  
ACT team expected to provide an 
array of services 
Responsibility for 
crisis services: 
Consumers have direct access to cell 
phones or pager carried by staff 
Crisis services available 24/7 and 
provided by the team 
Responsibility for 
hospital 
admission: 
95% or more of admits have team 
involvement   
Responsibility for 
hospital 
discharge: 
95% or more of discharges have 
team involvement   
Time-unlimited 
services: 
5% graduation rate or less 
(excluding dropouts)   
Community-based 
services: 80%+ contacts out of office 75%+ contacts out of office 
No dropout 
policy: 5% annual dropout rate or less   
Assertive 
engagement: 
Well thought out strategies, uses 
street outreach and legal 
mechanisms   
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Intensity of 
service: 
Face-to-face minutes 120/wk/client 
minimum (average)   
Frequency of 
contact: 
Face-to-face contacts 4/wk/client 
minimum (average) 
Contacts 3/wk/client minimum 
(average) 
Work with 
support system: 
4+ contacts to support system per 
client per month   
Individualized SA 
treatment: 
Clients with SA disorders spend on 
average 24+ minutes/wk in formal tx   
Dual disorder 
treatment groups: 
50% consumers with DD attend 
group meetings monthly   
*Consumers on 
team: 
Employed as full-time clinicians 
with full professional status 
At least 1 staff member is also a 
consumer 
 
*These items were added after the DACTS was published and are not included in the 
calculation for DACTS scoring. 
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Table 3.  Internal Consistency Coefficients (Cronbach's Alpha) for the EBPAS 
 
      
 Requirements  Appeal Openness Divergence Total Score 
Time 1 (N=15) 0.97 0.69 0.88 0.72 0.85 
      
Time 2 (N=16) 0.91 0.88 0.82 0.81 0.80 
      
Average  0.94 0.78 0.85 0.76 0.82 
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Table 4.  Internal Consistency Coefficients (Cronbach's Alpha) for the National 
EBP Implementation Project Scales  
 
   
 Personal Feelings About ACT 
 Total Score (9 items) 
 
Personal support for ACT   
(4 items) 
 
Time 1 (N=11) 0.78 0.83 
   
 Workplace Aspects  
 Total Score (10 items) 
 
Agency-wide support for 
ACT (7 items) 
 
Time 1 (N=11) 0.95 0.95 
   
 Conditions  
 Total Score (5 items)  
 
Time 1 (N=11) 0.39  
   
Time 2 (N=16) 0.58  
   
Average 0.49   
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Table 5.  Internal Consistency Coefficients (Cronbach's alpha) for the MLQ Leadership 
Factors 
 
 
Staff Ratings of Middle Management Leaders 
 
 Time 1  Time 2   
Transformational Leadership    
   Inspirational Motivation .81, n=9 .90, n=13  
   Individual Consideration .77, n=8 .89, n=14  
   Intellectual Stimulation .94, n=9 .94, n=13  
   Idealized Influence (behavior) .93, n=9 .73, n=13  
   Idealized Influence (attributed) .91, n=9 .86, n=13  
Transactional Leadership    
   Contingent Reward .77, n=9 .85, n=11  
   Active Management-by-Exception .76, n=8 .93, n=13  
Passive/Avoidant Leadership    
   Laissez-Faire .81, n=9 .41, n=14  
   Passive Management-by-Exception .87, n=9 .85, n=13  
 
Staff Ratings of Team Leader 
 
 Time 1  Time 2  
Transformational Leadership    
   Inspirational Motivation .20, n=9 .91, n=12  
   Individual Consideration .75, n=9 .80, n=14  
   Intellectual Stimulation .84, n=9 .86, n=14  
   Idealized Influence (behavior) .89, n=9 .79, n=13  
   Idealized Influence (attributed) .58, n=9 .89, n=13  
Transactional Leadership    
   Contingent Reward .55, n=9 .87, n=10  
   Active Management-by-Exception .69, n=9 .85, n=13  
Passive/Avoidant Leadership    
   Laissez-Faire .74, n=9 .73, n=14  
   Passive Management-by-Exception .86, n=9 .90, n=14   
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Table 6.  Analysis Guide for Quantitative Measures 
Instruments Total Score 
Analyzed 
Subscales 
Analyzed 
Individual 
Items 
Analyzed 
DACTS X   
EBPAS X X  
MLQ  X  
ACT Feelings  X X 
Workplace Aspects   X X 
Conditions That Help or Hinder   X 
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Table 7. Comprehensive List of Initial Content Codes used to Code the Interviews 
  Barriers/ Dislikes Facilitators/ Likes 
 
1. Team Leader has to be licensed 1. Little or no change to services 
2. Nurse required on team 2. Commitment of upper management to ACT 
3. Have to provide all services/cannot refer out 3. Leadership/support of middle management 
4. Strict rule on staff vacancies 4. Leadership/support of Team Leader 
5. Pay grade difficult to attract/retain qualified 
staff 5. Leadership/support of teammates 
6. Inability to fit all in 8 hour day 6. *Support from DMH 
7. More paperwork 7. Good communication  
8. Cannot bill for travel 
8. Slow process of change/ Preparation began 
early 
9. Consumers influence: not home/do not want 
long visits/refuse services 9. Passage of time 
10. Pressure for billing 10. ACT model valued  
11. Perception job is in danger 11. Likes having specialized positions 
12. Decreased quality 12.* Lower caseload 
13. Lack of support/upper management does 
not understand demands of job 13. *Agency monitors fidelity 
14. DMH: No input from staff/do not 
understand demands  14. Trainings 
15. DMH: financial concerns 15. Higher quality/positive aspects of changes 
16. Staff turnover   
17. Too many changes at once   
18. ASO challenges/difficult process to 
authorize   
19. Staff Burnout   
20. Not enough referrals/intakes   
21. Not enough supervision   
22. Not enough training   
23. Difficult to learn new billing system   
24. Lack of communication    
25. ACT model requirements (e.g., weekend 
shifts)   
26. ACT model not flexible    
27. Clientele too severe   
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Note. Following the coding process, "Too Many Changes at Once" informed the identification of 
3 themes not listed in this table: “Ambiguity of Rule 132,” “Implementation Overload,” and 
“Conflicting Regulations from Funding Sources.”  "Lack of Communication" was broken down 
into “Ambiguity of Rule 132,” “Lack of Communication by Thresholds” (which did not emerge to 
the level of inclusion in the report), and “Lack of Guidance from DMH.”  The codes/themes that 
emerged from breaking these original codes down are used in the remaining tables and 
discussions.  *Indicates codes that were not reported to a level for inclusion in the report.   
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Table 8.  Qualitative Themes that Emerged in the Study 
 
 
Common to Environment or 
Implementation of Rule 132 in 
General 
Unique to ACT Implementation in 
Accordance with Rule 132 at 
Thresholds 
Barriers 
  -DMH Regulations Concerning ACT 
-Perceived Negative Impact of FFS -Negative Staff Attitudes re: ACT 
-Ambiguity of Rules 
-Lack of Guidance from DMH -Implementation Overload 
-Difficulties with ASO -Lack of Resources 
  -Staff Turnover 
  
 
-Misalignment of Requirements from   
 Funding Sources (unique to Homeless  
 Outreach team) 
 
Facilitators 
    
-Leadership 
 
-Management's Commitment to  
 Implementing ACT 
 
-Familiarity with Type of Service  
 being Implemented 
 
 -Positive Staff Attitude Regarding ACT  
 Model (unique to North ACT team) 
-Positive Staff Attitudes Regarding   
 Changes in General 
   
-Communication and Preparation for  
 Changes 
 
-Passage of Time (Time 2) 
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Table 9.  Barriers Common to the Three Teams and the Original Codes that Informed Them 
 
 
Common Barriers 
Negative Impact of FFS 
    -Inability to fit all in 8 hour day 
           -Cannot bill for travel 
           -More paperwork 
           -Consumers influence: not home/do not want long visits 
    -Pressure for billing/management priority is billing 
           -Perception management does not care/understand demands of job 
           -DMH: financial concerns (result in upper management pressure for billing) 
    -Perception job is in danger (in context of productivity standards and state   
     financial situation) 
    -Decreased quality 
    -Staff burnout 
  
Ambiguity of Rule 132 
     -Too many changes at once/doing too much at once 
     -Lack of communication 
  
Lack of guidance from DMH 
     -Lack of communication 
  
Difficulties with the managed care organization (“ASO”) 
     -ASO challenges/difficult process for service authorization 
     -Lack of communication 
             -Lack of guidance from DMH 
     -Staff burnout 
  
  
 
 
Note.  The higher level common barriers are bolded and the originally conceived codes that 
informed the interpretation are listed beneath.  The list of original codes used by the two raters can 
be found in Table 7. 
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Table 10.  Barriers Specific to ACT Implementation and the Original Codes that Informed Them 
 
ACT-Specific Barriers 
DMH Regulations 
     -Team Leader has to be licensed 
            -Staff turnover (particularly in key positions like Team Leader) 
                    -More paperwork (Homeless Outreach due to lack of Team  
                    Leader) 
                   -Not enough supervision (due to lack of Team Leader) 
                   -Burnout 
            -Pay grade difficult to attract/retain qualified staff 
     -Nurse required on the team 
             -Staff turnover 
             -Pay grade difficult to attract/retain qualified staff 
     -Strict rule on staff vacancies 
            -Staff turnover 
            -Pay grade difficult to attract/retain qualified staff 
     -Have to provide ALL services/cannot refer out 
            -Not enough training: higher skills 
                  -Decreased quality 
           -Lack of resources (e.g., time to develop groups, group therapy, training) 
                  -Decreased quality 
                  -Consumer influence: refuse services 
                           -Not enough referrals/intakes (Homeless Outreach team) 
  
Implementation Overload 
     -Too many changes at once/doing too much at once 
     -Lack of communication 
     -Staff burnout 
  
Negative Staff Attitudes regarding ACT Model 
     -Dislike model requirements (e.g., weekend shifts) 
     -Perceive that model is not flexible 
            -Decreased quality 
     -Dislikes working with SMI populations 
  
Conflicting Regulations of Funding Sources (Homeless Outreach) 
     -Too many changes at once/doing too much at once 
     -Lack of communication 
      -Not enough referrals/intakes 
  
 
Note.  The higher level ACT-specific barriers are bolded and the originally conceived codes that 
informed the interpretation are listed beneath.  The list of original codes used by the two raters 
can be found in Table 7. 
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Note.  Themes are bolded with the original codes that were used to inform them listed 
beneath.  The list of original codes used by the two raters can be found in Table 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11.  Facilitators and the Original Codes that Informed Them 
  Common Facilitators (Across all Teams) ACT-specific Facilitators 
Positive Staff Attitude regarding Rule 132 
 
Positive Staff Attitude regarding ACT   
       (unique to North ACT team) 
      
       -Higher quality of services/positive  
        aspects  of changes        -ACT model valued 
         -Benefit to specialized positions 
         -Higher quality (in relation to ACT) 
    
Leadership Upper Management Commitment to ACT 
     -Leadership/support from middle  
      management 
        
       -Upper management support/commitment   
        to ACT 
     -Leadership/support from Team Leader   
     -Leadership/support from teammates   
     -Good communication (in the context of  
      being able to voice opinions to leaders)   
    
Good Communication and Preparation 
   
     -Good communication (in the context of  
      being well-informed of the changes) 
   
     -Slow process of change/preparation began  
      early   
    
Familiarity with Services 
   
     -Little or no change to services   
    
Passage of Time (Time 2)   
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Table 12. Objective Changes as a Result of Fee-For-Service (FFS) 
  
Grant-based funding (Prior to Rule 132) FFS funding (established by Rule 132) 
Service agency negotiates yearly contract 
with DMH for services provided and 
receives monthly installments on contract 
1.  Service agencies have an annual contract 
with a maximum allowable amount (i.e., cap 
on reimbursement) 
2.  Practitioners must bill for specific service 
categories 
Staff members do not have productivity 
standards 
Practitioners must meet specific productivity 
standards for direct service provision 
 
For documentation purposes, all ACT 
services were coded in a single category, 
without distinction between types of 
services 
Services must be itemized for billing/ staff 
required to learn nuances of each code 
No strictly followed rule on when billing 
and notes are due 
Billing and notes must be completed within 72 
hours 
Can bill for travel time if consumer's 
possessions (e.g., medications) are in the 
car 
Cannot bill for travel/ reimbursement limited to 
time spent with consumer 
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Table 13.  ACT Fidelity Across Teams and Time Periods 
 
 
 
Time 1 
 
 
Human 
Resources 
Organizational 
Boundaries 
Nature of 
Services 
Total Fidelity 
Score 
 
North ACT 4.45 4.57 3.90 4.29 
Homeless Outreach 4.09 4.14 3.50 3.89 
CST 3.45 3.57 3.20 3.39 
 
 
Time 2 
 
 
Human 
Resources 
Organizational 
Boundaries 
Nature of 
Services 
Total Fidelity 
Score 
 
North ACT 4.73 4.71 4.00 4.46 
Homeless Outreach 3.82 3.71 3.30 3.61 
CST 3.45 3.71 3.40 3.50 
     
Note.  ACT fidelity ranges from 1 to 5, with scores of 4.0 and above indicating high fidelity to 
the model. 
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Table 14.  EBPAS Mean Scores Across Teams and Time Periods 
 
 
 
 
 
Requirements 
Mean (SD) 
Appeal      
Mean (SD) 
Openness  
Mean (SD) 
Divergence 
Mean (SD) 
Total Score 
Mean (SD) 
Time 1 
North ACT, N=6 2.5 (1.1) 2.7 (0.6) 2.4 (1.0) 2.0 (0.9) 2.4 (0.5) 
Homeless Outreach, N=5 2.6 (1.1) 3.0 (0.7) 2.7 (0.6) 2.8 (0.8) 2.8 (0.6) 
CST, N=4 3.0 (0.3) 3.3 (0.4) 2.8 (0.5) 3.0 (0.4) 3.0 (0.3) 
Time 2 
North ACT, N=5 2.9 (0.6) 2.9 (0.2) 2.2 (0.5) 2.1 (0.8) 2.5 (0.6) 
Homeless Outreach, N=6 2.8 (1.0) 2.7 (0.9) 2.7 (0.7) 3.0 (0.9) 2.8 (0.5) 
CST, N=5 2.7 (0.7) 3.2 (0.8) 2.9 (0.7) 2.2 (0.7) 2.7 (0.6) 
      
Note. The 15 EBPAS items are rated from 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a very great extent), with higher scores indicating more 
positive attitudes toward EBPs and manualized treatments in general. 
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Table 15.  Comparison of the Two Teams that Attempted ACT Implementation on the ACT 
Feelings Scale at Time 1 
 
Item 
North ACT, 
N=6, Mean 
(SD) 
Homeless 
Outreach, N=5, 
Mean (SD) 
 
1.  Understand the ACT model 3.3 (0.8) 4.4 (0.6) 
2.  ACT provides significant advantage 2.5 (1.2) 2.6 (0.9) 
3.  Personally committed to implementation 3.5 (0.8) 4.0 (0.7) 
4.  Motivated to implement ACT 3.8 (0.4) 4.0 (0.7) 
5.  ACT is consistent with personal philosophy 3.2 (1.0) 4.0 (0.7) 
6.  ACT is consistent with services at workplace 3.2 (0.8) 3.4 (1.3) 
7.  ACT required significant change in daily practice 3.2 (1.2) 2.2 (1.1) 
8.  ACT required significant change in care provided 2.7 (1.0) 1.8 (0.5) 
9.  Important that ACT is based on research 3.3 (1.0) 3.4 (1.5) 
 
Personal Feelings Subscale (items 2, 3, 4, 5) 3.3 (0.7) 3.7 (0.7) 
   
Note.  The ACT Feelings scale items are rated from 1 to 5 with higher scores generally 
indicating more positive attitude toward the ACT model and implementation.  Items 7 and 8 
assess degree of change to their daily practice and care provided to the consumers as a result 
of implementing ACT.  Therefore, higher scores on these two items suggest a greater level of 
change was required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
200 
 
 
 
Table 16.  Comparison of the North ACT Team's Ratings on the ACT Feelings Scale over 
Time 
 
Item 
Time 1, N=6, 
Mean (SD) 
Time 2, N=5, 
Mean (SD) 
 
1.  Understand the ACT model 3.3 (0.8) 3.6 (0.6) 
2.  ACT provides significant advantage 2.5 (1.2) 3.0 (0.7) 
3.  Personally committed to implementation 3.5 (0.8) 3.8 (0.8) 
4.  Motivated to implement ACT 3.8 (0.4) 3.8 (0.5) 
5.  ACT is consistent with personal philosophy 3.2 (1.0) 4.2 (0.5) 
6.  ACT is consistent with services at workplace 3.2 (0.8) 4.2 (0.8) 
7.  ACT required significant change in daily practice 3.2 (1.2) 3.4 (1.1) 
8.  ACT required significant change in care provided  2.7 (1.0) 3.0 (0.7) 
9.  Important that ACT is based on research 3.3 (1.0) 3.6 (0.9) 
 
Personal Feelings Subscale (items 2, 3, 4, 5) 3.3 (0.7) 3.7 (0.4) 
   
Note.  The ACT Feelings scale items are rated from 1 to 5 with higher scores generally 
indicating more positive attitude toward the ACT model and implementation.  However, items 
7 and 8 assess degree of change to their daily practice and care provided to the consumers as a 
result of implementing ACT.  Higher scores on these two items suggest a greater level of 
change was required. 
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Table 17.  Comparison of the Two Teams that Attempted ACT Implementation on the 
Workplace Aspects Scale at Time 1 
 
Item 
North ACT, 
N=6, Mean 
(SD) 
Homeless 
Outreach, 
N=5, Mean 
(SD) 
 
1.  The agency is committed to implementing ACT 3.8 (1.0) 3.8 (0.8) 
2.  Upper management is supportive of implementing ACT 3.7 (1.2) 3.8 (0.8) 
3.  My supervisor is supportive of implementing ACT 4.0 (1.1) 4.2 (0.5) 
4.  My colleagues support implementing ACT 3.5 (1.2) 3.4 (1.1) 
5.  I support implementing ACT 4.0 (0.6) 4.0 (0.7) 
6.  There is enough support to maintain implementation 3.3 (0.8) 3.0 (1.2) 
7.  There is consensus to continue providing ACT 3.5 (0.8) 3.0 (1.2) 
8.  People are committed to practicing ACT 3.5 (0.8) 3.2 (0.8) 
9.  It has been easy to implement ACT 2.5 (1.2) 2.0 (0.0) 
10.  ACT provides a greater benefit to consumers 3.2 (1.5) 2.4 (1.1) 
 
Agency-wide Support for ACT Subscale  
(items 1-4 and 6-8) 3.6 (0.9) 3.5 (0.9) 
Note.  The Workplace Aspects scale items are rated from 1 to 5 with higher scores indicating a 
more positive outcome. 
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Table 18.  Comparison of the North ACT Team's Ratings on the Workplace Aspects Scale over 
Time 
 
Item 
Time 1, N=6, 
Mean (SD) 
Time 2, N=5, 
Mean (SD) 
 
1.  The agency is committed to implementing ACT 3.8 (1.0) 4.2 (0.5) 
2.  Upper management is supportive of implementing ACT 3.7 (1.2) 3.8 (0.5) 
3.  My supervisor is supportive of implementing ACT 4.0 (1.1) 4.2 (0.5) 
4.  My colleagues support implementing ACT 3.5 (1.2) 4.2 (0.5) 
5.  I support implementing ACT 4.0 (0.6) 3.6 (0.6) 
6.  There is enough support to maintain implementation 3.3 (0.8) 4.0 (0.7) 
7.  There is consensus to continue providing ACT 3.5 (0.8) 4.2 (0.5) 
8.  People are committed to practicing ACT 3.5 (0.8) 4.2 (0.5) 
9.  It has been easy to implement ACT 2.5 (1.2) 2.4 (0.6) 
10.  ACT provides a greater benefit to consumers 3.2 (1.5) 3.4 (0.6) 
 
Agency-wide Support for ACT Subscale 
(items 1-4 and 6-8) 3.6 (0.9) 4.1 (0.3) 
Note.  The Workplace Aspects scale items are rated from 1 to 5 with higher scores indicating a 
more positive outcome. 
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Table 19. Ratings on the Conditions Scale over Time by Team 
 
      
 
North ACT 
 
Homeless Outreach 
 
CST 
Item 
Time 1, 
N=6, Mean 
(SD) 
Time 2, 
N=5, Mean 
(SD) 
 
Time 1, 
N=5, Mean 
(SD) 
Time 2, 
N=6, Mean 
(SD) 
 
Time 1, 
N=4, Mean 
(SD) 
Time 2, 
N=5, Mean 
(SD) 
 
1.  Training and supervision are adequate   2.8 (1.3) 2.2 (1.1) 
 
2.6 (1.3) 4.0 (0.6) 
 
4.3 (0.5) 4.6 (0.6) 
2.  Funding mechanisms support the service 3.0 (0.9) 2.6 (1.1) 
 
2.4 (1.5) 3.3 (1.2) 
 
3.3 (1.0) 2.4 (1.1) 
3.  Staff are given feedback on consumer outcomes 2.5 (0.8) 3.2 (0.8) 
 
1.6 (0.6) 3.3 (1.5) 
 
3.3 (1.5) 2.8 (1.3) 
4.  Staff are skeptical regarding the added value  3.0 (0.6) 2.8 (0.5) 
 
3.6 (1.1) 3.0 (0.9) 
 
1.7 (1.0) 3.0 (1.0) 
5.  There is intense work pressure on staff  3.5 (1.5) 3.6 (1.5) 
 
3.6 (1.1) 3.8 (1.0) 
 
4.2 (1.0) 3.6 (1.7) 
         
Note.  The Conditions scale items are rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) with higher scores on items 1, 2, and 3 indicating a 
factor that facilitates the service.  However, higher scores on items 4 and 5 suggest factors that may hinder the practice of the service.  The type 
of service refers to ACT for the North ACT team at both time points, ACT for the Homeless Outreach team at Time 1, but CST at Time 2, and 
CST at both time points for the CST team.   
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Table 20.  Leadership Classification of Individuals Rated With the MLQ and Outcomes of Leadership at Time 1 
 
 North ACT  Homeless Outreach  CST 
 
Team 
Leader 
Middle 
Management, 
N=3, Mean 
(SD)  
Team 
Leader, 
N=5, Mean 
(SD) 
Middle 
Management, 
N=3, Mean 
(SD)  
Team 
Leader 
Middle 
Management, 
N=3, Mean 
(SD) 
 
Transformational Leadership ----- 3.1 (0.4)  2.4 (0.5) 2.3 (1.3)  ----- 3.5 (0.4) 
     Inspirational Motivation ----- 2.8 (0.1)  2.6 (0.4) 2.7 (1.0)  ----- 3.4 (0.6) 
     Intellectual Stimulation ----- 3.1 (1.0)  2.2 (0.9) 2.2 (1.2)  ----- 3.2 (0.8) 
     Individualized Consideration ----- 3.3 (0.7)  2.2 (0.8) 2.1 (1.3)  ----- 3.8 (0.3) 
     Idealized Attributes ----- 3.1 (0.5)  2.5 (0.7) 2.2 (1.2)  ----- 3.7 (0.1) 
     Idealized Behaviors ----- 3.1 (0.6)  2.5 (0.5) 2.3 (1.6)  ----- 3.4 (0.6) 
         
Transactional Leadership ----- 2.5 (0.3)  2.8 (0.4) 2.3 (0.8)  ----- 2.9 (1.0) 
     Contingent Reward ----- 3.3 (0.7)  3.1 (0.5) 2.5 (1.1)  ----- 3.9 (0.1) 
     Management-by-Exception (Active) ----- 1.8 (0.3)  2.5 (0.7) 2.0 (0.7)  ----- 1.8 (1.9) 
         
Passive/Avoidant Leadership ----- 1.4 (1.0)  .53 (0.1) .25 (0.3)  ----- .08 (0.1) 
     Management-by-Exception (Passive) ----- 1.4 (1.3)  .75 (0.2) .25 (0.3)  ----- .17 (0.3) 
     Laissez-Faire ----- 1.3 (0.8)  .30 (0.3) .25 (0.4)  ----- 0 (.00) 
         
Outcomes of Leadership         
     Effectiveness ----- 2.6 (0.6)  2.8 (0.3) 2.6 (1.4)  ----- 3.8 (0.3) 
     Satisfaction ----- 2.8 (0.3)  2.9 (0.4) 3.0 (1.0)  ----- 3.8 (0.3) 
     Extra Effort ----- 2.4 (0.5)   2.2 (0.6) 2.2 (1.8)   ----- 3.1 (0.7) 
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Note.  The MLQ is 45 items rated on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (frequently, if not always).  The Program Manager (i.e., middle management) 
was the same individual for the North ACT and CST teams.  Substantial missing data prohibited the calculation of Team Leader ratings for the 
North ACT and CST teams.  The Team Leader ratings for the Homeless Outreach team were based on interactions with the Program Manager 
who was the acting Team Leader at Time 1, while middle management ratings were based on interactions with the West Regional Manager. 
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Table 21.  Leadership Classification of Individuals Rated With the MLQ and Outcomes of Leadership at Time 2 
 
 North ACT  Homeless Outreach  CST 
 
Team 
Leader, 
N=4, Mean 
(SD) 
Middle 
Management, 
N=4, Mean 
(SD)  
Team 
Leader, 
N=6, Mean 
(SD) 
Middle 
Management, 
N=6, Mean 
(SD)  
Team 
Leader, 
N=4, Mean 
(SD) 
Middle 
Management, 
N=4, Mean 
(SD) 
 
Transformational Leadership 3.0 (0.4) 2.6 (0.8)  2.2 (1.0) 2.3 (1.0)  3.3 (0.6) 3.6 (0.3) 
     Inspirational Motivation 3.3 (0.3) 2.8 (0.9)  2.2 (1.3) 2.5 (1.1)  3.3 (0.7) 3.1 (0.9) 
     Intellectual Stimulation 2.8 (0.2) 2.4 (1.0)  2.2 (1.0) 2.1 (1.2)  3.3 (1.0) 3.8 (0.2) 
     Individualized Consideration 2.6 (0.7) 2.6 (1.2)  2.0 (0.9) 2.1 (1.1)  3.3 (1.0) 3.9 (0.1) 
     Idealized Attributes 3.2 (0.7) 2.9 (0.6)  2.2 (0.8) 2.8 (0.9)  3.3 (1.0) 3.6 (0.3) 
     Idealized Behaviors 3.1 (0.7) 2.4 (0.4)  2.2 (1.2) 2.3 (1.1)  3.1 (0.3) 3.4 (0.1) 
         
Transactional Leadership 2.8 (0.3) 2.7 (0.4)  1.5 (0.7) 2.1 (0.7)  2.7 (0.6) 2.0 (0.4) 
     Contingent Reward 3.2 (0.4) 2.8 (0.1)  2.3 (1.1) 2.8 (0.8)  3.7 (0.5) 3.7 (0.5) 
     Management-by-Exception (Active) 2.4 (0.4) 2.5 (0.8)  .75 (0.6) 1.3 (1.1)  1.7 (1.6) .25 (0.4) 
         
Passive/Avoidant Leadership 1.0 (1.1) 1.2 (1.0)  .65 (0.9) .58 (0.6)  .25 (0.1) .16 (0.2) 
     Management-by-Exception (Passive) 1.1 (1.3) 1.4 (1.3)  .75 (1.1) .79 (0.8)  .38 (0.3) .31 (0.4) 
     Laissez-Faire .94 (.1.0) .94 (0.8)  .54 (0.8) .38 (0.4)  .13 (0.1) 0 (0.0) 
         
Outcomes of Leadership         
     Effectiveness 3.2 (0.4) 2.7 (0.7)  2.6 (0.6) 2.6 (0.6)  3.4 (0.8) 3.8 (0.4) 
     Satisfaction 2.9 (0.6) 3.3 (0.9)  3.1 (0.5) 3.1 (0.6)  3.4 (1.3) 4.0 (0.0) 
     Extra Effort 2.9 (0.8) 2.7 (0.6)   2.0 (0.9) 2.4 (1.0)   2.8 (1.4) 3.7 (0.5) 
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Note.  The MLQ is 45 items rated on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (frequently, if not always).  The Program Manager (i.e., middle management) 
was the same individual for the North ACT and CST teams. 
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Table 22.  Perceived Barriers and Negative Factors across Teams at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
 
Time 1 
 
Time 2 
 
North ACT  
Homeless 
Outreach  CST Team  Management 
 
North ACT  
Homeless 
Outreach  CST Team  Management  
Codes 
Team 
Members 
(N=6) 
Team 
Members 
(N=4) 
Team 
Members 
(N=4) 
Middle/Upper 
(N=2) 
 
Team 
Members 
(N=5) 
Team 
Members 
(N=3) 
Team 
Members 
(N=2) 
Middle/Upper 
(N=2) 
 
Inability to fit all in 8 hr day 5 (83%) 4 (100%) 3 (75%) 0 
 
5 (100%) 2 (67%) 2 (100%) 0 
More paperwork 3 (50%) 3 (75%) 2 (50%) 2 (100%) 
 
3 (60%) 2 (67%) 1 (50%) 2 (100%) 
Can't bill for travel 1 (17%) 2 (50%) 1 (25%) 1 (50%) 
 
0 0 0 0 
Pressure for billing 4 (67%) 3 (75%) 3 (75%) 1 (50%) 
 
4 (80%) 2 (67%) 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 
Perception job is in danger 1 (17%) 1 (25%) 2 (50%) 0 
 
3 (60%) 2 (67%) 1 (50%) 2 (100%) 
Decreased quality 3 (50%) 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 1 (50%) 
 
3 (60%) 1 (33%) 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 
Upper management not 
understanding of demands  5 (83%) 2 (50%) 1 (25%) 0 
 
3 (60%) 1 (33%) 0 1 (50%) 
Ambiguity of Rule 132 3 (50%) 1 (25%) 3 (75%) 2 (100%) 
 
2 (40%) 1 (33%) 0 1 (50%) 
Implementation overload 1 (17%) 2 (50%) 0 1 (50%) 
 
0 0 0 2 (100%) 
ASO/ Authorization process 1 (17%) 1 (25%) 0 1 (50%) 
 
1 (20%) 0 0 2 (100%) 
Burnout 2 (33%) 2 (50%) 1 (25%) 1 (50%) 
 
5 (100%) 2 (67%) 1 (50%) 2 (100%) 
No training on higher skills 1 (17%) 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 1 (50%) 
 
1 (20%) 0 0 0 
No training on ACT model 1 (17%) 0 N/A 0 
 
1 (20%) N/A N/A 1 (50%) 
Team Leader has to be 
licensed  2 (33%) 4 (100%) N/A 2 (100%) 
 
0 N/A N/A 1 (50%) 
Nurse required on team 2 (33%) 0 N/A 1 (50%) 
 
0 N/A N/A 1 (50%) 
Strict rules on staff vacancies  1 (17%) 0 N/A 2 (100%) 
 
0 N/A N/A 2 (100%) 
Provide all services 4 (67%) 3 (75%) N/A 2 (100%) 
 
2 (40%) N/A N/A 2 (100%) 
Pay grade low to attract 
qualified staff 2 (33%) 3 (75%) N/A 2 (100%) 
 
1 (20%) N/A N/A 2 (100%) 
Lack of resources 4 (67%) 2 (50%) 0 1 (50%) 
 
3 (60%) 0 0 2 (100%) 
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Staff turnover 4 (67%) 4 (100%) 0 2 (100%) 
 
5 (100%) 1 (33%) 0 2 (100%) 
Not enough supervision 0 3 (75%) 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
Not enough referrals/New 
clients 0 3 (75%) 0 2 (100%) 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 
Conflicting regulations from 
funding sources N/A 2 (50%) N/A 2 (100%) 
 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
DMH: No input from staff/ 
Do not understand demands 3 (50%) 3 (75%) 0 1 (50%) 
 
1 (20%) 0 0 1 (50%) 
DMH: Financial concerns 2 (33%) 0 0 2 (100%) 
 
3 (60%) 2 (67%) 0 2 (100%) 
DMH: Lack of guidance on 
Rule 132 2 (33%) 0 0 1 (50%) 
 
1 (20%) 0 0 1 (50%) 
ACT job requirements (e.g., 
weekend shifts) 0 1 (25%) N/A 1 (50%) 
 
0 N/A N/A 0 
Clientele too Severe 0 1 (25%) N/A 0 
 
0 N/A N/A 0 
ACT model not Flexible (e.g., 
mandated # of visits, alternate 
who sees consumers) 3 (50%) 1 (25%) N/A 1 (50%) 
 
2 (40%) N/A N/A 0 
 
Note.  "Team Members" refers to line staff and Team Leaders.  The West Program Manager who was acting Team Leader for the Homeless Outreach team at 
Time 1 is represented under "Management."  At Time 2, two of the staff on the North ACT team were hired after the Time 1 interviews.  Additionally, the 
Homeless Outreach team was providing CST services at Time 2 and had a new Team Leader who is included in the analyses. 
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Table 23.  Comparison of Line Staff and those in Leadership Positions on Barriers and Perceived 
Negative Factors at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
 
Time 1 
 
Time 2 
Codes 
Line Staff 
(N=12) 
Leaders 
(N=4) 
 
Line Staff 
(N=7) 
 Leaders 
(N=5) 
 
Inability to fit all in an 8 hr day 10 (83%) 2 (50%) 
 
6 (86%) 3 (60%) 
More paperwork 7 (58%) 3 (75%) 
 
4 (57%) 4 (80%) 
Can't bill for travel 3 (25%) 2 (50%) 
 
0 0 
Pressure for billing 8 (67%) 3 (75%) 
 
5 (71%) 5 (100%) 
Perception job is in danger 4 (33%) 0 
 
4 (57%) 4 (80%) 
Decreased quality 7 (58%) 1 (25%) 
 
5 (71%) 1 (20%) 
Upper mgmt. not understanding  7 (58%) 1 (25%) 
 
3 (43%) 2 (40%) 
Ambiguity of Rule 132 5 (42%) 4 (100%) 
 
0 3 (60%) 
Implementation overload 3 (25%) 1 (25%) 
 
0 2 (40%) 
ASO/ Authorization process 1 (8%) 2 (50%) 
 
0 3 (60%) 
Burnout 4 (33%) 2 (50%) 
 
5 (71%) 3 (60%) 
No training on higher skills 5 (42%) 1 (25%) 
 
1 (14%) 0 
No training on ACT model** 1 (8%) 0 
 
1 (14%) 1 (20%) 
Team Leader has to be licensed** 5 (42%) 3 (75%) 
 
0 1 (20%) 
Nurse required on team** 1 (8%) 2 (50%) 
 
0 1 (20%) 
Strict rules on staff vacancies** 0 3 (75%) 
 
0 2 (40%) 
Provide all services** 7 (58%) 2 (50%) 
 
2 (29%) 2 (40%) 
Pay grade low to attract qualified staff 3 (25%) 3 (75%) 
 
1 (14%) 3 (60%) 
Lack of resources 4 (33%) 2 (50%) 
 
2 (29%) 3 (60%) 
Staff turnover 7 (58%) 3 (75%) 
 
5 (71%) 3 (60%) 
Not enough supervision 3 (25%) 0 
 
0 0 
Not enough referrals/New clients 3 (25%) 2 (50%) 
 
0 0 
Conflicting rules from funding sources 2 (17%) 2 (50%) 
 
N/A N/A 
DMH: No input from staff 5 (42%) 2 (50%) 
 
0 2 (40%) 
DMH: Financial concerns 1 (8%) 3 (75%) 
 
3 (43%) 4 (80%) 
DMH: Lack of guidance on Rule 132 1 (8%) 2 (50%) 
 
0 1 (20%) 
ACT job requirements** 1 (8%) 1 (25%) 
 
0 0 
Clientele too Severe 1 (8%) 0 
 
0 0 
ACT model not Flexible** 3 (25%) 2 (50%)   2 (29%) 0 
 
Note.  "Leaders" refers to those staff members who are in leadership positions and includes Team 
Leaders, middle management (e.g., Program Managers and Assistant Program Managers), and 
upper management (i.e., Clinical Director).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
**Indicates themes that are specific to ACT.  At Time 1 there were 9 line staff and 3 individuals 
from management who were involved with an ACT team, while 4 line staff and 3 of management 
were involved with ACT at Time 2.
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Table 24.  Perceived Facilitators and Positive Factors across Teams at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
 
Time 1 
 
Time 2 
 
North 
ACT  
Homeless 
Outreach  
CST  
Team  Management  
 
North 
ACT  
Homeless 
Outreach  
CST  
Team  Management  
Codes 
Team 
Members 
(N=6) 
Team 
Members 
(N=4) 
Team 
Members 
(N=4) 
Middle/Upper 
(N=2) 
 
Team 
Members 
(N=5) 
Team 
Members 
(N=3) 
Team 
Members 
(N=2) 
Middle/Upper 
(N=2) 
 
Familiarity with services 4 (67%) 4 (100%) 4 (100%) 2 (100%) 
 
3 (60%) 3 (100%) 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 
Positive aspects of changes  3 (50%) 1 (25%) 3 (75%) 2 (100%) 
 
1 (20%) 2 (67%) 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 
Values ACT model  6 (100%) 0 N/A 2 (100%) 
 
4 (80%) N/A N/A 1 (50%) 
Leadership from Team Leader 5 (83%) 1 (25%) 3 (75%) 0 
 
5 (100%) 3 (100%) 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 
Leadership from teammates 4 (67%) 1 (25%) 3 (75%) 0 
 
5 (100%) 1 (33%) 2 (100%) 0 
Leadership from middle mgmt. 5 (83%) 1 (25%) 4 (100%) 2 (100%) 
 
5 (100%) 3 (100%) 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 
Upper mgmt. committed to ACT 4 (67%) 2 (50%) N/A 2 (100%) 
 
5 (100%) N/A N/A 2 (100%) 
Communication re: changes 4 (67%) 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 2 (100%) 
 
0 0 1 (50%) 0 
Began preparations early 3 (50%) 1 (25%) 2 (50%) 2 (100%) 
 
1 (20%) 0 1 (50%) 0 
Passage of time/practice 0 0 2 (50%) 0 
 
2 (40%) 0 2 (100%) 1 (50%) 
 
Note.  "Team Members" refers to line staff and Team Leaders.  The West Program Manager who was acting Team Leader for the Homeless 
Outreach team at Time 1 is represented under "Management."  At Time 2, two of the staff on the North ACT team were hired after the Time 1 
interviews.  Additionally, the Homeless Outreach team was providing CST services at Time 2 and had a new Team Leader who is included in the 
analyses as well. 
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Table 25.  Comparison of Line Staff and those in Leadership Positions on Facilitators and Positive 
Factors at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
 
Time 1 
 
Time 2 
Codes 
Line Staff 
(N=12) 
Leaders 
(N=4) 
 
Line Staff 
(N=7) 
Leaders 
(N=5) 
 
Familiarity with services 11 (92%) 3 (75%) 
 
6 (86%) 4 (80%) 
Positive aspects of changes  5 (42%) 4 (100%) 
 
3 (43%) 4 (80%) 
Values ACT model**  5 (42%) 3 (75%) 
 
3 (43%) 2 (40%) 
Leadership from Team Leader 7 (58%) 2 (50%) 
 
7 (100%) 5 (100%) 
Leadership from teammates 6 (50%) 3 (75%) 
 
6 (86%) 2 (40%) 
Leadership from middle mgmt. 8 (67%) 4 (100%) 
 
7 (100%) 5 (100%) 
Upper mgmt. committed to ACT** 5 (42%) 3 (75%) 
 
4 (57%) 3 (60%) 
Communication from agency re: changes 6 (50%) 4 (100%) 
 
0 1 (25%) 
Began preparations early 5 (42%) 3 (75%) 
 
2 (29%) 0 
Passage of time/practice 1 (8%) 1 (25%)   2 (29%) 3 (60%) 
 
Note.  "Leaders" refers to those in leadership positions and includes Team Leaders, middle 
management (e.g., Program Managers and Assistant Program Managers), and upper management 
(i.e., Clinical Director).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
**Indicates themes that are specific to ACT.  At Time 1 there were 9 line staff and 3 individuals 
from management who were involved with an ACT team, while 4 line staff and 3 of management 
were involved with ACT at Time 2. 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized Factors that Influence ACT Implementation 
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Figure 2.  Organizational Positions Related to the Service Delivery Teams Represented in the 
Study 
 
Note.  The Clinical Director managed 5 Regional Managers, who themselves managed various 
programs in addition to overseeing the Bridge Programs in that region (e.g., housing).
Chief Executive Officer 
(not interviewed) 
Line Staff (interviewed) 
Team Leaders (interviewed) 
Clinical Director 
(interviewed) 
Regional Managers                     
(not interviewed) 
Bridge Program 
Managers/Asst. Program 
Managers (interviewed) 
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Appendix A.  Evidence-Based Practice Attitudes Scale (EBPAS) 
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The following questions ask about your feelings about using new types of therapy, 
interventions, or treatments.  Manualized therapy, treatment, or intervention refers to any 
intervention that has specific guidelines and/or components that are outlined in a manual 
and/or that are to be followed in a structured or predetermined way. Indicate the extent to 
which you agree with each item using the following scale: 
0 1 2 3 4 
Not at 
All 
To a Slight 
Extent 
To a Moderate 
Extent 
To a Great 
Extent 
To a Very Great 
Extent 
Item Subscale Question 
1. 3 I like to use new types of therapy/interventions to help my clients. 
2. 3 I am willing to try new types of therapy/interventions even if I have to follow a treatment manual. 
3. 4 I know better than academic researchers how to care for my clients. 
4. 3 I am willing to use new and different types of therapy/interventions developed by researchers. 
5. 4 Research based treatments/interventions are not clinically useful. 
6. 4 Clinical experience is more important than using manualized therapy/interventions. 
7. 4 I would not use manualized therapy/interventions. 
8. 3 I would try a new therapy/intervention even if it were very different from what I am used to doing. 
  
For questions 9–15: If you received training in a therapy or 
intervention that was new to you, how likely would you be to adopt it 
if: 
9. 2 it was intuitively appealing? 
10. 2 it “made sense” to you? 
11. 1 it was required by your supervisor? 
12. 1 it was required by your agency? 
13. 1 it was required by your state? 
14. 2 it was being used by colleagues who were happy with it? 
15. 2 you felt you had enough training to use it correctly? 
 
Note: Subscale 1 = Requirements; 2 = Appeal; 3 = Openness; 4 = Divergence 
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Appendix B.  National EBP Implementation Project Scales 
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“How I feel personally about ACT”  
 
Circle the number that expresses how you feel about each statement:  
 
1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= unsure, 4= agree, 5= strongly agree 
 
1. I understand the ACT model completely:                             1     2     3     4     5 
 
2. ACT provided me with a significant advantage  
    over what we were previously providing:                             1    2     3     4     5 
 
3. I am committed to the implementation:                                1    2     3     4     5 
 
4. I am motivated to implement ACT:                                      1     2     3     4     5 
 
5. ACT is consistent with my philosophy and  
    mission of care:                                                                     1    2     3     4     5 
 
6. The methods and techniques of ACT are consistent with      1     2     3    4     5 
    the general mode of providing services at my workplace 
 
 
7. Implementing ACT has required significant change 
    in my daily practice:                                                              1     2     3     4     5 
 
8. Implementing ACT has required me to make a great 
    deal of change in how I provided consumer care:                1     2     3     4     5 
 
9. It is important to me that ACT is based on  
    scientific research:                                                                1     2     3     4     5 
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“Aspects of Implementing ACT in my Workplace”  
 
Circle the number that expresses how you feel about each statement:  
 
1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= unsure, 4= agree, 5= strongly agree 
 
1. The agency is committed to implementing ACT                  1     2     3     4     5 
 
2.  Upper management is supportive of implementing ACT     1     2     3     4     5 
 
3. My supervisor is supportive of implementing ACT               1     2     3     4     5 
 
4. My colleagues generally support implementing ACT            1     2     3     4     5 
 
5. I support implementing ACT                                                  1     2     3     4     5 
 
6. There is enough support for ACT to help  
    maintain implementation                                                        1     2     3     4     5  
 
7. There is consensus to continue providing ACT                      1     2     3     4     5 
 
8. People are committed to practicing ACT                                1     2     3     4     5 
 
9. It has been easy to implement ACT                                        1     2     3     4     5 
 
10. Since implementing ACT I have noticed greater                  1    2     3     4     5 
    benefits for the consumer 
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“Conditions that Can Help or Hinder the Implementation of a Practice” (modified to 
read ACT or CST instead of EBP) 
 
Circle the number that expresses how you feel about each statement:  
 
1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= unsure, 4= agree, 5= strongly agree 
 
 
1. Training and supervision are adequate to allow me 
    to feel competent in providing ACT services                                1     2     3     4     5 
 
2. Funding mechanisms support ACT                                               1     2     3     4     5 
 
3. Staff are given feedback about consumer outcomes  
    to inform whether ACT is an improvement                                   1     2     3     4     5 
 
4. Staff are skeptical about the added value of ACT                         1     2     3     4     5 
 
5. There is intense work pressure on staff carrying out ACT            1     2     3     4     5 
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Appendix C.  Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire 
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Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) Rater Form (5x-Short) 
 
 
Not at all      Once in a while      Sometimes      Fairly often      Frequently, if not always 
 
      0                        1                         2                       3                          4 
 
THE PERSON I AM RATING… 
 
1. Provides me with assistance in exchange for my efforts…………….0   1   2   3   4 
10.  Instills pride in me for being associated with him/her………………0   1   2   3   4 
 
24.  Keeps track of all mistakes………………………………………….0   1   2   3   4 
 
28.  Avoids making decisions……………………………………………0   1   2   3   4 
 
44.  Increases my willingness to try harder……………………………...0   1   2   3   4 
 
 
Note.  The MLQ consists of 45 items.  Due to copyrighting only a subset of 5 items could 
be included here. 
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